Villanueva v. United States

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: June 22, 2018
• Docket: 16-2528-pr
• Status: Published

Opinion

16-2528-pr Villanueva v. United States of America

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term 2017

Argued: August 22, 2017 Decided: June 22, 2018

Docket No. 16‐2528

‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ RICHARD VILLANUEVA, Petitioner‐Appellee,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent‐Appellant. ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐

Before: NEWMAN, LEVAL, and POOLER, Circuit Judges.

Appeal from the June 14, 2016, amended judgment of the District Court for

the District of Connecticut (Janet C. Hall, Chief Judge), modifying a sentence

based on a ruling that a Connecticut first degree assault conviction was not a

“violent felony” for purposes of enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career

Criminal Act of 1984.

Remanded for resentencing. Judge Pooler dissents with a separate opinion.

Robert M. Spector, Asst. U.S. Atty., New Haven, CT (Deirdre M. Daly, U.S. Atty., Marc H. Silverman, Asst. U.S. Atty., New Haven, CT, on the brief), for Respondent‐ Appellant.

Charles F. Willson, Federal Defender’s Office, Hartford, CT, for Petitioner‐Appellee.

JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal by the United States presents the narrow issue of whether the

offense of violating Connecticut’s statute punishing first degree assault, Conn.

Gen. Stat. § 53a‐59(a)(1), qualifies as a “violent felony” for purposes of enhanced

sentencing under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (“ACCA”), 18

U.S.C. § 924(e). That issue turns on whether the Connecticut statute, analyzed

under the so‐called “modified categorical approach,” Mathis v. United States, 136

S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016), has as an element what federal law means by defining

“violent felony” to require the use of “physical force.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).

This issue arises on an appeal from the June 14, 2016, amended judgment of the

District Court for the District of Connecticut (Janet C. Hall, Chief Judge),

modifying the sentence of Appellee Richard Villanueva. That judgment brings

up for review the District Court’s June 10, 2016, ruling that Villanueva’s assault

offense was not a “violent felony” for purposes of the ACCA.

Because we conclude that Villanueva’s assault conviction qualified as an

ACCA predicate, we remand for resentencing.

Background

The ACCA authorizes a punishment of up to ten years’ imprisonment for

any person who possesses a firearm after being convicted of a felony. See 18

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The ACCA also requires a minimum fifteen year

term of imprisonment for any person who violates subsection 922(g) and has

three previous convictions for a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense.” See

id. § 924(e)(1). “Violent felony” is defined, as relevant to this case, as any crime

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that “has as an

element the use . . . of physical force against the person of another,” id.

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i), or “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another,” id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Subsection 924(e)(2)(B)(i) is

known as the “elements clause,” and the quoted portion of subsection

924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is known as the “residual clause.” See Welch v. United States, 136 S.

Ct. 1257, 1261 (2016). The “elements clause” is sometimes called the “force

clause.” See, e.g., United States v. Jones, No. 15‐1518‐cr, 2017 WL 3974269, at *1 (2d

Cir. Sept. 11, 2017).

In June 1999, Villanueva, then using the name Richard Zebrowski, was

indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The indictment alleged four prior convictions, two for

narcotics violations, a third for first degree assault in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat.

53a‐59(a), and a fourth for assault on an officer in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat.

53a‐167(c). After a jury found Villanueva guilty, a presentence report (“PSR”)

recommended sentencing under the ACCA’s minimum fifteen year sentence

provision. The PSR reflected that the first degree assault conviction resulted from

Villanueva’s firing a gun three or four times and hitting his victim in the

shoulder. The PSR calculated a Guidelines range of 262‐327 months.

The District Court concluded that each of the two narcotics convictions

was a “serious drug offense” within the meaning of subsection 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)

and at least one of the assault convictions was a “violent felony” within the

meaning of subsection 924(e)(2)(B), without specifying whether the elements

clause or the residual clause of that subsection applied. Because the District

Court did not specify which of the two assault convictions qualified as a “violent

felony” for purposes of the ACCA or whether it was using the elements clause or

the residual clause, it left open the possibility that it was implicitly using the

residual clause. The Court imposed a sentence pursuant to the ACCA of 262

months. This Court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. United States v.

Zebrowski, 229 F.3d 1136 (2d Cir. 2000) (table).

In 2007, this Court affirmed a denial of Villanueva’s first motion to vacate

his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. That motion raised no issue relating to the

ACCA.

On February 13, 2013, the District Court entered an amended judgment to

reflect the fact that Villanueva’s name had been legally changed from Zebrowski.

The sentence of 262 months remained unchanged.

In June 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that the “residual clause” of the

ACCA was unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551,

2557 (2015).

Villanueva then filed in this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), a

motion for leave to file in the District Court a second motion under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255, relying on Johnson. This Court granted the motion, concluding that

Villanueva had made “a prima facie showing” that his two assault convictions

are not violent felonies “under any provision of the ACCA that remains in effect

after Johnson.” We instructed the District Court to “determine whether the assault

convictions remain proper ACCA predicates after Johnson, and what evidence

may be considered in making that determination.”1

On June 10, 2016, the District Court granted Villanueva’s second section

2255 motion and vacated his sentence. See Villanueva v. United States, 191 F. Supp.

3d 178 (D. Conn. 2016). In a carefully considered opinion, the Court first said

“that it is more likely than not that [Villanueva] was sentenced under ACCA’s

Residual Clause,” id. at 184, which led to the Court’s conclusion that he had

“shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the court [had] sentenced him

under the Residual Clause, and not the Elements Clause,” see id. at 188.

