U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-1756
VINCENT ANTHONY VINCE, Appellant v.
MATTHEW GODLEWSKI, in his individual capacity; JONATHAN KASKEY, in his individual capacity; JOSEPH WOZNIAK, in his individual capacity; JOHN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ, JR., in his individual capacity; ROBERT CAPPARELL, in his individual capacity; JOHN DOE No.1, in his individual capacity; JOHN DOE No. 2, in his individual capacity _____________________________ Appeal from U.S. District Court, M.D. Pa. Judge Julia K. Munley, No. 3:24-cv-00902
Before: RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and MASCOTT, Circuit Judges Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 21, 2026 Decided: June 3, 2026 _____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION*
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Vincent Anthony Vince appeals the District Court’s order granting ap-
pellees’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim. For the following reasons, we will affirm the order.
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. I. BACKGROUND
The appellees are five officers from the Wilkes-Barre Township Police Department.
Vince contends that those officers violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). The action arises from an incident on
June 3, 2022, when Vince was retrieving his car from ACT Towing in Wilkes-Barre Town-
ship, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. The appellees approached Vince and informed him
they were arresting him based on an active warrant for an alleged violation of a Protection
from Abuse Order. He advised the officers that the warrant had been dismissed by a judge
of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, but the appellees insisted that they had
verified the warrant.
Vince contacted his lawyer who advised the appellees that the warrant had been
lifted, and he could provide proof later that day. Vince’s counsel directed the appellees to
contact the Luzerne County Prothonotary’s Office or Vince’s wife to confirm the dismissal.
Vince contends that the appellees refused to confirm those details, and instead, they placed
him in handcuffs and advised him of his rights. He alleges that the appellees held him in
a “hot, unairconditioned vehicle” for 3–4 hours until his wife secured copies of the court
order nullifying the warrant. Id. After viewing the court order, the appellees made several
phone calls before releasing Vince from custody. The same lawyer involved in the under-
lying incident currently represents Vince in this action.
Vince claims that he suffered trauma and severe emotional distress as a result of the
incident. On June 6, 2024, he filed this lawsuit and alleged four causes of action: Count I
– Section 1983 claims for false arrest, excessive force, and due process violations; Count
2 II – false arrest; Count III – false imprisonment; and Count IV – intentional infliction of
emotional distress. In August 2024, the appellees moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss all counts for failure to state a claim.
On March 21, 2025, the District Court granted the appellees’ motion as to the Sec-
tion 1983 claims and determined that the officers were protected by qualified immunity
because they had “reasonably mistaken probable cause.” JA15. The District Court did not
give Vince leave to amend his complaint, finding that doing so would be futile. And fi-
nally, the District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and dismissed those claims without prejudice. Vince appealed the District Court’s
dismissal of his complaint.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW1
We exercise plenary review of a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), and we may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Stringer v.
Cnty. of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 84 (3d Cir. 2025). Because our review is de novo, we “accept
all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plain-
tiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.
2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over the appellant’s Section 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3 III. SECTION 1983
Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, rather, it provides remedies for dep-
rivations of rights established in the Constitution or under federal law. Kneipp v. Tedder,
95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). Under Section 1983, a plaintiff must establish a viola-
tion of a constitutional right caused by a person acting under the color of state law. Phillips,
515 F.3d at 235. There is no question that the appellees were acting under the color of the
law, and thus, we are left to “identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have
been violated.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998). Here, Vince
alleges that his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated.
A. THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
The District Court dismissed Vince’s Fifth Amendment claim because the Fifth
Amendment only restricts the actions of federal officials, and the appellees, who are mu-
nicipal officers, are not federal officials. JA8–9 (citing Nguyen v. U.S. Cath. Conf., 719
F.2d 52, 54–55 (3d Cir. 1983)). We agree, and the District Court therefore committed no
error in dismissing the Fifth Amendment claim.
Vince also challenges the District Court’s dismissal of his Fourteenth Amendment
claim, arguing that he “clearly pleaded” that the appellees “acted under color of state law
[and] violated [his] Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural and substantive due process
of law.” Appellant Br. 26. But Vince misconstrues the issue; his claims for unlawful arrest
and excessive force are not properly analyzed under the Due Process Clause.
The Fourth Amendment governs claims of unlawful arrest, not the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268–69
4 (3d Cir. 2000); DeLade v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-1756
VINCENT ANTHONY VINCE, Appellant v.
MATTHEW GODLEWSKI, in his individual capacity; JONATHAN KASKEY, in his individual capacity; JOSEPH WOZNIAK, in his individual capacity; JOHN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ, JR., in his individual capacity; ROBERT CAPPARELL, in his individual capacity; JOHN DOE No.1, in his individual capacity; JOHN DOE No. 2, in his individual capacity _____________________________ Appeal from U.S. District Court, M.D. Pa. Judge Julia K. Munley, No. 3:24-cv-00902
Before: RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and MASCOTT, Circuit Judges Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 21, 2026 Decided: June 3, 2026 _____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION*
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Vincent Anthony Vince appeals the District Court’s order granting ap-
pellees’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim. For the following reasons, we will affirm the order.
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. I. BACKGROUND
The appellees are five officers from the Wilkes-Barre Township Police Department.
Vince contends that those officers violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). The action arises from an incident on
June 3, 2022, when Vince was retrieving his car from ACT Towing in Wilkes-Barre Town-
ship, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. The appellees approached Vince and informed him
they were arresting him based on an active warrant for an alleged violation of a Protection
from Abuse Order. He advised the officers that the warrant had been dismissed by a judge
of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, but the appellees insisted that they had
verified the warrant.
Vince contacted his lawyer who advised the appellees that the warrant had been
lifted, and he could provide proof later that day. Vince’s counsel directed the appellees to
contact the Luzerne County Prothonotary’s Office or Vince’s wife to confirm the dismissal.
