Virginian Railway Co. v. Underwood

146 S.E. 277, 152 Va. 264, 1929 Va. LEXIS 168
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedJanuary 17, 1929
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 146 S.E. 277 (Virginian Railway Co. v. Underwood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Virginian Railway Co. v. Underwood, 146 S.E. 277, 152 Va. 264, 1929 Va. LEXIS 168 (Va. 1929).

Opinion

Campbell, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This action was brought by notice of motion by the personal representative of Leatha Underwood, deceased, to recover damages for the death of his intestate, caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant railway company. The basis of recovery is set forth in the notice of motion from which we make the following extract:

“That prior to the construction of your railway, the public highway in Charlotte county, Virginia, about two miles southwest of Phenix, ran some three to five hundred feet northeast of the point at which the highway, as it now exists, and as changed by you and your predecessors, the Tidewater Railway Company, crosses your right of way and the tracks of an overhead bridge, and was perfectly safe and convenient, there being no railway then existing to be crossed at grade overhead or underneath.

“That on or about the........day of..........., 19. ., at said point on your right of way in Charlotte county, Virginia, and about two miles southwest of Phenix, you or your predecessor, the Tidewater Railway Company, to whose rights, privileges, franchises and duties you succeeded, with the consent of the Board of Supervisors of Charlotte county, obtained as above set out, changed the location of the public highway — - [267]*267which formerly ran near and at the point of the location of the said overhead bridge perfectly straight from a point from three to five hundred feet northeast of said overhead bridge to a point from three to five hundred feet southeast of said bridge across your proposed right of way — whereby the highway as changed by you runs in a westerly direction from a point about four hundred and fifty feet northeast of said bridge, and then at a point within about twenty feet of said bridge makes an abrupt turn, almost at right angles, crossing your right of way and tracks on an overhead bridge or crossing, at which point there is a deep cut made by your roadbed sixty feet below the bottom of said bridge or crossing, so that by reason of said change in the highway aforesaid, and the deep cut and overhead crossing constructed by you without taking ordinary precautions or providing any warning, guard rails, mounds or any other protection, or obstruction at the approaches to said bridge, and especially at the northern end of said bridge, you created an extremely dangerous and hazardous situation, which theretofore had not existed, and it thereupon became and was your duty, to do, construct and operate said crossing so as not to impair, impede, or obstruct such highway, and to operate such crossing by permanent and proper structures and fixtures and control the same by such customary and approved appliances and regulations as would best secure the safe passage and transportation of persons and property over and along such crossing.

“That on or about the 6th day of September, 1926, the plaintiff’s intestate was travelling along the highway, from Phenix on the way towards Lynchburg, traveling in the rear seat of a five passenger Chevrolet automobile, about midnight, towards Brookneal, which [268]*268is in a northerly direction from said crossing; that the plaintiff’s intestate was being driven by one D. E. Rakes, who was a careful, experienced, and skillful driver; that neither the plaintiff’s intestate nor the said D. E. Rakes was familiar with the road at that point; and that driving over said highway as aforesaid, the plaintiff’s intestate, and the said D. E. Rakes approached said crossing shortly after midnight on the day aforesaid, at which time it was dark and the road was obscured by such darkness, and at which time the said Rakes was driving said car at a moderate rate of speed, using all proper care and precaution to stay in said highway, and was using great care and caution, and driving slowly and carefully; that the lights upon said car were on and giving their usual light; that when said plaintiff’s intestate and D. E. Rakes approached said bridge at its northeastern end, that is, from the Phenix side, and just before reaching said abrupt turn within a few feet of said bridge, the lights of said car, shining straight ahead, with nothing in the range covered but open and cleared space, all of which indicated that the road continued straight; that as a result of the negligence of the defendant aforesaid, the plaintiff’s intestate and the said Rakes failed to see that the said highway turned abruptly towards the south, almost at right angles, within a few feet of the end of said bridge, and the car was driven straight ahead and to the right side or northerly end of said bridge, on your right of way, and before the plaintiff’s intestate or the said Rakes became aware of the dangerous turn in said road, or could see that they were off the county highway, the plaintiff’s intestate and the said D. E. Rakes and the car in which they were driving, were precipitated from the top of the embankment at the northerly end of said bridge, over into [269]*269said out and to the bottom of your roadbed, a distance of approximately sixty feet, and as a consequence thereof as the car violently struck the rails and cross ties, the plaintiff’s intestate was instantly killed.”

Upon the trial of the case a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the trial court entered judgment thereon and to that judgment this writ of error was awarded. Before stating the facts of the case we will dispose of the contention of the defendant that the burden of maintaining the crossing was upon the highway authorities and not upon the defendant. Section 3886 of the Code which provides for the construction of highways over a railroad contains the following language: ‘‘ When the crossing is constructed above the track of said railroad the approaches and structures shall be safe, convenient and substantial, and when the crossing is constructed beneath said tracks the said county road and all necessary drains and ditches shall be put in good permanent condition, and the structures supporting the tracks of the railroad shall be safe, permanent and substantial. * * * * *. After said crossing has been constructed the corporation whose track or work is to be crossed shall maintain the same.”

In 3 Elliott on Railroads (3d ed.) page 1575, it is said:

“The railway company must erect and maintian such structures as are reasonably necessary to enable travelers to get on, off, and over the crossing in safety. * * *. And where the construction of the railroad caused a cut or fill in the highway so as to make it dangerous for travel unless protected, it will be the duty of the company to erect proper guard rails to keep travelers from falling into the cut or off the embankment. Barriers or guard rails in a proper case are [270]*270regarded as areasonable part of the necessary restoration of the highway to a favorable condition of travel.”

Passing upon this identical question in Virginian Railway Co. v. Farr, 147 Va. 217, 136 S. E. 668, West, J., said:

“In the instant case, the county road is thirty, and the traveled portion thereof twenty feet wide. The company dug a cut across the road ninety-eight feet wide and twenty-two feet deep, over which it built a bridge only eighteen feet wide. The road was on the company’s right of way' for more than seventy feet from the bridge, and approached the bridge nearly at grade. The company’s right of way on each side of the road was level and free from bushes and weeds.

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Bluebook (online)
146 S.E. 277, 152 Va. 264, 1929 Va. LEXIS 168, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/virginian-railway-co-v-underwood-va-1929.