The Court then rejected the Government’s contention that the error of

using the residual clause was harmless because it was not a structural error.2 See

1 Our ruling also instructed the District Court to determine whether Johnson announced a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review, a requirement for a successive motion under section 2255, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). By the time the District Court ruled on the second section 2255 motion, the Supreme Court had ruled that Johnson was retroactive. See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016).

“Taking the Residual Clause out of the equation so substantially alters 2

the framework of ACCA that a Johnson error can hardly be said to be anything 6

id. at 190. The Court then stated that it need not rest on its structural error

determination because, even on harmless error review, the error was not

harmless. See id. This conclusion rested on the Court’s determination, which is at

the heart of the pending appeal, that neither of Villanueva’s assault convictions

qualified as ACCA predicates because neither was a “violent felony” for lack of a

required element of the use of physical force. See id. at 191‐98.

On June 14, 2016, the Court resentenced Villanueva. First, the Court

recalculated his Sentencing Guidelines range to be 63‐78 months.3 Then,

recognizing that Villanueva had served more than the ten‐year maximum term

for a violation of subsection 922(g)(1) without an ACCA enhancement, the Court

resentenced him to time served and placed him on supervised release. A second

amended judgment was entered the same day.

The Government seeks review of the District Court’s June 10 ruling, made

reviewable by entry of the second amended judgment on June 14.

Discussion

other than ‘structural error,’ which is unamenable to harmless error review.” Villanueva, 191 F. Supp. 3d at 190.

3 The District Court recalculated the Guidelines sentencing range because

it did not consider any of Villanueva’s four prior convictions to be either a “crime of violence” or a “controlled substance offense” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. 7

The Government contends that each of Villanueva’s two assault

convictions was a “violent felony” within the meaning of the elements clause of

ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Villanueva contends that neither assault

conviction was a “violent felony.”

The elements clause defines a “violent felony,” required for enhanced

punishment, to include a crime that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Id. The Supreme

Court has stated that, for purposes of the elements clause, “the phrase ‘physical

force’ means violent force‐‐that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury

to another person.” (Curtis) Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)

(emphasis in original).4 So the issue on this appeal is whether either of the

statutes defining Villanueva’s two assault offenses includes, as an element, the

use of violent force. We confine our consideration to the first degree assault

conviction under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a‐59(a)(1).

4 We cite this Johnson case as “(Curtis) Johnson” to distinguish it from the somewhat

related later case of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), the case invalidating the residual clause. Some courts distinguish the cases by citing the later Johnson case as “Johnson II.” See, e.g., United States v. Herr, 2016 WL 6090714, No. 16‐cr‐10038‐IT, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 18, 2016). The use of “II” in case names customarily identifies the second phase of the same litigation. We prefer to distinguish the earlier and less frequently cited Johnson case by using the first name of the petitioner in parentheses. Another way to distinguish the earlier case is to label it Curtis Johnson v. United States. See United States v. Vail‐Bailon, No. 15‐10351, 2017 WL 3667647, at 3 (11th Cir. Aug. 25, 2017) (in banc).

The Connecticut first degree assault provision has two subdivisions. The

first states:

A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a‐59(a)(1).

Two definition provisions are relevant to our inquiry:

“Serious physical injury” means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a‐3(4).

“Dangerous instrument” means any instrument, article or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used or attempted or threatened to be used, is capable of causing death or serious physical injury . . . .”

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a‐3(7).

The Supreme Court has instructed that in determining whether a

state criminal statute qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense, courts are to

use the so‐called “categorical approach,” and, when the state statute has

subdivisions, courts are to use the so‐called “modified categorical

approach.” See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). Under

these approaches, “courts identify the minimum criminal conduct

necessary for conviction under a particular statute” and “look only to the

statutory definitions—i.e., the elements—of [the] . . . offense[], and not to

the particular [underlying] facts.” United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51, 55 (2d

Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis, brackets, and

ellipsis in original).

Under either the general or the modified categorical approach,

courts ascertain the elements of the offense from such materials as the

indictment, a plea agreement, or a plea colloquy, but courts are not

permitted to consider the facts of the offense conduct, as might be revealed

by a trial transcript or a PSR. “ACCA . . . treats such facts [the means by

which the crime was committed] as irrelevant: Find them or not, by

examining the record or anything else, a court still may not use them to

enhance a[n ACCA] sentence.” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2253

(2016). Thus, in this case, under the rigidly structured regime of categorical

analysis, we may not consider the fact, disclosed by Villanueva’s PSR, that

he committed his assault by shooting his victim in the shoulder.

In the pending case, the Connecticut first degree assault statute is

divisible into subsections, and the modified categorical approach is

therefore applicable. We are concerned with subsection (1).

Villanueva contends, and the District Court agreed, that the first

degree assault statute does not require the use of physical force and is

therefore not a “violent felony” for purposes of the ACCA because, under

the definition of “dangerous instrument,” the offense could be committed

by use of a “substance” and, for example, the use of a poisonous substance

to kill or injure would not constitute the use of physical force. We disagree.

The Supreme Court rejected Villanueva’s reasoning in United States

v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 405 (2014). Castleman was indicted for violating 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits possession of a firearm by a person

previously convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” He

argued that his previous conviction for causing bodily injury to the mother

of his child did not involve the use of “physical force” as required by the

federal statute’s definition of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,”

see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). The District Court dismissed the charge,

reasoning “that one can cause bodily injury without the use of physical

force‐‐for example, by deceiving [the victim] into drinking a poisoned

beverage, without making contact of any kind.” 134 S. Ct. at 1414 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court’s rejection of the District Court’s reasoning is

instructive:

The “use of force” in Castleman’s example is not the act of “sprinkl[ing]” the poison; it is the act of employing poison knowingly as a device to cause physical harm. That the harm occurs indirectly, rather than directly (as with a kick or punch), does not matter. Under Castleman’s logic, after all, one could say that pulling the trigger on a gun is not a “use of force” because it is the bullet, not the trigger, that actually strikes the victim.