Vince contends that the appellees refused to confirm those details, and instead, they placed
him in handcuffs and advised him of his rights. He alleges that the appellees held him in
a “hot, unairconditioned vehicle” for 3–4 hours until his wife secured copies of the court
order nullifying the warrant. Id. After viewing the court order, the appellees made several
phone calls before releasing Vince from custody. The same lawyer involved in the under-
lying incident currently represents Vince in this action.
Vince claims that he suffered trauma and severe emotional distress as a result of the
incident. On June 6, 2024, he filed this lawsuit and alleged four causes of action: Count I
– Section 1983 claims for false arrest, excessive force, and due process violations; Count
2 II – false arrest; Count III – false imprisonment; and Count IV – intentional infliction of
emotional distress. In August 2024, the appellees moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss all counts for failure to state a claim.
On March 21, 2025, the District Court granted the appellees’ motion as to the Sec-
tion 1983 claims and determined that the officers were protected by qualified immunity
because they had “reasonably mistaken probable cause.” JA15. The District Court did not
give Vince leave to amend his complaint, finding that doing so would be futile. And fi-
nally, the District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and dismissed those claims without prejudice. Vince appealed the District Court’s
dismissal of his complaint.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW1
We exercise plenary review of a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), and we may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Stringer v.
Cnty. of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 84 (3d Cir. 2025). Because our review is de novo, we “accept
all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plain-
tiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.
2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over the appellant’s Section 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3 III. SECTION 1983
Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, rather, it provides remedies for dep-
rivations of rights established in the Constitution or under federal law. Kneipp v. Tedder,
95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). Under Section 1983, a plaintiff must establish a viola-
tion of a constitutional right caused by a person acting under the color of state law. Phillips,
515 F.3d at 235. There is no question that the appellees were acting under the color of the
law, and thus, we are left to “identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have
been violated.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998). Here, Vince
alleges that his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated.
A. THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
The District Court dismissed Vince’s Fifth Amendment claim because the Fifth
Amendment only restricts the actions of federal officials, and the appellees, who are mu-
nicipal officers, are not federal officials. JA8–9 (citing Nguyen v. U.S. Cath. Conf., 719
F.2d 52, 54–55 (3d Cir. 1983)). We agree, and the District Court therefore committed no
error in dismissing the Fifth Amendment claim.
Vince also challenges the District Court’s dismissal of his Fourteenth Amendment
claim, arguing that he “clearly pleaded” that the appellees “acted under color of state law
[and] violated [his] Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural and substantive due process
of law.” Appellant Br. 26. But Vince misconstrues the issue; his claims for unlawful arrest
and excessive force are not properly analyzed under the Due Process Clause.
The Fourth Amendment governs claims of unlawful arrest, not the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268–69
4 (3d Cir. 2000); DeLade v. Cargan, 972 F.3d 207, 210 (3d Cir. 2020). And the Supreme
Court has held that “all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—
deadly or not—in the course of an arrest . . . should be analyzed under the Fourth Amend-
ment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a ‘substantive due process’ ap-
proach.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Here, Vince’s claims of unlawful
arrest and excessive force fall squarely under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the
District Court did not err in dismissing Vince’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.
B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Vince alleges two Fourth Amendment violations: unlawful arrest and excessive
force. The District Court found Vince’s allegations for excessive force to be “threadbare.”
JA10. We agree.
To determine if police conduct constitutes excessive force, we consider whether the
force used was “‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
[the officers], without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S
at 397. Here, Vince alleges that he was physically restrained by handcuffs in a hot car for
3–4 hours while the officers verified his assertion that his warrant had been lifted. He does
not allege that complained to the officers of discomfort from the handcuffs or the temper-
ature in the car. Thus, the District Court did not err in concluding that the complaint failed
to state a Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force. See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772,
776–77 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding that handcuffing can be unreasonable if it was done
unnecessarily or excessively).
5 The District Court also properly dismissed Vince’s claim of unlawful arrest under
the Fourth Amendment. An officer sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified im-
munity unless he (1) violated a constitutional right that (2) was clearly established when
he acted. George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 571–72 (3d Cir. 2013).
We begin and end our analysis on the first prong: whether Vince plausibly alleges
a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. He does not. The Fourth Amendment protects
persons from “unreasonable searches and seizures” and prohibits arrests without probable
cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir.
1995). To determine whether an action was reasonable, we ask whether “the circum-
stances, viewed objectively, justify [the challenged] action.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 736 (2011) (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). And probable
cause exists when “reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances within a police
officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude
that an offense has been committed by the person being arrested.” United States v. Myers,
308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002).
We have generally extended qualified immunity to officers who make an arrest
based on an objectively reasonable belief that there is a valid warrant, as long as it is rea-
sonable in light of the relevant circumstances. See Berg, 219 F.3d at 273. Here, the offic-
ers’ belief that there was a valid bench warrant gave them “reasonably trustworthy infor-
mation,” and thus, probable cause to arrest Vince. When Vince provided documentation
that the warrant had been lifted, the officers confirmed the information and released him,
which was reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, the arrest was reasonable under
6 the Fourth Amendment and no violation occurred. The District Court committed no error
in dismissing Vince’s Section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest under the Fourth Amendment.
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
If a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit
the plaintiff leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Phillips,
515 F.3d at 245. The District Court concluded that amendment to the complaint would be
futile because Vince is currently represented by the same counsel who communicated with
officers at the scene and directed Vince’s wife to retrieve documents from the Luzerne
County Courthouse. We agree that because of counsel’s involvement with the underlying
incident, any facts plausibly stating either an excessive force or unlawful arrest claim
would have been alleged in the initial complaint. Thus, the District Court committed no
error.
*****
For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM.