Villagrana v. Kernan

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: June 12, 2025
• Docket: 4:22-cv-02618
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 AMBROSIO VILLAGRANA, Case No. 22-cv-02618-JST

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 9 v. STRONGHOLD ENGINEERING, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON 10 SCOTT KERNAN, et al., THE PLEADINGS 11 Defendants. Re: ECF No. 73

12 13 Before the Court is Defendant Stronghold Engineering, Inc.’s motion for judgment on the 14 pleadings. ECF No. 73. The Court will deny the motion. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 A. Factual Background 17 The Court accepts the following allegations from the complaint as true for the purpose of 18 deciding this motion. Espy v. J2 Glob., Inc., 99 F. 4th 527, 535 (9th Cir. 2024). Plaintiff was 19 incarcerated at CTF-Soledad at the time of all relevant events. The soil in and around CTF- 20 Soledad contains a fungus that causes Valley Fever. ECF No. 36 ¶ 29. Disturbing the soil causes 21 the fungal spores to spread into the air. Id. Most people who breathe in the fungal spores and 22 contract Valley Fever need antifungal medication to recover. Id. Although Valley Fever initially 23 attacks the lungs, it can spread to other parts of the body and cause a more severe, chronic form of 24 the illness. Id. Certain groups of people, including those with a weakened immune system, are at 25 higher risk of Valley Fever spreading throughout the body. Id. 26 In or around 2004, the California Department of Public Health issued a report with specific 27 recommendations regarding how to reduce and control the spread of Valley Fever in California 1 Valley Fever spores. Id. ¶¶ 38–39. The report recommended wetting the soil at construction sites 2 and installing ventilation systems to mitigate the spread of spores. Id. ¶ 38. In April 2012, the 3 CDCR issued another report concerning Valley Fever in adult prisons, discussing the dangers of 4 Valley Fever with respect to specific groups of people and the connection between new 5 construction projects and the spread of Valley Fever. Id. “It was a known fact that Monterey 6 Country [i]s part of the hyperendemic zone and th[at] construction work would require[] tractors 7 and other equipment to dig up the soil and stockpile[] [the soil] nearby.” Id. ¶ 32. Knowledge of 8 these reports placed Defendants on notice that construction at CTF-Soledad would cause the 9 spread of Valley Fever. E.g., id. ¶¶ 35–39. 10 Despite knowledge of the recommendations in these reports, the CDCR undertook 11 construction of CTF-Soledad’s West Medical Facility in 2016 without implementing the 12 recommendations described above. Id. ¶ 30. The CDCR contracted with Stronghold, of which 13 Defendant Bailey serves as the CEO, to construct the West Medical Facility. Id. ¶ 2. During 14 construction, Bailey and Stronghold “failed to implement the safety procedures required by the 15 California Division of Occupational Safety and Health.” Id. ¶ 13. Stronghold’s construction crew 16 used tractors and other equipment to dig up the soil and stockpile it nearby, causing tremendous 17 amounts of dust and debris to cloud the air and to enter freely through open prison windows into 18 the main central prison facility corridor. Id. ¶ 31. No ventilation system was fitted to the windows 19 to control the dust. Id. The construction project caused a spike in Valley Fever infections at CTF- 20 Soledad, with over a hundred inmates contracting the disease between 2016 and 2019. E.g., id. ¶ 21 48. 22 On December 14, 2017, Villagrana was diagnosed with Valley Fever. Id. ¶ 9. As a result, 23 he continues to suffer from headaches, sores on his head and body, significant weight loss, and 24 liver and joint pain caused by the antifungal medication used to treat Valley Fever. Id. Plaintiff 25 was released from CTF-Soledad on or about October 20, 2022. ECF No. 20. 26 B. Relevant Procedural Background 27 Plaintiff, while still proceeding pro se, filed his second amended complaint on August 15, 1 2023. ECF No. 41. 2 Defendants Hatton, Allison, and Kernan moved for judgment on the pleadings, ECF No. 3 50. The Court granted the motion and granted Villagrana leave to amend the complaint. ECF No. 4 76. Villagrana did not file an amended complaint, so the Court dismissed those Defendants with 5 prejudice. ECF No. 82. 6 Stronghold now moves for judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 73. Villagrana opposes 7 the motion, ECF No. 79, and Stronghold has filed a reply, ECF No. 80. The Court requested 8 supplemental briefing, ECF No. 83, on Villagrana’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, asserted against 9 Stronghold under a joint action theory. Stronghold filed its supplemental brief, ECF No. 84; 10 Villagrana filed a supplemental opposition, ECF No. 85; and Stronghold filed a supplemental 11 reply, ECF No. 86. 12 II. JURISDICTION 13 The Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. 