Id. at 1415. Making clear its view that the inquiry as to “force,” for federal law

purposes, focuses on the causation of a consequence, rather than the physical act

of initiating an action that leads to a consequence, the Court stated, “[T]he

knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of

physical force.” Id. at 1414.

Villanueva discounts the relevance of what the Supreme Court said in

Castleman because that case concerned the element of “physical force” for

purposes of a misdemeanor offense, one involving a domestic relations context.

We recognize that language in one judicial opinion, even when written by the

Supreme Court, cannot be uncritically applied to other cases. But the Supreme

Court’s explanation of why sprinkling poison constitutes use of physical force

even if the offender does not hit or even touch the victim is precisely relevant to

our case. The explanation that initiating, however gently, a consequence that

inflicts injury constitutes the use of physical force was independent of both the

domestic relations context and the fact that the offense at issue was a

misdemeanor.

The reasoning of Castleman has been deemed relevant to the proper

interpretation of various criminal statutes by several courts, including ours. See

Hill, 890 F.3d at 58 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)); Hernandez v. Lynch, 831

F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (construing Cal. Penal Code §§ 422, 664); United

States v. Waters, 823 F.3d 1062, 1066 (7th Cir. 2016) (construing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat.

§ 5/12‐3.2); United States v. Rice, 813 F.3d 704, 705‐06 (8th Cir. 2016) (construing

Ark. Code Ann. § 5‐13‐202(a)(4)).

Under the reasoning of Castleman, the use of a “substance” (the term in the

Connecticut definition of “dangerous instrument”) constitutes use of physical

force, for federal law purposes, because the relevant force is the impact of the

substance on the victim, not the impact of the user on the substance.

Furthermore, the state statute’s requirement that the use of a “substance” must

be “capable of causing death or serious physical injury” to qualify as a

“dangerous instrument” for purposes of first degree assault, see Conn. Gen. Stat.

§ 53(a)‐3(7), satisfies the ACCA requirement that the predicate offense has as an

element the use of physical force that is violent, as (Curtis) Johnson requires. See

(Curtis) Johnson, 559 U.S. at 14.

Villanueva also endeavors to discount the reasoning of Castleman by

pointing out that the Connecticut courts do not construe the first degree assault

statute to require force,5 and reminding us that the Supreme Court has instructed

that while federal law determines the meaning of “violent felony” in subsection

924(e)(1), state law determines the elements of a state offense, see (Curtis) Johnson,

559 U.S. at 138. Castleman itself refutes this aspect of Villanueva’s argument. The

Supreme Court pointed out that “Castleman pleaded guilty to having

‘intentionally or knowingly cause[d] bodily injury,’” 134 S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting

the words of the indictment that tracked Tenn. Code Ann. § 39‐13‐101(a)(1)), and

then ruled that causing such a resulting injury was, as a matter of federal law, the

5 Villanueva cites State v. Gooch, 438 A.2d 867, 871 (Conn. 1982), State v. Carter, 61 A.2d

1103 (Conn. App. 2013), aff’d, 120 A.3d 1229 (Conn. 2013), State v. Holmes, 817 A.2d 689, 702 (Conn. App.), and Connecticut’s pattern jury instructions for subsection 53a‐59(a)(1), 5A Conn. Prac. Jury Instructions § 9.1 (4th ed.).

use of physical force for purposes of determining whether “physical force,”

required by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), was satisfied. State law specified the

elements, but federal law determined whether the consequences of the conduct

that those elements required for a state law offense rendered conviction for that

conduct a “violent felony” under federal law.

Villanueva seeks to support the District Court’s ruling by citing this

Court’s decision in Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2003). That

decision ruled that a Connecticut conviction for third degree assault, see Conn.

Gen. Stat. § 53a‐61(a), was not a “crime of violence” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. §

16(a), which makes conviction for such a crime a basis for removal of an alien.

We accept Villanueva’s premise that “crime of violence” in subsection 16(a) is the

equivalent of “violent felony” in subsection 924(e). See (Curtis) Johnson, 559 U.S.

at 140 (equating “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 16 with “violent felony” in

subsection 924(e)(2)(B)(i)). Nevertheless, we do not agree that Chrzanoski aids

Villanueva.

Chrzanoski explained an understanding of the use of force that has been

abrogated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Castleman.6 We explained the effect

6 The holding of Chrzanoski has not been disturbed. First, the defendant’s prior offense,

which our Court assumed to be third degree assault in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a‐61(a)(1),

of Castleman on Chrzanski in Hill, 890 F.3d at 59‐60. The issue in Hill was whether

Hobbs Act robbery is a “crime of violence” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(3).7 See Hill, 890 F.3d at 53. Hill had argued that his offense could not

qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause of subsection

924(c)(3)(A) because it can be committed without physical force. See id.

In rejecting Hill’s argument, we said, “In Castleman, the Supreme Court,

construing ‘physical force’ as it is employed in connection with § 922(g)(9), made

clear that physical force ‘encompasses even its indirect application,’ as when a

battery is committed by administering a poison.” Id. at 59 (quoting Castleman, 134

S. Ct. at 1414‐15). Then, explicitly reckoning with Hill’s reliance on Chrzanoski, we

added, “[T]he Chrzanoski panel did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s

reasoning in Castleman to the effect that a use of physical force can encompass

acts undertaken to cause physical harm, even when the harm occurs indirectly

see 327 F.3d at 192, was a misdemeanor and could not for that reason have qualified as a “violent felony” under ACCA. Second, the misdemeanor offense required intent to cause only “physical injury,” not “serious physical injury,” as required for Villanueva’s first degree assault conviction. That latter element is necessary to make his offense a “violent felony.”

