Villeda-Mejia v. Garland
This text of Villeda-Mejia v. Garland (Villeda-Mejia v. Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 25 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RUDY VILLEDA-MEJIA, No. 23-3420 Agency No. Petitioner, A088-367-378 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 20, 2024** Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, GOULD, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Rudy Alexander Villeda-Mejia is a citizen of Honduras. He petitions for
review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which denied
his motion to reopen proceedings seeking protection under the Convention Against
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Torture (“CAT”) based on changed circumstances in Honduras. We review the
BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, and we defer to the
BIA’s exercise of discretion unless it acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to
law. Reyes-Corado v. Garland, 76 F.4th 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 2023). We deny the
petition.
To prevail on a motion to reopen on the basis of changed country conditions,
a petitioner must: “(1) produce evidence that conditions have changed in the
country of removal; (2) demonstrate that the evidence is material; (3) show that the
evidence was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the
previous hearings; and (4) ‘demonstrate that the new evidence, when considered
together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would establish prima
facie eligibility for the relief sought.’” Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1204
(9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008)).
The new evidence must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence presented at
the previous hearing. Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004).
Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Villeda-Mejia’s motion
to reopen. As the BIA noted, the evidence that Villeda-Mejia submitted in support
of his motion to reopen, which consisted of an academic article and a news article,
“reflects a continuation of the crime, violence and police corruption previously
considered by the Immigration Judge during the merits hearing.” Because this
2 23-3420 evidence “simply recounts previous conditions presented at a previous hearing,” it
is insufficient to show a change in country conditions. Agonafer, 859 F.3d at 1204.
PETITION DENIED.
3 23-3420
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