14 III. LEGAL STANDARD 15 After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for 16 judgment on the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).1 The analysis for Rule 12(c) motions for 17 judgment on the pleadings is ‘substantially identical to [the] analysis under Rule 12(b)(6).” 18 Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). Under both 19 rules, “a court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the 20 plaintiff to a legal remedy.” Brooks v. Dunlop Mfg. Inc., No. C 10-04341 CRB, 2011 WL 21 6140912, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011). A plaintiff must allege facts that are enough to raise his 22 right to relief “above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 23 (citation omitted). “A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the 24 allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment 25

26 1 Villagrana “anticipates that the Court will treat this motion as one made under Rule 12(b)(6)” because “the pleadings are not closed and a motion under Rule 12(c) is not appropriate.” ECF No. 27 79 at 5 (quotation omitted). Stronghold answered the complaint on April 12, 2024, ECF No. 65, 1 as a matter of law.” Fajardo v. City of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation 2 omitted). Further, “[a]lthough Rule 12(c) does not mention leave to amend, courts have discretion 3 both to grant a Rule 12(c) motion with leave to amend, and to simply grant dismissal of the action 4 instead of entry of judgment.” Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 300 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (C.D. Cal. 5 2004) (citations omitted). 6 In general, courts must construe pro se pleadings liberally. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 7 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). 8 IV. DISCUSSION 9 Villagrana brings two claims against Stronghold: (1) negligence, and (2) a claim brought 10 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pursuant to a joint action theory, alleging that Stronghold violated the 11 Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on deliberate indifference to inmate safety and health. ECF No. 12 73 ¶¶ 44–61. 13 A. Negligence 14 Stronghold makes three arguments regarding Villagrana’s negligence claim: that (1) 15 Stronghold owed no duty of care to protect Villagrana from contracting Valley Fever, (2) there is 16 no admissible evidence that Stronghold’s conduct caused Villagrana to contract Valley Fever, and 17 (3) Villagrana’s negligence claim is time barred. The Court addresses each argument in turn. 18 1. Duty of Care 19 Stronghold first argues that “[t]his Court should determine, as a matter of law, that 20 Stronghold Engineering owes Plaintiff no legal duty of care to prevent Plaintiff from being 21 exposed to the fungus that causes Valley Fever.” ECF No. 73 at 6. Stronghold contends that, 22 while Villagrana pled that Stronghold failed to follow safety procedures of the California Division 23 of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA), Villagrana failed to name the particular 24 Cal/OSHA procedures that would have conferred upon Stronghold a duty to prevent Villagrana’s 25 contracting Valley Fever. Id. at 6–7. Stronghold further argues that it had no duty because it is 26 “merely a general contractor tasked with constructing a medical facility adjacent to the prison” and 27 “not a prison official.” Id. at 7 (emphasis in original). 1 cv-02702-JST, 2017 WL 4922380, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2017) (citing Justo v. Indymac 2 Bancorp, No. SA-cv-09-1116 JVS (AGRx), 2010 WL 623715, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2010)); 3 see also Century Surety Co. v. Crosby Ins., Inc., 124 Cal. App. 4th 116, 127 (2004) (listing “a 4 legal duty of care toward the plaintiff” as an element of a negligence cause of action). Thus, a 5 complaint is “‘fatally defective’” if it “lacks allegations of fact sufficient to show the defendant 6 owed the plaintiff a legal duty of care.” McAllister v. Patterson Cos., No. 10-cv-5413 RSWL 7 (MANx), 2012 WL 1688726, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2012) (quoting Crescent Woodworking Co. 8 v. Accent Furniture, Inc., No. EDCV 04-01318 DDP (PJWx), 2005 WL 5925586, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 9 Dec. 6, 2005)). 10 “In general, each person has a duty to act with reasonable care under the circumstances.” 