7 Hill was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1) by committing a firearms‐related

murder in the course of a “crime of violence,” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). The “crime of violence” was Hobbs Act robbery as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). See Hill, 890 F.3d at 54.

(as with poisoning).” Id. at 60 (quoting Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1415). Chrzanoski is

as unavailing for Villanueva as it was for Hill.8

We deem it worth noting that we do not agree with the Government effort

to enlist several other decisions of this Court in support of its argument that

Villanueva’s first degree assault conviction has as an element the use of physical

force. See Brief for Appellant at 17 (citing United States v. Walker, 442 F.3d 787, 788

(2d Cir. 2006)); id. at 19‐20 (citing Harris v. United States, No. 15‐2679 (2d Cir. Nov.

17, 2015), United States v. Williams, 526 F. App’x 29, 37 (2d Cir. June 4, 2013), and

United States v. Bogle, 522 F. App’x 15, 19‐20 (2d Cir. May 23, 2013)).

Walker, Williams, and Bogle ruled that a New York conviction for second

degree assault, see N.Y. Penal L. § 120.05(2), qualified as an ACCA predicate

offense. Although the New York second degree assault statute is very similar to

the Connecticut first degree assault statute, and the New York definition of

“dangerous weapon” is very similar to Connecticut’s definition, there is no

indication in any of these cases that the appellants contended that the

8 We note that last year, this Court issued a summary order that relied on Chrzanoski in

determining that a New York conviction for second degree burglary, see N.Y. Penal Law § 140.25 was not a “crime of violence” for purposes of subsection 4B1.2(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Welch, 641 F. App’x 37, 42 (2d Cir. 2016). Without comparing the Guidelines provision to the ACCA or the New York second degree burglary offense to the Connecticut first degree assault offense, we point out that the summary order did not reckon with Castleman or Hill, nor was either decision cited by the parties in Welch.

“substance” language of the “dangerous instrument” definition precluded the

New York convictions from qualifying as ACCA predicates. In view of the

persuasive force of the reasoning in Castleman, we need not decide whether to

rely on what would be at most an implicit holding of Walker, Williams, and Bogle.

See Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) (“Questions which merely lurk in

the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to

be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.”).

Harris, the fourth decision cited by the Government, concerned a

Connecticut conviction for first degree assault “by means of the discharge of a

firearm” in violation of subdivision (5) of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a‐59(a), not

subdivision (1) as in the pending case, and did not require consideration of the

definition of “dangerous instrument.” See Government’s Memorandum in

Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to File a Successive Motion under 28

U.S.C. § 2255, at 12‐14, and Harris’s Traverse in Response, at 2‐5, Harris v. United

States, No. 15‐2679 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 2015).

The District Court, apparently unaware that Harris did not concern the

same subdivision of the first degree assault statute under which Villanueva was

convicted, see Villanueva, 191 F. Supp. 3d at 194,9 declined to consider Harris

persuasive “where, as here, the Second Circuit has issued a mandate to this court

directing the court to determine ‘whether the assault conviction[] remain[s] a

proper ACCA predicate after Johnson.’” Id. (brackets in original, italics added)

(quoting Zebrowski v. United States, No. 15‐3676 (2d Cir. Feb. 16, 2016) (order

granting leave to file successive section 2255 motion)).

The language of that direction is included in all orders of this Court

granting leave to file a successive section 2255 motion in the aftermath of the

Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson. The language simply calls upon a district

court to assess a prior conviction, without intimating any view of this Court as to

what the outcome of that assessment should be. Such orders also customarily

state, as the “leave to file” order did in this case, that the applicant has made a

“prima facie showing that he has satisfied the successive motion requirements

with respect to his proposed claim based on Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.

9 The District Court’s unawareness of this fact is entirely understandable. This Court’s

order denying Harris leave to file a successive section 2255 motion did not identify the subdivision of the first degree assault statute under which he had been convicted. See Harris v. United States, No. 15‐2679 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 2015) (order denying leave to file). The Government’s brief in the pending appeal also reveals unawareness that Harris had been convicted of assault by means of a firearm under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a‐59(a)(5). This fact is revealed in the parties’ papers on Harris’ motion to file a successive section 2255 motion.

2551 (2015).” “Prima facie” has a different meaning in different contexts.10 In this

context, it has the weakest possible meaning, indicating no more than that the

applicant’s claim should be considered by a district court.

Since Villanueva’s first degree assault conviction qualified as an ACCA

predicate, the District Court’s order of June 10, 2016, must be vacated, the June

14, 2016, second amended judgment must also be vacated, and we will remand

with directions to resentence. The District Court’s options on resentencing

remain to be determined.

The Government contends that the District Court should re‐impose the

original sentence of 262 months (21 years and 10 months).11 Villanueva, arguing

for affirmance, does not consider the scope of resentencing if such should be

ordered.

10 See, e.g., Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1336 (2d Cir. 1997) (in banc) (“[T]he term prima facie case, as used in Title VII and ADEA actions, has a meaning that is quite different from and more limited than that ascribed to the term in many other actions.”); id. at 1365 (Newman, C.J., with whom Kearse, Winter, and Cabranes, JJ., join, dissenting) (“[T]he majority nonetheless asserts that ‘prima facie case’ in Title VII has a third meaning.

