Vincent Gomes v. Department of Defense

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided May 22, 2024·No. SF-0752-19-0370-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

VINCENT A. GOMES, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0752-19-0370-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: May 22, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Brook L. Beesley , Alameda, California, for the appellant.

Christine J. Yen , Esquire, Stockton, California, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the agency’s decision to remove the appellant based on an alleged violation of a last change settlement agreement (LCSA). On petition for review, the agency argues that the administrative judge erred in concluding that the sick leave provisions of the LCSA did not apply and that the medical documentation submitted by the appellant was sufficient. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

at 12-19. It also argues that she improperly reconstituted the basis for the LCSA violation when she considered whether the appellant’s documentation was fraudulent and not just administratively unacceptable, and thus, that her finding that the agency acted in bad faith was erroneous. Id. at 10-11. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to VACATE the administrative judge’s finding that the agency acted in bad faith when it charged the appellant with fraud, and to provide the appropriate standards of causation for the appellant’s affirmative defenses, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

The administrative judge correctly found that the sick leave provisions of the LCSA do not apply. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 42, Initial Decision (ID) at 13. Therefore, we agree with her conclusion that the waiver provision prohibiting an appeal of the appellant’s removal to the Board does not apply. ID at 14-15; see Bruhn v. Department of Agriculture, 124 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 9 (2016) (stating that a waiver of appeal rights in a LCSA should not be enforced when the appellant shows that he complied with the agreement). However, in furtherance of her finding that the waiver provision does not apply, the administrative judge also concluded that the agency acted in bad faith when it charged the appellant

with submitting fraudulent medical documentation. ID at 14-15. In its petition for review, the agency asserts that this conclusion was in error. PFR File, Tab 10-11.

By way of background, in the removal notice, the Chief of Security and Emergency Services explained the context of the LCSA and noted that the appellant’s prior removal from March 29, 2017, was held in abeyance for 2 years absent any violations of the LCSA. IAF, Tab 5 at 18. He then discussed the Notice of Violation of the LCSA and explained the agency’s basis for determining that the appellant violated the terms of the LCSA. Id. at 18-19. While not included in the Notice of Violation, the Chief of Security and Emergency Services added in the removal notice that the agency believed that a February 11, 2019 document was “fraudulent.” Id. In the initial decision, the administrative judge construed this language as a “charge of falsification,” and found that the appellant did not violate the LCSA by submitting a fraudulent medical note. ID at 14. She further concluded that the agency acted in bad faith when it charged the appellant with fraud. ID at 15.

On review, the agency argues that the administrative judge “improperly reconstituted the basis” for the LCSA violations and erroneously found that the agency acted in bad faith by charging the appellant with fraud. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-11. We agree. In the LCSA, the parties agreed that, if the appellant failed to follow the agreement at any time during the 2-year period, the appellant “will be immediately removed from Federal service.” IAF, Tab 5 at 50. Elsewhere, the LCSA also provided that, if an alleged violation of the agreement, as detailed in a Notice of Violation, is substantiated, the appellant will be issued a written decision regarding the violation and will not receive a new proposed removal or new 30-day advanced notice. Id. at 54. In Lizzio v. Department of the Army, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit analyzed a similar agreement and concluded that an alleged breach of an LCSA is not a separate charge, but rather, an event that triggers the reinstatement of the original charge. 534 F.3d 1367,

1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Thus, the “charges” that served as the basis of the appellant’s instant removal were the charges which brought about the LCSA in 2017, in conjunction with the violation of the LCSA. IAF, Tab 5 at 50. As such, we agree with the agency that, contrary to the administrative judge’s discussion, the agency did not “charge” the appellant with falsification. ID at 14; IAF, Tab 5 at 18.

Similarly, because there was not a charge of falsification or fraud that led to the appellant’s removal, we vacate the administrative judge’s finding that “[t]he agency acted in bad faith when it charged the appellant with fraud.” ID at 15. Although the Chief of Security and Emergency Services discusses in the decision removing the appellant the agency’s belief that the February 11, 2019 document was fraudulent, it is the Notice of Violation that served the basis of the removal and that notice did not discuss fraud or falsification. IAF, Tab 5 at 26-27. Nonetheless, because we agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant complied with the terms of the LCSA, we agree with her ultimate conclusion that the LCSA’s waiver provision is unenforceable. ID at 14-15; IAF, Tab 50, 54.

Additionally, the appellant raised below the affirmative defenses of reprisal for equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity, disparate treatment disability discrimination, and failure to accommodate. IAF, Tabs 19 at 2, 6, Tab 21 at 2-7. The administrative judge correctly concluded that the appellant failed to establish the EEO reprisal and disparate treatment disability discrimination claims, and concluded that the appellant was collaterally estopped from raising the failure to accommodate claim. ID at 22-28. However, we modify the initial decision with respect to the standards of causation applicable to an EEO reprisal claim based on disability discrimination, as explained below.

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Vincent Gomes v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2024).

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