11 Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 51 Cal. 4th 764, 771 (2011). “Whether a given case falls within an 12 exception to the general rule of a duty of ordinary care, or whether a duty of care exists in a given 13 circumstance, is a question of law to be determined by the court on a case-by-case basis.” Darling 14 v. Green, 2012 WL 12895823, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012) (citing Laabs v. So. Cal. Edison 15 Co., 175 Cal. App. 4th 1260, 1270 (2009)). As Stronghold acknowledges, “‘[t]he standard of care 16 required in a particular circumstance may be based on a statute or the custom and practice in the 17 relevant community,’” ECF No. 80 at 2 (quoting Danning v. Bank of Am., 151 Cal. App. 3d 961, 18 980 (Cal. App. 1984)), and “Cal-OSHA provisions, like any other statute or regulation, may be 19 used to establish [the] applicable standard of care.” ECF No. 80 at 2 (citing Elsner v. Uveges, 34 20 Cal. 4th 915, 928 (2004)). 21 Stronghold urges this Court to find that it has no duty of care as a matter of law under the 22 circumstances of this case. Stronghold argues that the complaint’s “fail[ure] to identify the 23 particular ‘dust control measures’ set forth by a particular OSHA regulation which Stronghold 24 Engineering purportedly should have possibly implemented which would have somehow 25 prevented Plaintiff from contracting Valley Fever” is fatal to Villagrana’s negligence claim. Id. at 26 7. In support of this argument, Stronghold cites cases that stand for the general principle that “the 27 existence of a duty is a question of law for the court,” ECF No. 80 at 2 (quoting Ky. Fried Chicken 1 id. (holding that fast food restaurant owed customers no duty to protect against harm caused by 2 third-party criminal conduct)). Stronghold does not point to any authority that holds that a 3 plaintiff needs to identify “particular . . . measures” set forth in regulations in order to plead a duty 4 of care. 5 Likewise, Stronghold argues summarily that it is “not a prison official but merely a general 6 contractor tasked with constructing a medical facility adjacent to the prison.” ECF No. 73 at 7 7 (internal quotation omitted, emphasis in original). But it cites no authority for the proposition that 8 general contractors are not subject to the general duty of ordinary care in these circumstances. 9 The complaint alleges that “[a]ll . . . Defendants knew about Valley Fever in the soil 10 around CTF-Soledad and Monterey County, and knew or should have known about inmate deaths 11 from exposure to Valley Fever spores in the air, especially during digging and new construction 12 projects.” ECF No. 36 ¶ 39. It alleges that “Beverly Bailey, as the CEO of the Stronghold 13 Engineering Incorporated, knew of the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health 14 requirements when working in a Valley Fever hot zone” and yet “she failed to implement on the 15 construction site[] the safety measures required.” Id. ¶ 56. The Court declines to find that a 16 general contractor who knowingly operates in a Valley Fever hot zone, is aware of the risks of 17 Valley Fever, is aware that that digging up soil will increase the risk of people nearby contracting 18 Valley Fever, and fails to implement Cal/OSHA procedures and other reasonable precautions has 19 no duty as a matter of law to prevent the spread of Valley Fever. 20 2. Causation 21 Stronghold next argues that “there is no admissible evidence that Stronghold Engineering 22 caused plaintiff to develop Valley Fever.” ECF No. 73 at 7. As an initial matter, Villagrana is not 23 required to present “admissible evidence”—or any evidence—at this stage. Nevada Fed. Credit 24 Union v. Countrywide Funding Corp., CV 10-2040 DSF (JEMx), 2010 WL 11549712, at *1 (C.D. 25 Cal. July 2, 2010) (analysis of admissibility of evidence “obviously cannot be done at the motion 26 to dismiss stage”); Finjan, Inc. v. SonicWall, Inc., No. 17-cv-04467-BLF, 2018 WL 2234370, at 27 *5 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2018) (“at the motion to dismiss stage . . . [a]dmissibility is not at issue”). 1 sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 2 U.S. 544, 546 (2007). 3 Stronghold rests its causation argument primarily on Miranda v. Bomel Construction Co., 4 187 Cal. App. 4th 1326 (2010), which it claims “is indistinguishable from” the instant case. ECF 5 No. 73 at 8. But the case is distinguishable in at least one important respect: it was decided at 6 summary judgment, not on a motion to dismiss. In Miranda, the California Court of Appeal 7 affirmed summary judgment of plaintiff’s negligence claim against a construction company that 8 stockpiled excess dirt on a vacant lot next to the workplace of the plaintiff, who contracted Valley 9 Fever. Id. at 1328–29. The court, after considering the plaintiff’s expert declarations, concluded 10 that they “failed to present any evidence” that “the uncovered dirt at [the vacant lot] was the 11 source of the fungus spore causing Miranda’s illness creating liability.” Id. at 1339 (emphasis 12 omitted). But here, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, Villagrana need not present 13 evidence proving that Stronghold’s conduct caused him to contract Valley Fever. Lowe v. County 14 of Butte ex rel. Dep’t of Probation & Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 2:20-cv-01997-JAM-DMC, 2021 WL 15 1890386, at *5 (quoting Medina-Velazquez v. Hernandez-Gregorat, 767 F.3d 103, 111 (1st Cir. 16 2014) (“For pleading purposes, plaintiffs need not establish causation. The facts contained in the 17 complaint need only show that the claim of causation is plausible.”). 