11 The record does not disclose what the actual consequences of such a sentence would

be for Villanueva. From the date of the original sentencing, February 1, 2000, he had served at least 16 years, 4 months, and 13 days by June 14, 2016 (the date of resentencing and placement on supervised release), a term of imprisonment beyond the ACCA’s 15 year minimum. If the original sentence were to be re‐imposed, his release date would depend on the length of any presentencing confinement and any good time credits earned during imprisonment.

“{A} court’s duty is always to sentence the defendant as he stands before

the court on the day of sentencing,” United States v. Bryson, 229 F.3d 425, 426

(2000), and a court is “required to resentence [the defendant] in light of the

circumstances as they stood at the time of resentencing,” Werber v. United States,

149 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 1998). At resentencing, Villanueva will have been out of

prison for more than two years (after having served more than the ACCA

mandatory fifteen year sentence). That is a circumstance the District Court is

entitled to consider in deciding whether to impose a sentence that requires him

to serve all, part, or none of the unexpired term of the original sentence. See

Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 490 (2011) (rehabilitation since prior

sentencing may be considered on resentencing); United States v. Hernandez, 604

F.3d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 2010) (defendant’s rehabilitation during prolonged freedom

pending resentencing warranted consideration).

Conclusion

The case is remanded with directions to vacate the ruling of June 10, 2016,

vacate the sentence imposed on June 14, 2014, and resentence.12

12 Because we have remanded for resentencing, we need not determine whether the

District Court’s pre‐Johnson error of using the residual clause in imposing the original sentence was a structural or a harmless error.

POOLER, Circuit Judge:

I respectfully dissent.

This case calls on us to decide whether Villanueva’s prior crimes

qualify as “violent felonies” that render him eligible for an ACCA

sentencing enhancement. See (Curtis) Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133,

140 (2010). My colleagues conclude that United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct.

1405 (2014), a case which analyzed the level of force applicable to a

“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” effectively decides the

question. But this reasoning overlooks the plain and decisive fact that the

Castleman Court repeatedly distinguished the ACCA context we confront

here, and carefully cabined its discussion to exclude ACCA elements clause

determinations. Indeed, the Supreme Court has now twice noted that the

definition of force applicable to the Castleman inquiry was “a comical

misfit” to ACCA. (Curtis) Johnson, 559 U.S. at 145; Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at

1410 (quoting (Curtis) Johnson).

As a result, my colleague’s reliance on Castleman improperly extends

that decision to the very statutory context that the Castleman Court

1 specifically and repeatedly differentiated. See United States v. Rico‐Mejia,

859 F.3d 318, 322 (5th Cir. 2017) (declining to rely on Castleman in

Sentencing Guidelines crime of violence determination because, “[b]y its

express terms, Castleman’s analysis is not applicable to the physical force

requirement for a crime of violence, which ‘suggests a category of violent,

active crimes’ that have as an element a heightened form of physical force

that is narrower in scope than that applicable in the domestic violence

context”); see also Williams v. United States, 712 F. App’x 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2017)

(summary order) (“Castleman … only addressed the meaning of a

‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’ as defined by 18 U.S.C. §

922(g)(9). Thus, the decision does not squarely address the ‘violent felony’

definition of ACCA…”).

Their application of Castleman here is all the more unwarranted since

binding Circuit authority stands for the contrary proposition. In Chrzanoski

v. Ashcroft, we reasoned that statutes such as the one we analyze today do

not have, as an element, physical force. 327 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2003).

Given that Castleman explicitly confined its application to a specific setting

2 of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, I would follow Chrzanoksi

and affirm the judgment of the district court following Circuit precedent—

rather than taking the path Castleman seemed to expressly forbid, of

applying a lower level of force to an ACCA case.

But as my colleagues note, they are not alone in their views. Our

Circuit has previously interpreted Castleman in similar fashion, see United

States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51, 58‐60 (2d Cir. 2018),1 and so have most circuit

courts. For that reason, I recognize that the decision issued today is

reasonable. But I cannot agree that it is correct.

At bottom, much of the difficulty here is exacerbated by the unhappy

marriage between the elements clause analysis we must perform in the

wake of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (“Johnson 2015”), and

legislative draftsmanship that did not account for this altered landscape.

1 The Hill panel’s discussion of Castleman was not necessary to its judgment, since the panel addressed Castleman only by assuming arguendo that Hill’s argument related to Castleman was relevant, even though the Hill panel explicitly found it was not. 890 F.3d at 59. Thus this discussion is dicta, and not binding on this panel. See Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 142 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[D]icta are not and cannot be binding. Holdings—what is necessary to a decision—are binding. Dicta—no matter how strong or how characterized—are not.”) (internal punctuation omitted).

3 But, given the stakes—and the many years of imprisonment that will be

spent behind bars, not only by Villanueva, but also by a class of individuals

with a similar conviction record—our meticulous attention to this

categorical approach analysis is vital to the integrity of our justice system. I

fear that all too frequently we fall prey to the impulse to decide these cases

instinctively, in a way that renders elements clauses just as capacious and

chameleon‐like as the residual clauses that are now broadly invalid.

I. Castleman Cabined Itself to Its Statutory Setting

In 2010, the Supreme Court in (Curtis) Johnson ruled that ACCA’s

elements clause—the same clause at issue here—required qualifying crimes

have “violent force” as an element. 559 U.S. at 140 (emphasis in original).

Importantly, the (Curtis) Johnson Court specifically rejected the notion that

the definition of “physical force” found in the common law should govern

the ACCA elements clause inquiry. Id. at 139‐42. The (Curtis) Johnson Court

reasoned that a common‐law conception of force was ill‐suited to ACCA,

because the common‐law notion of force was derived from the

misdemeanor crime of battery, and required only “the slightest offensive

4 touching.” Id. at 139. Thus common‐law force was “a comical misfit” for

ACCA’s elements clause, which defined a category of “violent felonies.” Id.

at 145.

In Castleman, the Supreme Court ruled that common‐law force—

“namely, offensive touching”—did apply to the determination of whether a

crime qualifies as “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). 134 S. Ct. at 1410. In so deciding, the Castleman Court

was at pains to distinguish (Curtis) Johnson and the ACCA setting. The

Castleman Court reasoned that common‐law force, with its roots in

misdemeanor crimes, was a poor fit for the “violent felonies” discussed in

ACCA, but, in the context of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,”

it was “likely that Congress meant to incorporate that misdemeanor‐

specific meaning of ‘force.’” 134 S. Ct. at 1411 (emphasis added). The

Castleman Court also noted that the two contexts were different because

“’[d]omestic violence’ is not merely a type of ‘violence’; it is a term of art

encompassing acts that one might not characterize as ‘violent’ in a

nondomestic context.” Id. As a result, “[m]inor uses of force may not

5 constitute ‘violence’ in the generic sense,” but may well be “easy to

describe as ‘domestic violence.’” Id.; see also Stuckey v. United States, 878

F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2017) (observing that in Castleman, “the Court

confirmed that certain ‘minor uses of force’ do not rise to the level of

violence that the ACCA requires”) (brackets omitted).

In light of the different statutory context at issue in Castleman, and the

common‐law force applicable in that statutory setting, the Castleman Court

found that a Tennessee domestic abuse statute constituted a “misdemeanor

crime of domestic violence,” even though a conviction could lie for acts

such as “deceiving the victim into drinking a poisoned beverage, without

making contact of any kind.” Id. at 1414 (brackets omitted). Such a poison‐

based conviction would appropriately qualify as a misdemeanor crime of

domestic violence because “the common‐law concept of ‘force’ encompasses

even its indirect application,” and “[i]t is impossible to cause bodily injury

without applying force in the common‐law sense.” Id. at 1414‐15 (emphasis

added).

6 Given this carefully cabined discussion, I cannot agree with my

colleagues’ efforts to graft Castleman back onto the ACCA inquiry.

Contrary to their reasoning, Castleman did not create a regime where

causation of an injury is the dispositive question for force inquiries under

federal law (and such an approach is ill advised for myriad reasons, as I

explain below). Nor does Castleman command that we reject the poison‐

related argument pressed by Villanueva here. Tellingly, my colleagues

quote Hill’s recounting that “[i]n Castleman, the Supreme Court … made

clear that physical force ‘encompasses even its indirect application.’” Op. at

16 (quoting Hill, 890 F.3d at 59 (itself quoting Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1414‐

15)). But of course, the Castleman Court in fact made a much narrower

pronouncement, asserting only that “the common‐law concept of ‘force’

encompasses even its indirect application.” Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1414

(emphasis added). The partial quote employed by my colleagues reflects

the difficulties that inhere in the general approach of reading Castleman to

extend far beyond its explicit bounds.

7 My colleagues, and other courts, have found support for this broad

extension by looking to a portion of Castleman that discusses what it means

to use force. Op. at 12‐13. The Castleman Court in this passage commented

that under the defendant’s specious argument, “one could say that pulling

the trigger on a gun is not a ‘use of force’ because it is the bullet, not the

trigger, that actually strikes the victim.” 134 S. Ct. at 1415. However, once

again, context reveals that this passage does not militate in favor of the

broad application my colleagues assert. Rather, that section addresses only

how force is used in the relevant sense. And as the Supreme Court itself

noted, it is simply not the case that “the word ‘use’ somehow alters the

meaning of ‘force.’” Id. Thus this passage is of little independent value in

analyzing the meaning of “force.”

On my read of Castleman, it is quite apparent that the opinion teaches

that (i) there is significant daylight between common‐law force and the

violent force required here, and (ii) causation of a consequence will

conclusively demonstrate the applicable degree of force only where the

common‐law definition of force applies.

8 For these same reasons, a poisoning could easily be found to

constitute an offensive touching—but not violent force. Castleman, 134 S.

Ct. at 1414‐15. An offensive touching may occur through poisoning, since

the poison is a “concrete bod[y]” that comes into contact with the victim.

Id. at 1410 n.2. But poisoning does not necessitate violent force, in the sense

that it is not “moving, acting, or characterized, by physical force, esp. by

extreme and sudden or by unjust or improper force; furious; severe;

vehement.” (Curtis) Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140 (quoting Webster’s New

International Dictionary 986) (internal punctuation omitted). And

poisoning does not comport with the conception of violent force evinced by

the Castleman Court’s opinion. In an illustrative passage, the Castleman

majority explained that a lower force threshold was appropriate in the

domestic violence context because it is “hard to describe as ‘violence’ a

squeeze of the arm that causes a bruise… But an act of this nature is easy to

describe as domestic violence.” 134 S. Ct. at 1412 (quoting Flores v. Ashcroft,

350 F.3d 666, 670 (2003)) (internal punctuation omitted). It would seem that

poisoning requires even less violence than such an abusive squeeze. And as

9 we have recognized, poisoning simply does not require physical force, as it

is generally understood. See Chrzanoski, 327 F.3d at 195.

My colleagues attempt to solve this problem by positing that the

severity of the consequence is what demonstrates that the force is

sufficiently violent. Op. at 15‐16 n.6. In their view, the Connecticut statute’s

requirement that the “substance” be “capable of causing death or serious

physical injury” suffices to show violent force. Id. And of course they are

correct that poison may cause severe consequences, including death.

