Pannell, Judge.
In September, 1967, one Charlie Susie Bell acquired property from Mr. Jack Morgan and a Mr. G. Byron Davis, described by security deed inter alia, as 503 Briscoe Street, City of Covington, Newton County, Georgia. Coincidentally, a three-year fire insurance policy was issued by Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., through the same Mr. Davis, the vice-president of the Bank of Mansfield, who also engaged in the insurance business. That policy described the property as being issued "on the frame, approved roof, one family dwelling, located corner of Briscoe Street and Cannon Street, Covington, Georgia.” The property was subsequently deeded in 1969 by the Bank to Owen Price as purchaser at foreclosure sale, after the death of Charlie Susie Bell. The security deed given by Price again showed the street address as 503 Briscoe Street. Mr. Davis appraised the house for the bank loan purposes "right at $6,000.” Following Mr. Davis’ retirement from the Bank, and also from his insurance business, a Mr. M. O. Campbell became the Cashier of the Bank. He also engaged in the insurance business, but as a broker. In late March, Mr. Campbell made application to the Steele-Prescott Agency for "renewal” of the fire insurance on Mr. Price’s property, utilizing a copy of the expired Fireman’s Fund [446]*446policy. Mr. Campbell struck the name Charlie Susie Bell as the name of the insured and wrote the name "Owen Price” thereunder. He also wrote in black ink across the face of the application beneath the description of the insured property the words, "Please renew one year name of Owen Price.” Mr. Price relied on the Bank and Mr. Campbell to handle his fire insurance matters, except for a small policy which Mr. Price personally had undertaken to obtain from another insurance company, payable to himself and the Bank. Mr. Steele, a partner in the insurance agency for appellant, stated that when the policy application was received from Mr. Campbell it contained the number "4109” written in blue ink under the name "Owen Price.” Housing numbers had recently been changed in Covington, but prior to the writing of the insurance policy here concerned, and considerable confusion existed as to the old and new numbers. For example, Mr. Price’s new house number 4145 on Briscoe was the same as the old number on the house at the new 4109 Cannon Street. Mr. Steele assumed, perhaps after a telephone call, that the blue ink number, 4109, written on the policy when received from the Bank, represented the number of the house to be insured. He drove to the intersection of Briscoe and Cannon and found a house facing Cannon and adjacent to the intersection with Briscoe Street with that number, but with no name on the mailbox. There was no house number on Price’s Briscoe Street house, nor was there a name on the mailbox. Without inquiry of area residents, Mr. Steele took a picture of the residence at 4109 Cannon Street and departed. A Virginia Mutual policy was thereafter prepared for typing by a Mrs. Gassaway in the insurance agency’s office, by adding the effective date of the policy, "April 1, 1971,” striking part of the old description reading "corner Briscoe Street and,” penning the number "4109” below the description to reflect that the new policy would read as it did, "located at 4109 Cannon Street, Covington, Georgia.” The original policy was mailed to the bank and a copy mailed to Mr. Price at the Cannon Street address. The latter copy was not received. On receipt of the original policy by the bank, it was removed from the envelope and placed in Mr. Price’s file [447]*447against the security deed or other bank records, which properly reflected the Briscoe Street address. No check for accuracy was made. The policy remained filed until after the fire about one year later. Shortly after issuance of the policy by appellant’s agent, Mr. Campbell was killed during a bank robbery. A few weeks after the fire the bank notified the insurance agency of the loss and asked for payment of the face value of the policy. Virginia Mutual declined payment, and tendered premium plus interest. No evidence of the value of the house at the time of the fire, or the cost of repair to the burned interior was introduced at trial.
