Vincent Unto v. Moore-Mccormack Lines, Inc

Third Circuit

Vincent Unto v. Moore-Mccormack Lines, Inc

293 F.2d 26

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit

DecidedAugust 29, 1961

Docket13460_1

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 293 F.2d 26 (Vincent Unto v. Moore-Mccormack Lines, Inc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Vincent Unto v. Moore-Mccormack Lines, Inc, 293 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1961).

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PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment entered on a verdict for the defendant in a civil action brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by him while serving as a seaman aboard the defendant’s vessel, S. S. Mormactide. The plaintiff based his claim upon the alleged unseaworthiness of the vessel and the negligence of its officers and crew.

The plaintiff first asserts that the trial judge erred in admitting tv/o documents in evidence, one a receipted bill for professional services rendered to the plaintiff by Dr. Carino Cramer of Santos, Brazil, and the other a report of the illness of the plaintiff made by the chief mate of the Mormactide. The receipted bill was a record of a payment made by the defendant in the regular course of its business and the illness report was made by one of its employees also in the regular course of business. Both were produced from the defendant’s records. We are satisfied that both were properly admitted in evidence.

The plaintiff’s other contention is that the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury. He asserts that the jury was told that the negligence complained of by the plaintiff must have been the proximate cause of his injury in order to entitle him to recover on that ground, whereas they should have been told that the plaintiff was entitled to recover if the defendant’s negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the

injury. The fact is, however, that the trial judge at least twice in the course of his charge gave the jury substantially the latter instruction. Moreover a reading of the entire charge satisfies us that the jury must have understood the trial judge’s reference to “proximate cause” in this sense since he gave them no other definition of the phrase. They, therefore, could not have been aware of the more restricted technical legal meaning sometimes given to the phrase. We conclude that there was no reversible error in the charge.

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment entered on a verdict for the defendant in a civil action brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by him while serving as a seaman aboard the defendant’s vessel, S. S. Mormactide. The plaintiff based his claim upon the alleged unseaworthiness of the vessel and the negligence of its officers and crew.

The plaintiff first asserts that the trial judge erred in admitting tv/o documents in evidence, one a receipted bill for professional services rendered to the plaintiff by Dr. Carino Cramer of Santos, Brazil, and the other a report of the illness of the plaintiff made by the chief mate of the Mormactide. The receipted bill was a record of a payment made by the defendant in the regular course of its business and the illness report was made by one of its employees also in the regular course of business. Both were produced from the defendant’s records. We are satisfied that both were properly admitted in evidence.

The plaintiff’s other contention is that the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury. He asserts that the jury was told that the negligence complained of by the plaintiff must have been the proximate cause of his injury in order to entitle him to recover on that ground, whereas they should have been told that the plaintiff was entitled to recover if the defendant’s negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the

injury. The fact is, however, that the trial judge at least twice in the course of his charge gave the jury substantially the latter instruction. Moreover a reading of the entire charge satisfies us that the jury must have understood the trial judge’s reference to “proximate cause” in this sense since he gave them no other definition of the phrase. They, therefore, could not have been aware of the more restricted technical legal meaning sometimes given to the phrase. We conclude that there was no reversible error in the charge.

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

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293 F.2d 26, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vincent-unto-v-moore-mccormack-lines-inc-ca3-1961.

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