However, this view, of force as defined by consequence, overlooks the fact

that the Castleman majority—not once, but twice—expressly declined to

find that causation of injury could demonstrate violent force. 134 S.Ct. at

1413, 1414. And the Castleman Court further reaffirmed that it viewed

violent force as “suggest[ing] a category of violent, active crimes,” id. at

1411 n.4, which decidedly does not describe poisoning.

Accordingly, given the distinct statutory setting of Castleman, and the

Court’s repeated assertions that common law force is a distinct, lesser type

of force than the violent force we must find here, I cannot agree with my

10 colleagues that Castleman can be read to decide this case. Where the

Supreme Court repeatedly insists that it is analyzing a specific type of

force, we should heed their instruction and take care to observe that

limitation. We certainly should not take their carefully cabined decision

and tack it on to the specific statutory setting the Court distinguished, as

my colleagues have done here.

II. Heeding Castleman’s Express Limitations, Its Rationale Should be Read to Accord with Circuit Precedent

There is another, larger problem with extending Castleman in the

manner employed by my colleagues. Castleman’s willingness to infer

common‐law force from the causation of bodily injury sits in tension with

Circuit precedent. Where a statute requires only causation of injury, there

is no “element” of force, as we have previously understood that term.

Again, I readily concede that my colleagues are not unreasonable in their

methodology—Castleman’s holdings (if stripped of the careful limitations to

statutory context I discuss above) may lend some weight to the notion that

we may find an “element” of force where an injury has been caused. But

this approach is out of step with the plain command of the elements clause,

11 and our prior case law. In light of Castleman’s persistent cabining of its

inquiry, we should not read that case to abrogate our authority in other

contexts. Accordingly, my colleagues’ interpretation—that Castleman

mandates that “the inquiry as to ‘force,’ for federal law purposes, focuses

on the causation of a consequence,” Op. at 12—represents a fundamental

shift in our Circuit’s practice, which I believe is in error.

Our Circuit’s prior case law reflects the specific inquiry we must

perform here. ACCA’s elements clause, like many similarly phrased

elements clauses, requires that a qualifying statute have “as an element the

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person

of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Typically, for offenses created by

statute, rather than common law, we ascertain the elements from the text of

the statute itself. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013)

(under categorical approach, “courts may look only to the statutory

definitions—i.e., the elements—of a defendant’s prior offenses…”) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243,

2248‐49 (2016) (“Elements are the constituent parts of a crime’s legal

12 definition—the things the prosecution must prove to sustain a conviction.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The portion of the Connecticut first degree assault statute that

underlies Villanueva’s conviction requires that an individual, “[w]ith intent

to cause serious physical injury to another person … causes such injury to

such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a

dangerous instrument.” Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a‐59(a)(1). The statute

makes no reference to force of any kind. It speaks solely in terms of

causation. A prosecutor need not prove “force” to a jury to secure a

conviction—much less violent force.

Accordingly, if we look only to the text of the statute, it would seem

that the crime does not have, “as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” 18 U.S.C. §

924(e)(2)(B)(i). In some instances, the Supreme Court has indicated that this

type of textual inquiry, of looking to the explicit elements of the offense

alone, is indeed how elements clause determinations should be performed.

See, e.g., Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1629 (2016) (noting that elements

13 clause of another “crime of violence provision would not pick up

demanding a ransom for kidnapping [because] 18 U.S.C. § 875(a) …

defin[es] the crime without any reference to physical force”) (internal

punctuation omitted).

However, in applying the categorical approach, we often do not use a

strictly textual method, but also analyze whether force inheres in the crime

by looking to the minimum conduct covered by the statute. See, e.g.,

Martinez v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 2008). This focus on the

potential conduct of conviction perhaps has the salutary effect of avoiding

an overly formal inquiry, where the word “force” must literally appear in

the statute. But it must be noted that by looking to minimum conduct, we

are already moving a step beyond what the plain text of the elements

clause would seem to envision—namely, locating the elements in the text

of the statute, where they have been traditionally found, to see whether

those elements include physical force.

Further, defining minimum conduct is often a trying task. While the

“focus on the minimum conduct criminalized by the … statute is not an

14 invitation to apply legal imagination to the … offense,” Moncrieffe v. Holder,

569 U.S. 184, 191 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), some degree of

abstraction is inherent in this exercise, since we are looking beyond the text

of the statute to the real world conduct it might sweep in. In this specific

case, all agree that the minimum conduct required for conviction would be

poisoning—but not all statutes are so obvious.

Indeed, in some instances, the quest to define minimum conduct has

led courts to all but abandon the statutory text, and consider only

applications of the statute that arise in the case law. Under this approach,

courts will refuse to consider a potential type of minimum conduct

permitted by the statutory text, unless a defendant finds a case illustrating

that the statute has been used by prosecutors in that manner. See, e.g., Hill,

890 F.3d at 57 n.9, 58‐59 (declining to consider potential nonviolent means

of putting an individual in “fear of injury” as permitted by text of statute of

conviction, citing lack of case law). This approach has the virtue of

simplicity for courts: absent a case on point, a particular application of a

statute will be discarded. But in a system where more than ninety percent

15 of all convictions are the product of plea agreements, we can hardly expect

a judicial opinion to have issued on each available fact pattern. See Lafler v.

Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (“Ninety‐seven percent of federal

convictions and ninety‐four percent of state convictions are the result of

guilty pleas.”). A defendant’s inability to find a case illustrating a particular

type of conviction does not necessarily indicate that such cases do not

exist—rather, it may well reflect the fact that finding such a case would

require onerous and unwieldy research into the filings of individual cases,

to ascertain whether the particular facts might fit the mold obviously

encompassed by the statutory language.2 See Ramos v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 709

F.3d 1066, 1072 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that defendant need not point

to case law illustrating specific types of prosecution “when the statutory

2 Indeed, in this very case, the minimum conduct criminalized by the statute— poisoning—does not appear to have generated case law. Nonetheless, it seems from public reports that prosecutors have used the first degree assault statute in poisoning cases. See Suspects in poisoning fight charges in court, NewsTimes (Danbury, CT) (Apr. 19, 2007), http://www.newstimes.com/news/article/Suspects ‐in‐poisoning‐fight‐charges‐in‐court‐236686.php; Mother Faces Charges Of Poisoning Her Child, Hartford Courant (Dec. 10, 1993), http://articles.courant.com /1993‐12‐10/news/0000000848_1_methanol‐poison‐child‐affidavit; Woman accused of trying to poison husband ʹsnapped,ʹ lawyer says, Darien News (Apr. 2, 2007) http://www.dariennewsonline.com/news/article/Woman‐accused‐of‐trying‐to‐ poison‐husband‐46164.php.

16 language itself, rather than the application of legal imagination to that

language, creates the realistic probability that a state would apply the

statute to conduct beyond the generic definition”) (internal quotation

marks omitted).3

This is all to say that elements clause inquiries are complex, and have

led courts to embrace methodologies that are far afield from what the

elements clause itself would seem to command. It should be good news for

us then, that with specific regard to statutes phrased in terms of causation

of bodily injury, such as the one we confront here, we have previously

considered the fair inferences that may be drawn from the statutory text. In

Chrzanoski, we recognized that “intentional causation of injury does not

necessarily involve the use of force.” 327 F.3d at 195. This is because a

doctor that withholds medicine may cause bodily injury without applying

3 Even if there truly were no cases to have ever been charged under such a fact pattern, this could be attributable more to the preferences of prosecutors than a lack of a legal element. Of course, it is fair to observe that the dearth of published opinions regarding a particular version of offense conduct indicates that such cases are rarely brought. But where the text of a statute is clear, we cannot rely on the forbearance of prosecutors to prevent an offense from qualifying as a crime of violence.

17 force of any kind, see id. at 196, as may a neglectful parent that fails to

provide nourishment to their child.

However, in Castleman, the Court found that a statute, phrased

similarly to the one we consider here, has an element of force—although as

discussed, the Court found only common‐law force, rather than the violent

force we must locate today. 134 S. Ct. at 1413‐14. The statute considered

there, much like the statute here, defined an offense in terms of “caus[ing]

bodily injury.” Id. at 1409. Despite the fact that the statute did not have an

explicit, textual element of force, the Court concluded that the statute did

have in fact “as an element,” common‐law force, because “[i]t is impossible

to cause bodily injury without applying force in the common‐law sense.”

Id. at 1415.

The Castleman court did not discuss the types of minimum conduct

we identified in Chrzanoski—despite the fact, which we recognized in

Chrzanoski and which nearly every first year law student knows, a person

may cause injury without resorting even to offensive touching. Instead of

acknowledging these potential applications, the minimum conduct that

18 was located by the Castleman Court was poisoning. See id. at 1414‐15.

Perhaps the neglectful parent example was simply the other side of the line

separating “legal imagination,” Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191, from conduct

that is properly considered in a categorical analysis. Is it hard to see why,

exactly, that would be the case: a neglectful parent starving a child would

cause bodily injury, and clearly fulfill all the textual requirements of the

statute at issue in Castleman.

Most likely, the Castleman Court was deterred from exploring such

minimum conduct by its desire to construe misdemeanor crimes of

domestic violence under Section 922(g)(9) to encompass statutes phrased in

terms of causation. As the Castleman Court noted, “a contrary reading

would have rendered § 922(g)(9) inoperative in many States,” since the

relevant statutes defining misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence are

largely phrased in terms of causation. 134 S. Ct. at 1413.

In my view, Castleman’s willingness to infer an element of common‐

law force, while discarding other minimum conduct plainly encompassed

by the statute at hand, underscores the unique nature of that decision—and

19 the caution we should employ in applying it beyond its explicit bounds.

Our trepidation should apply a fortiori here, where our Circuit precedent

in Chrzanoski stands for the contrary proposition: that, as a general matter,

force cannot be inferred from causation of bodily injury. The Castleman

Court emphasized that it was dealing with a specific, lesser type of force

than the violence force we must find here. And it must be said again: the

Castleman Court twice declined to find that causation of bodily injury could

show violence force. 134 S.Ct. at 1413, 1414. Accordingly, Castleman’s

analytic approach, by its own express instruction, should be read

narrowly—and should not be interpreted, as my colleagues would have it,

to cabin otherwise binding Circuit precedent.

* * *

Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the district court. I

readily acknowledge that my colleagues’ opinion accords with the

prevailing view across the federal courts of how best to perform elements

clause determinations in the wake of Castleman. However, in my

assessment, this approach ignores the explicit limitations of Castleman, as

20 well as binding Circuit authority. Happily, I note that the Supreme Court

has recently granted certiorari in a case implicating some of these same

concerns, and we may soon be given more definitive guidance in how best

to perform violent force inquiries. See Stokeling v. United States, 138 S. Ct.

1438 (2018).

Of course, the categorical approach itself is a rather bizarre exercise,

requiring intricate legal inquiry to determine whether one of Villanueva’s

convictions, for shooting another person in the shoulder, should indeed be

considered a crime of violence. However, in my view, the correct

application of precedent requires that we affirm the judgment of the

district court here.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.