Violetta Rosales v. Elevate PFS Holdings, Inc.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: June 23, 2026
• Docket: 4:26-cv-01728
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 VIOLETTA ROSALES, Case No. 26-cv-01728-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 11 10 ELEVATE PFS HOLDINGS, INC., 11 Defendant.

12 13 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to remand. Dkt. No. 11 (“Mot.”); Dkt. No. 14 12 (“Opp.”); Dkt. No. 13 (“Reply”). The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition 15 without oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons 16 discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff Violetta Rosales filed this putative class action against Defendant Elevate PFS 19 Holdings, Inc. in Alameda County Superior Court on January 22, 2026. See Dkt. No 1-1, Ex. A 20 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “engaged in a pattern of wage and hour violations,” 21 and brings claims for (1) failure to pay minimum and overtime wages; (2) failure to provide meal 22 periods; (3) failure to permit rest periods; (4) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; 23 (5) failure to pay all wages due during employment and upon separation of employment; and (6) 24 unfair and unlawful business practices. Id. ¶¶ 2, 32–83. 25 Defendant removed to federal court in February 2026. See Dkt. No. 1 (“Notice of 26 Removal”). Defendant cites the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), as the 27 basis for this Court’s jurisdiction, and argues that CAFA jurisdiction is present because, based on 1 326 class members); (2) minimal diversity is present because Plaintiff is a California citizen and 2 Defendant is not; and (3) the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 (and is estimated to be 3 $15,227,779.60). Notice of Removal ¶¶ 14–50. 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 A defendant may remove any civil action to federal court where the district court would 6 have original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441; see also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 7 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). To do so, a party seeking removal must file a notice of removal within 8 30 days of receiving the initial pleading or within 30 days of receiving “an amended pleading, 9 motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or 10 has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), (3). The notice must contain a “short and plain 11 statement of the grounds for removal.” Id. § 1446(a); see also Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 12 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 2015). 13 CAFA vests the district courts with original jurisdiction over civil actions in which the 14 amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, there is minimal diversity of citizenship between the 15 parties, and the action involves at least 100 class members. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Under CAFA, 16 “the claims of the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in 17 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000.” Id. § 1332(d)(6). The removing party bears 18 the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction, even in a case removed pursuant to CAFA. 19 Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683–85 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[U]nder CAFA the 20 burden of establishing removal jurisdiction remains, as before, on the proponent of federal 21 jurisdiction.”). 22 A plaintiff may seek to remand a case to the state court from which it was removed if the 23 district court lacks jurisdiction or if there was a defect in the removal procedure. See 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1447(c). However, there is no anti-removal presumption in cases invoking CAFA. Dart 25 Cherokee Basin Operating, Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). 26 III. DISCUSSION 27 Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to establish that amount in controversy exceeds 1 $15,227,779.60, including attorneys’ fees, Notice of Removal ¶ 50, Plaintiff argues that 2 “Defendant’s amount in controversy consists of wholly unsubstantiated and plainly unreasonable 3 assumptions and violation rates [that] lack support in evidence or in the Complaint,” Mot. at 3. 4 The Ninth Circuit has “defined the amount in controversy as the amount at stake in the 5 underlying litigation.” Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 6 2016) (quotation omitted). In other words, the amount in controversy “is simply an estimate of the 7 total amount in dispute, not a prospective assessment of defendant’s liability.” Lewis v. Verizon 8 Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010). “In that sense, the amount in controversy 9 reflects the maximum recovery the plaintiff could reasonably recover.” Arias v. Residence Inn by 10 Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original); see also Chavez v. JPMorgan 11 Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the amount in controversy is the 12 amount “at stake” in the litigation at the time of removal, “whatever the likelihood that [the 13 plaintiff] will actually recover [it]”). 14 “[A] defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the 15 amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart, 574 U.S. at 89; see also Arias, 16 936 F.3d at 925 (affirming that “a notice of removal ‘need not contain evidentiary submissions’” 17 (quotation omitted)). If the plaintiff contests those allegations in a motion to remand, however, 18 “the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy 19 requirement has been satisfied.” Dart, 574 U.S. at 88. The preponderance of the evidence 20 standard means the “defendant must provide evidence establishing that it is ‘more likely than not’” 21 that the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 22 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted). In assessing whether the amount in controversy 23 is “more likely than not” satisfied, courts may consider not only the facts alleged in the complaint, 24 taken as true for purposes of calculating the amount, but also “summary-judgment-type evidence 25 relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 26 Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). 27 While “[a] defendant need not make the plaintiff’s case for it or prove the amount in 1 2020), a defendant may not establish federal jurisdiction “by mere speculation and conjecture, 2 with unreasonable assumptions.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197. Further, where a defendant relies on a 3 chain of reasoning that includes assumptions to satisfy its burden of proof, “those assumptions 4 cannot be pulled from thin air [and] need some reasonable ground underlying them.” Id. at 1199. 5 Those assumptions “can be founded on the allegations of the complaint and do not necessarily 6 need to be supported by evidence.” Perez v. Rose Hills Co., 131 F.4th 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2025) 7 (quotation omitted). And “an assumption is not unreasonable simply because another equally 8 valid assumption may exist.” Id. at 809. 9 The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff’s complaint does not specify an amount in 10 controversy on its face, so the Court considers each of the estimates provided in Defendant’s 11 notice of removal. 12 a. Unpaid Wages 13 For Plaintiff’s first cause of action, Defendant estimates that the amount in controversy is 14 $2,914,099.20 for failure to pay minimum wages and $874,229.76 for failure to pay overtime 15 wages. Notice of Removal ¶¶ 35–39. In its notice of removal, Defendant assumed that (1) each 16 employee “worked five hours of straight time for which they were not paid per pay period”; (2) 17 “there are at least 326 putative class members who were non-exempt, hourly employees and who 18 collectively worked a total of approximately 23,808 work weeks from January 22, 2022, to 19 present, equating to approximately 11,904 combined pay periods”; and (3) “Defendant’s non- 20 exempt hourly employees generally earned an average of approximately $24.48 per hour during 21 the class period.” Id. ¶¶ 33–34, 36. Defendant also assumed that each employee worked one hour 22 of unpaid overtime per pay period and should have been paid one-and-a-half times the regular rate 23 of pay for each such hour. Id. at 38–39. 24 First, as Plaintiff notes, Defendant assumed five hours of unpaid wages and one hour of 25 unpaid overtime per pay period, but then multiplied those values by the number of work weeks. 26 See Mot. at 6. Under its stated assumptions, the amount in controversy should have been 27 $1,457,049.60 for failure to pay minimum wages (5 hours per pay period * 11,904 pay periods * 1 11,904 pay periods *$24.48 per hour * 1.5 overtime multiplier).1 2 Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendant improperly assumed that class members were not 3 paid the “entire average hourly rate of pay,” despite the fact that Plaintiff’s claims allege that 4 Defendant failed to pay some non-zero difference between the amount paid and “the correct 5 regular rate of pay.” Mot. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that “[d]uring the relevant time period, 6 Defendant[] failed to pay for all hours worked at the correct rate of pay.” Compl. ¶ 38; see also id. 7 ¶ 40 (“During the relevant time period, Defendant[] regularly failed to pay all wages to Plaintiff 8 and Class Members for all hours worked in violation of the Labor Code and the applicable IWC 9 Wage Order.”). Plaintiff specifically alleges that “Defendant[] failed to pay . . . at least the 10 minimum wage and overtime wage for all hours worked due to Defendant[’s] policy and practice 11 of failing to incorporate non-discretionary bonuses in Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ regular rate 12 of pay. As a result, Defendant[] failed to pay Plaintiff and Class Members for all minimum and 13 overtime wages in violation of the Labor Code and applicable IWC Wage Order.” Id. ¶ 25 14 (emphasis added). 15 While these allegations are relatively sparse, the Court agrees that the obvious implication 16 of the complaint is that class members were paid some but not all of the wages that they were 17 owed. As a result, Defendant has put forth an assumption that does not match Plaintiff’s 18 underlying theory. Cf. Petersen v. Gold Bond Bldg. Prods., LLC, No. 24-CV-00617-TSH, 2024 19 WL 3859801, at *3–*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2024) (finding a “fundamental mismatch between the 20 type of . . . violation Plaintiff alleges and the type of violation Defendant presumes” where 21 “Plaintiff repeatedly alleges that Defendant failed to properly calculate the hourly overtime rate of 22 pay by failing to include all forms of compensation in the ‘regular rate of pay’”). 23 When challenged on this point, Defendant does not explain how its assumptions could be 24

25 1 Defendant argues that “[w]age-and-hour claims . . . are inherently tied to hours worked, which are most appropriately measured on a workweek basis.” Opp. at 10. This may be true, and it is 26 also true that a calculation that relied on assumptions tied to work weeks could have been reasonable. But Defendant’s stated assumptions were tied to pay periods—which is not inherently 27 unreasonable—and Defendant has not provided any real explanation for why the Court should 1 consistent with Plaintiff’s underpayment theory or provide any evidence supporting its 2 assumptions. Instead, Defendant claims that Plaintiff asserts “sweeping allegations that she and 3 all class members were not paid for all hours worked.” Opp. at 10. To the extent this assumes 4 that Plaintiff is alleging that she and class members were never paid, that assumption is 5 unreasonable, unsupported by the complaint, and overlooks allegations such as those describing 6 the failure to incorporate non-discretionary bonuses. In addition, Defendant repeatedly suggests 7 that Plaintiff had to introduce evidence to challenge its jurisdictional calculations. See, e.g., id. at 8 10 (noting that “Plaintiff offers no competing assumption and no evidence suggesting a lower 9 violation rate”). But “[a] factual attack . . . need only challenge the truth of the defendant’s 10 jurisdictional allegations by making a reasoned argument as to why any assumptions on which 11 they are based are not supported by evidence.” Harris, 980 F.3d at 700. Plaintiff has done exactly 12 that. 13 “Where a defendant’s assumption is unreasonable on its face without comparison to a 14 better alternative, a district court may be justified in simply rejecting that assumption and 15 concluding that the defendant failed to meet its burden.” Jauregui v. Roadrunner Transp. Servs., 16 Inc., 28 F.4th 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2022). Because Defendant does not engage with the substance of 17 Plaintiff’s arguments and does not provide any additional evidence or justification for assumptions 18 that are inconsistent with the theory of the complaint, the Court has no “better alternative” that it 19 can apply. As a result, the Court concludes that Defendant has not demonstrated the amount in 20 controversy for its unpaid wages claim by a preponderance of the evidence. See Rodriguez v. 21 Novolex Holdings, LLC, No. 2:26-CV-00068-MEMF-SK, 2026 WL 981217, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22 9, 2026) (applying Jauregui and concluding defendant had not met its burden); see also Woods v. 23 C.H. Robinson Co., Inc., No. 25-CV-00294-SK, 2025 WL 914762, at *3–*4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 24 2025) (using $0 amount in controversy where defendant unreasonably assumed unpaid overtime, 25 instead of underpaid overtime in case involving similar allegations of failure to include, for 26 example, non-discretionary bonuses).2 27 1 Finally, Plaintiff argues that “there is no evidence of the total number of shifts that Plaintiff 2 or the class members worked that were long enough to entitle any of them to overtime wages.” 3 Mot. at 7. Defendant was allegedly required to compensate class members for all overtime 4 worked “at 1 ½ times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 8 hours per 5 workday [and] 40 hours per week.” Compl. ¶ 37. “Yet, when challenged, Defendant[] provide[s] 6 no evidence to support that any employee worked more than eight hours a day or more than forty 7 hours a week to be eligible for even one violation per pay period.” Marshall v. Tailored Shared 8 Servs., LLC, No. 2:24-CV-03446-ODW (MRWX), 2024 WL 4700606, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 9 2024). Nor do any allegations in the complaint suggest that “putative class members were 10 ‘regularly’ required to perform ‘work duties off-the-clock.’” See Seijas v. Jackson Lab’y, No. 11 2:24-CV-03423-DJC-AC, 2026 WL 203257, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2026). This further 12 demonstrates the unreasonableness of Defendant’s overtime assumptions. And, unlike in 13 comparable cases, Defendant has not put forth any evidence from which the Court can craft a 14 better assumption. Cf. Agdeppa v. C & J Clark Retail, Inc., No. 25-CV-10862-JSC, 2026 WL 15 874686, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2026) (applying 50% of the defendants’ calculated violation 16 rate for unpaid overtime claim where they had introduced evidence that average shift length was 17 6.5 hours). 18 “A defendant need not make the plaintiff’s case for it or prove the amount in controversy 19 beyond a legal certainty. Nonetheless, the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the 20 assumptions on which the calculation of the amount in controversy was based remain[s]” with 21 Defendant. Harris, 980 F.3d at 701. Defendant consistently failed to engage with Plaintiff’s 22 arguments in its opposition, never advancing any serious justification or supporting evidence for 23 its assumptions. Defendant’s choice here leaves the Court without any better alternatives that it 24