Suit was instituted by Owen Price, as owner, and the Bank of Mansfield, as mortgagee, for "specific performance” of a fire insurance policy issued by defendant, Virginia Mutual Insurance Company, which involved a loss to a house owned by Price under mortgage to the Bank, but where the insurance policy sued on described other real property not owned by the plaintiffs which did not burn. A similar suit by the plaintiffs against the defendant agent Steele was, at the conclusion of the evidence, subject to a motion for a directed verdict, which the court granted. A similar motion by Virginia Mutual was overruled by the court. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs in the amount sued for, plus $1,500 for "bad faith” and $2,500 "for legal fees.” Thereafter, Virginia Mutual filed a motion in the alternative for judgment n.o.v., or for a new trial. Both motions were overruled and appellant filed its appeal. Held:
We think that this case is governed by our decision in Parris & Son v. Campbell, 128 Ga. App. 165 (196 SE2d 334). There, plaintiff purchased his various coverages of insurance through Parris & Son, a local agent for United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. Included, was a three year homeowner’s policy for theft coverage, with recovery on any one designated item limited to $1,000. During the period of coverage, the company successfully applied to the Insurance Commissioner which limited recovery to $500 in the aggregate for such losses and approved a new form for use. Upon expiration of the policy, the new policy on the new form was sent by mail, received by [448]*448plaintiff and placed still sealed in a filing cabinet with other policies. A subsequent burglary resulted in claim for valuables in the amount of $3,000, but the company offered a reduced amount based on the new policy. Motions for summary judgment were denied and appellants appealed pursuant to a certificate of review. In reversing, this court held at pp. 172, 173: "That the plaintiff-insured was under a duty to examine his policy and ascertain for himself what coverage he had is well settled. [Citations omitted.] It appears that the plaintiff received the policy in the mail and kept it without opening the envelope for something like nine months. Thus, he made no effort, until after the loss, to determine what his coverage under the policy was. He was charged by law with knowledge of the coverage [Citations omitted.] The insured was not only free to examine the contract, he was under a duty to do so, and if he had done that he would have observed just what coverage it provided to him. If it was not what he wished to have he could have renegotiated his contract, or, if the company was unwilling to do that, he could have returned it as unacceptable and negotiated a contract with another company. . . '[I]f. . . the policy issued [was] essentially different from the one that the plaintiff desired, the remedy of the plaintiff would have been to reject, when tendered, the policy as written. [Citations omitted.]’ Mitchiner v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 185 Ga. 194, 197 (194 SE 530).” For the same reasons, the appellee-Bank of Mansfield cannot recover and that judgment must be reversed.
As to appellee Price, the copy of the fire insurance policy concerned was mailed to him at the wrong address and no presumption of delivery arises from such mailing. Laughinghouse v. First of Ga. Ins. Co., 123 Ga. App. 189, 190 (179 SE2d 675).
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Pannell, Judge.
In September, 1967, one Charlie Susie Bell acquired property from Mr. Jack Morgan and a Mr. G. Byron Davis, described by security deed inter alia, as 503 Briscoe Street, City of Covington, Newton County, Georgia. Coincidentally, a three-year fire insurance policy was issued by Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., through the same Mr. Davis, the vice-president of the Bank of Mansfield, who also engaged in the insurance business. That policy described the property as being issued "on the frame, approved roof, one family dwelling, located corner of Briscoe Street and Cannon Street, Covington, Georgia.” The property was subsequently deeded in 1969 by the Bank to Owen Price as purchaser at foreclosure sale, after the death of Charlie Susie Bell. The security deed given by Price again showed the street address as 503 Briscoe Street. Mr. Davis appraised the house for the bank loan purposes "right at $6,000.” Following Mr. Davis’ retirement from the Bank, and also from his insurance business, a Mr. M. O. Campbell became the Cashier of the Bank. He also engaged in the insurance business, but as a broker. In late March, Mr. Campbell made application to the Steele-Prescott Agency for "renewal” of the fire insurance on Mr. Price’s property, utilizing a copy of the expired Fireman’s Fund [446]*446policy. Mr. Campbell struck the name Charlie Susie Bell as the name of the insured and wrote the name "Owen Price” thereunder. He also wrote in black ink across the face of the application beneath the description of the insured property the words, "Please renew one year name of Owen Price.” Mr. Price relied on the Bank and Mr. Campbell to handle his fire insurance matters, except for a small policy which Mr. Price personally had undertaken to obtain from another insurance company, payable to himself and the Bank. Mr. Steele, a partner in the insurance agency for appellant, stated that when the policy application was received from Mr. Campbell it contained the number "4109” written in blue ink under the name "Owen Price.” Housing numbers had recently been changed in Covington, but prior to the writing of the insurance policy here concerned, and considerable confusion existed as to the old and new numbers. For example, Mr. Price’s new house number 4145 on Briscoe was the same as the old number on the house at the new 4109 Cannon Street. Mr. Steele assumed, perhaps after a telephone call, that the blue ink number, 4109, written on the policy when received from the Bank, represented the number of the house to be insured. He drove to the intersection of Briscoe and Cannon and found a house facing Cannon and adjacent to the intersection with Briscoe Street with that number, but with no name on the mailbox. There was no house number on Price’s Briscoe Street house, nor was there a name on the mailbox. Without inquiry of area residents, Mr. Steele took a picture of the residence at 4109 Cannon Street and departed. A Virginia Mutual policy was thereafter prepared for typing by a Mrs. Gassaway in the insurance agency’s office, by adding the effective date of the policy, "April 1, 1971,” striking part of the old description reading "corner Briscoe Street and,” penning the number "4109” below the description to reflect that the new policy would read as it did, "located at 4109 Cannon Street, Covington, Georgia.” The original policy was mailed to the bank and a copy mailed to Mr. Price at the Cannon Street address. The latter copy was not received. On receipt of the original policy by the bank, it was removed from the envelope and placed in Mr. Price’s file [447]*447against the security deed or other bank records, which properly reflected the Briscoe Street address. No check for accuracy was made. The policy remained filed until after the fire about one year later. Shortly after issuance of the policy by appellant’s agent, Mr. Campbell was killed during a bank robbery. A few weeks after the fire the bank notified the insurance agency of the loss and asked for payment of the face value of the policy. Virginia Mutual declined payment, and tendered premium plus interest. No evidence of the value of the house at the time of the fire, or the cost of repair to the burned interior was introduced at trial.
