Virginian Limestone Corp. v. Commissioner

26 T.C. 553, 1956 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 159
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedJune 14, 1956
DocketDocket No. 51766
StatusPublished
Cited by37 cases

This text of 26 T.C. 553 (Virginian Limestone Corp. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Virginian Limestone Corp. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 553, 1956 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 159 (tax 1956).

Opinion

OPINION.

Pierce, Judge:

The controversy here is basically one as to the proper construction and application of those provisions of the 1939 Code, as amended,2 which control the rates of percentage depletion for petitioner’s product.

The petitioner’s position is that, when Congress provided in section 114 (b) (4) (A) (ii) that the allowance for depletion “shall be * * * in the case of dolomite * * * 10 per centum * ⅜ * of the gross income from the property during the taxable year,” it intended the term “dolomite” to mean and designate a particular class of natural rock which is commonly known by that name; that the rock here involved was of such class; and hence, that percentage depletion should be allowed in respect of all of petitioner’s rock at the uniform rate of 10 per cent, irrespective of the end-uses to which the rock products were put by customers.

The respondent’s position, on the other hand, is that the intent of Congress, in amending section 114 (b) (4) (A) in a manner that extended the benefits of percentage depletion to additional nonmetallic minerals, was to equalize the depletion rates among minerals that compete with one another; that there are no “definite lines of demarcation on the basis of chemical analysis between dolomite, stone, calcium carbonates, and metallurgical grade limestone”; and, hence, that the end-use test is necessary to facilitate administration of the statute, and to attain what respondent believes to have been the objectives of Congress. As regards the specific rates to be applied, respondent stated in his brief as follows:

In order to promote a uniform and equitable administration of section 114 (b) (4) (A), supra, as it applies to a rock consisting essentially of a mixture of calcium carbonate and magnesium carbonate [which would include dolomite], the mined mineral should be classified as follows:
(a) If it is used or sold for use as flux in a metallurgical process, it will be classified as “metallurgical grade limestone”. This definition would include the sales [of petitioner] in the amount of $10,535.14 to the Electro Metallurgical Company, which would qualify for 15% depletion.
(b) If it is used or sold for use as insulating and fireproofing material, as a refractory or calcined to make a dolomitic lime or plaster or dead burned to make a refractory, it will be classified as “dolomite”. Petitioner’s stone was not so used.
(c) If it is used or sold as a soil conditioner, it will be classified as calcium and magnesium carbonates. This definition would include the sales in the amount of $10,364.40 made by petitioner for use in agriculture.
(d) If it is used or sold for use as crushed rock, riprap, dimension stone, or similar purposes where the physical character and not the chemical composition is a major requirement, it will be classified as “stone”.

It should be observed that the present positions of both the petitioner and the respondent, as above set forth, are different from their original positions. Petititoner, on its return, claimed a 15 per cent rate of percentage depletion on all its rock; but it now contends that such rate should be 10 per cent. Respondent, in his notice of deficiency, allowed a rate of 10 per cent on the rock sold to Electro Metallurgical Company, and allowed 5 per cent on all other rock sold; but he now suggests a rate of 15 per cent for the rock sold to the Metallurgical Company, a rate of 10 per cent for the rock used for agricultural purposes, and a rate of 5 per cent on the remainder.

/.

At the outset of our consideration, it should be pointed out that we have hereinabove found, as a fact, that all of the rock which petitioner quarried and sold in 1951 was dolomite, within the commonly understood commercial meaning of that term. Also, we have found, as a fact, that the term “dolomite,” as used with reference to rock, is a term of specific designation, which has reference to a particular class of sedimentary rock that is rich in magnesium carbonate; whereas “stone” and “limestone” are terms of more general classification, and may refer to rocks which contain little or no magnesium carbonate. These findings of fact are based on our consideration of all the evidence, including the testimony of expert witnesses presented by petitioner, who had outstanding qualifications and long experience in classifying rocks.3

The respondent presented no testimony respecting the character of petitioner’s rock. In his brief, he neither affirmed nor denied that such rock was dolomite; but rather, he referred to it only in general terms, such as, “a rock consisting essentially of a mixture of calcium carbonate and magnesium carbonate.”

We resolve the first question in favor of the petitioner. The rock involved is dolomite.

II.

We turn now to the second question: Under the applicable statute, what rate or rates of percentage depletion are allowable in respect of the dolomite which petitioner quarried and sold in 1951 %

Section 23 of the 1939 Code provides that in computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:

(m) Depletion. — In the ease of mines, oil and gas wells, other natural deposits, and timber, a reasonable allowance for depletion * * *
For percentage depletion allowable under this subsection, see section 114 (b), (3) and (4).

Section 114 (b) (4), as amended by section 319 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1951, provides:

(A) * * * The allowance for depletion under section 23 (m) in the case of the following mines and other natural deposits shall be—
*******
(ii) in the case of * * * dolomite * * * 10 per centum
*******
of the gross income from the property during the taxable year * * *

The statute does not define “dolomite” or any of the other minerals mentioned therein; but the meaning which Congress intended to attach to them is shown by the legislative history. Such history may be resorted to as an aid to construction, when the meaning of the words of a statute are doubtful. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lederer, 252 U. S. 523. The Senate Finance Committee, which added the provisions now contained in paragraphs (i), (ii),and (iii) of section 114 (b) (4) (A), stated in its report: “The names of all the various enumerated minerals are of course intended to have their commonly understood commercial meaning.”4 Also the Conference Report to the House, made after said provisions had been agreed upon in conference, said:

Under the conference agreement calcium carbonates are granted an allowance of 10 percent, while marble, which is a calcium carbonate, receives 6 percent.

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Bluebook (online)
26 T.C. 553, 1956 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 159, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/virginian-limestone-corp-v-commissioner-tax-1956.