25 explain how its assumptions are consistent with Plaintiff’s underpayment theory, the Court would have reduced the amount in controversy for the underpaid minimum wages claim to a more 26 reasonable violation rate, such as one violation per pay period or one violation per work week. Cf. Garza v. Brinderson Constructors, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 906, 911–12 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (finding 27 assumption of one violation per week was reasonable where plaintiff alleged “policy or practice” 1 can reasonably apply. As a result, Defendant has not met its burden in establishing the amount in 2 controversy as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action. 3 b. Unpaid Meal Periods and Rest Periods 4 For Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action, Defendant estimates that the amount in 5 controversy is $2,895,910.56 for failure to provide meal periods and $2,895,910.56 for failure to 6 provide rest periods. Notice of Removal ¶¶ 40–43. In its notice of removal, Defendant assumed 7 that there was one applicable violation per shift (1 violation per shift * $24.48 per violation * 8 118,297 shifts). Id. Plaintiff objects both to the 100% violation rate and Defendant’s failure to 9 “introduce any evidence of the . . . total number of shifts that were long enough to entitle class 10 members to meal periods or rest periods” (five and four hours, respectively). Mot. at 7–8. 11 The Court agrees that Defendant’s assumptions are unreasonable. Defendant introduced 12 evidence that the class members “collectively worked approximately 118,297 shifts during the 13 Class Period.” Dkt. No. 1-2 ¶ 10. But Defendant’s declaration is silent on how long these shifts 14 were, and Defendant does not introduce any evidence clarifying this in its opposition. Cf. Lopez v. 15 Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“The problem with 16 [this] calculation is that an employee’s entitlement to meal and rest breaks depends on the length 17 of an employee's shift, and [defendant’s] calculations nowhere take shift length into account.”); 18 Harris, 980 F.3d at 701 (finding meal and rest period assumptions unreasonable where defendant 19 failed to provide any evidence to support its assumption that class members “worked shifts long 20 enough to qualify for meal or rest periods”); Benitez v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1101 21 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (rejecting rest and meal period assumptions where defendant “offered no 22 evidence regarding the average shift length” and nothing in the complaint clarified the length). 23 Defendant asserts that it “relied on data regarding total shifts worked during the class 24 period to estimate exposure,” but this misses the point about eligible shift lengths. See Opp. at 12. 25 Defendant also argues again that “Plaintiff . . . offers no alternative calculation, no competing 26 estimate of shifts, and no evidence suggesting that the number used by Defendant is inaccurate.” 27 Id. Defendant says that “once Defendant has provided a reasonable estimate grounded in the 1 that Defendant has not provided a reasonable estimate grounded in the available data, since there 2 is no indication that these shifts were for the relevant length. Moreover, nothing in the complaint 3 mentions the average length of a shift or otherwise supports the reasonableness of Defendant’s 4 calculations. Cf. Perez, 131 F.4th at 809 (noting that “if a violation rate cannot be justified by the 5 allegations in the compl[ai]nt, it must be justified by something else”). The “failure to support . . . 6 removal of this case with” evidence of shift length, “as well as [Defendant’s] failure to explain 7 why its assumed violation rate is supported by the allegations of the complaint, renders its 8 assumptions regarding the total amount in controversy on the meal and rest period claims 9 unreasonable.” Lopez, 777 F. Supp. 3d at 1108. The Court has no basis to determine what a better 10 assumption would have been here, so Defendant has not met its burden in establishing the amount 11 in controversy as to Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action. 12 c. Remaining Claims 13 Defendant estimates that the amount in controversy for the fourth and fifth causes of action 14 are $1,304,000 and $1,298,073.60, respectively. Notice of Removal ¶¶ 46, 48. Even if 15 Defendant’s underlying assumptions for those causes of action are reasonable and Defendant is 16 correct that “an additional 25% for attorneys[’] fees is warranted,” id. ¶ 50, the remaining amount 17 in controversy would be below the $5,000,000 minimum. Accordingly, the Court finds that 18 Defendant has not adequately established the amount-in-controversy requirement, and thus 19 GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion.3 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand, Dkt. No. 11. The Clerk is directed to 22 3 Defendant also argues that “Plaintiff’s challenge to the amount in controversy is untimely and 23 should be disregarded,” contending that she was required to file her motion to remand within 30 days of removal. Opp. at 6–7. “A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than 24 lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a).” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). While it is true that Plaintiff filed her 25 motion to remand more than 30 days after Defendant filed its notice of removal, Plaintiff is plainly arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction. See Mot. at 5 (“Here, based on the lack of evidence and 26 the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, the amount in controversy is well below the jurisdictional threshold.”). The Court disagrees that Plaintiff’s challenges can fairly be framed as procedural. 27 Cf. Chavoya v. Merrill Gardens L.L.C., No. 1:24-CV-00268-KES-BAM, 2024 WL 3219724, at *3 ] remand this case to the Superior Court of California for the County of Alameda and close the file. 2 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: June 23, 2026 ‘4 5 : □ HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 1] a 12

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