Suit was instituted by Owen Price, as owner, and the Bank of Mansfield, as mortgagee, for "specific performance” of a fire insurance policy issued by defendant, Virginia Mutual Insurance Company, which involved a loss to a house owned by Price under mortgage to the Bank, but where the insurance policy sued on described other real property not owned by the plaintiffs which did not burn. A similar suit by the plaintiffs against the defendant agent Steele was, at the conclusion of the evidence, subject to a motion for a directed verdict, which the court granted. A similar motion by Virginia Mutual was overruled by the court. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs in the amount sued for, plus $1,500 for "bad faith” and $2,500 "for legal fees.” Thereafter, Virginia Mutual filed a motion in the alternative for judgment n.o.v., or for a new trial. Both motions were overruled and appellant filed its appeal. Held:
We think that this case is governed by our decision in Parris & Son v. Campbell, 128 Ga. App. 165 (196 SE2d 334). There, plaintiff purchased his various coverages of insurance through Parris & Son, a local agent for United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. Included, was a three year homeowner’s policy for theft coverage, with recovery on any one designated item limited to $1,000. During the period of coverage, the company successfully applied to the Insurance Commissioner which limited recovery to $500 in the aggregate for such losses and approved a new form for use. Upon expiration of the policy, the new policy on the new form was sent by mail, received by [448]*448plaintiff and placed still sealed in a filing cabinet with other policies. A subsequent burglary resulted in claim for valuables in the amount of $3,000, but the company offered a reduced amount based on the new policy. Motions for summary judgment were denied and appellants appealed pursuant to a certificate of review. In reversing, this court held at pp. 172, 173: "That the plaintiff-insured was under a duty to examine his policy and ascertain for himself what coverage he had is well settled. [Citations omitted.] It appears that the plaintiff received the policy in the mail and kept it without opening the envelope for something like nine months. Thus, he made no effort, until after the loss, to determine what his coverage under the policy was. He was charged by law with knowledge of the coverage [Citations omitted.] The insured was not only free to examine the contract, he was under a duty to do so, and if he had done that he would have observed just what coverage it provided to him. If it was not what he wished to have he could have renegotiated his contract, or, if the company was unwilling to do that, he could have returned it as unacceptable and negotiated a contract with another company. . . '[I]f. . . the policy issued [was] essentially different from the one that the plaintiff desired, the remedy of the plaintiff would have been to reject, when tendered, the policy as written. [Citations omitted.]’ Mitchiner v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 185 Ga. 194, 197 (194 SE 530).” For the same reasons, the appellee-Bank of Mansfield cannot recover and that judgment must be reversed.
As to appellee Price, the copy of the fire insurance policy concerned was mailed to him at the wrong address and no presumption of delivery arises from such mailing. Laughinghouse v. First of Ga. Ins. Co., 123 Ga. App. 189, 190 (179 SE2d 675). His right to recover, therefore, is dependent on the absence of a principal-agent relationship with the Bank. The record reflects that from the time Price bought the house, that he relied on the late Mr. Campbell, as Cashier of the Bank, to handle all the business and that he "didn’t go anywhere to take out insurance.” It is also evident from the record that Price never checked on his insurance. He purchased the house [449]*449from the Bank in February, 1969, but the old insurance policy was not transferred to his name. Further, on its expiration in September, 1970, the property remained uninsured by the bank until April 1, 1971, when Mr. Campbell undertook to "renew” it for one year. We hold in the case sub judice, that the bank was Mr. Price’s agent in this connection and that their delicts are chargeable to him. His right to recover, if any, was against the bank. The judgment as to Mr. Price also requires reversal.
Argued January 11, 1974
Decided June 25, 1974
Rehearing denied July 18, 1974
Hansell, Post, Brandon & Borsey, Hugh E. Wright, for appellant.
Ballard & Thigpen, W. B. Ballard, George W. Griffeth, for appellees.
Judgment reversed.
Bell, C. J., Eberhardt, P. J., Quillian and Clark, JJ., concur. Been, Evans, Stolz and Webb, JJ., dissent.