Vlt Corp. v. Lambda Electronics, Inc.

238 F. Supp. 2d 347, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195, 2003 WL 76091
District Court, D. Massachusetts·Decided January 3, 2003·No. 1:01-cv-10957·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

*349 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SARIS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs VLT Corporation and Vicor Corporation (collectively “Vicor”) bring this patent infringement action against Lambda Electronics, Inc. (“Lambda”), claiming that Lambda’s power converters literally infringe Claims 1 and 5 of Vicor’s U.S. Patent No. Re. 36,098 (“the ’098 patent”). This complicated technology is examined in VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 130 F.Supp.2d 178 (D.Mass.2001) (“Unitrode ”), and the Memorandum and Order in VLT, Inc. v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 00-cv-11049-PBS (D.Mass. October 18, 2001) (“Lucent ”). Familiarity with these opinions is assumed.

Claim 1 of the ’098 patent reads:

In a single ended forward converter in which energy is transferred from a primary to a secondary winding of a transformer during the ON period of a primary switch, circuitry for recycling the magnetizing energy stored in said transformer to reset it during the OFF period of said primary switch, comprising:
a storage capacitor;
an auxiliary switch connected in series with said storage capacitor;
a switch control circuit operating said auxiliary switch in accordance with a control logic such that (a) said auxiliary switch is opened prior the ON period [sic] of said primary switch, (b) said auxiliary switch remains open throughout the ON period of said primary switch, (c) said auxiliary switch is closed after the ON period of said primary switch.

Lambda seeks a construction of two terms in Claim 1, both of which are central to plaintiffs infringement case. These terms are (1) “recycling the magnetizing energy stored in said transformer to reset it” and (2) “single ended forward converter.” Defendants Artesyn and Lucent, accused of infringing in related cases, join in these arguments. After extensive briefing, 1 I adopt Lambda’s claim construction with respect to the first item, but not the second.

A. The Standard for Claim Construction

The starting point in claim construction is the language of the claim itself, which sets forth the scope of the claimed invention unless the written description requires a contrary reading. See Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics, 215 F.3d 1281, 1287 (Fed.Cir.2000). “Preamble language in a claim may provide an indication of how an inventor intended to ‘carry out’ his invention.” Id. at n. 1. The Federal Circuit has emphasized that it indulges a “heavy presumption” that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning, which may be determined by reviewing a variety of sources, including the claims themselves, other intrinsic evidence such as the written description and the prosecution history, as well as dictionaries and treatises. Teleflex Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2002) (“Teleflex ”) (citations omitted). The ordinary meaning of a claim must be determined “from the standpoint of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art.” Id.

*350 “The use of extrinsic evidence to construe the scope of a claim is improper where the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term does not render the claim unclear and where the patentee has not chosen to be his own lexicographer.” Northern Telecom Ltd., 215 F.3d at 1288. Extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony, may be used where the intrinsic evidence cannot resolve ambiguities in the claim language. While the Court may rely on expert testimony to understand the technology and the ordinary meaning of terms to practitioners of the art, expert testimony may not be used to contradict claim language or the specification. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583-84 (Fed.Cir.1996).

Caselaw is a bit schizophrenic on the relationship between the claim language and the specification of a patent, particularly as it concerns embodiments of an invention. Lambda relies on one line of cases, which narrows claim constructions as a result of statements in the specification. See SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, 242 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed.Cir.2001) (holding that the characterization of a configuration in the specification as part of the “present invention” is “strong evidence that the claims should not be read to encompass the opposite structure.”); Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed.Cir.1998) (holding that “claims may be no broader than the supporting disclosure, and therefore that a narrow disclosure will limit claim breadth”); Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1382-83 (Fed.Cir.1999) (construing the claim to cover only the embodiment disclosed in the specification); Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed.Cir.1996) (when the “preferred embodiment” is described as the invention itself, the claims are not entitled to a broader scope than that embodiment).

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Vlt Corp. v. Lambda Electronics, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 347, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195, 2003 WL 76091 (D. Mass. 2003).

238 F. Supp. 2d 347 (Vlt Corp. v. Lambda Electronics, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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