18 Instead, the complaint must plead facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible 19 on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Villagrana’s complaint meets 20 that bar. It alleges that Bailey and Stronghold “failed to implement on the construction site the 21 safety procedures required by the California Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA), such as 22 implementing dust control measures” and that “as a result” of those and other failures, “from 2016 23 to 2019, CTF-Soledad Prison saw a spike in the number of inmates who contracted Valley Fever.” 24 ECF No. 36 ¶ 48. This included Villagrana, who was diagnosed with Valley Fever on December 25 14, 2017. Id. ¶ 9. These allegations draw a direct causal link between Stronghold’s conduct and 26 Villagrana’s harm. 27 Likewise, Stronghold’s arguments that the complaint “identifies no scientific data” 1 that Villagrana’s Valley Fever “could have been from countless sources, including a dust storm” 2 raise factual questions and thus are premature at this stage. See Rasooly v. Peine, 15-cv-04540- 3 JD, 2016 WL 3443382, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2016) (“Defendants challenge these allegations 4 on factual grounds, . . . and may prevail on them at the appropriate stage, but resolving fact 5 disputes is not within the motion to dismiss procedure.”). 6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Villagrana has properly pled causation. 7 3. Statute of Limitations 8 Finally, Stronghold argues that Villagrana’s claims are time-barred. Villagrana filed this 9 action nearly five years after his Valley Fever diagnosis, and Stronghold contends the appropriate 10 statute of limitations is two years. ECF No. 73 at 9–10 (citing Cal. Code Civ. P. § 340.8). In 11 response, Villagrana argues that he pled tolling of the statute of limitations. ECF No. 79 at 9–10. 12 A federal court must give effect to a state’s tolling provisions. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 13 U.S. 536, 543–44 (1989). The statute of limitations begins to run immediately after the 14 recognized disability period ends. See Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 378–89 15 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying California law). “A motion to dismiss based on the running of the 16 statute of limitations period may be granted only ‘if the assertions of the complaint, read with the 17 required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.’” Supermail 18 Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Jablon v. Dean 19 Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980)). 20 Villagrana raises four bases for tolling: disability of imprisonment, Cal. Code Civ. P. 21 § 352.1; California’s discovery rule, see Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal. 4th 797, 806 22 (Cal. 2005); the period during which Villagrana was seriously ill with Valley Fever; and the 23 period during the COVID-19 pandemic when CTF-Soledad was under a lockdown that prevented 24 Villagrana from visiting the prison law library. ECF No. 79 at 6–7. 25 If “the face of the complaint does not permit determination of the facts material to the 26 running of the statute,” a motion to dismiss for untimeliness must be denied. See Cobb v. Cook, 27 No. 2:12-cv-1666 JAM AC P, 2013 WL 1704992, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2013), report and 1 Villagrana’s bases for tolling in its opposition or in its reply. See ECF Nos. 73 at 9–10; 80 at 4. 2 Nor are the facts material to the running of the statute determinable from the face of the complaint. 3 Under California’s discovery rule, for example, a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff 4 “discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action,” which occurs when the plaintiff “‘has 5 reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements.’” Fox, 35 Cal. 4th at 807 (quoting 6 Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal. 4th 383, 398 (1999). Here, the complaint alleges that Villagrana 7 did not believe that his case of Valley Fever alone was sufficient to bring an action without 8 evidence of a larger epidemic within the prison, ECF No. 36 ¶ 26, and that he did not learn of the 9 larger epidemic until he “submitted [a] request to inspect CDCR’s medical public records.” Id. 10 ¶ 27. Villagrana received those records no earlier than March 15, 2021. See id. at 23. He filed his 11 initial complaint in this action on April 29, 2022. ECF No. 1. Accepting his factual allegations as 12 true, as the court must do at this stage, Smith v. City of Oakland, No. 19-cv-05398-JST, 2020 WL 13 2517857, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2020), Villagrana arguably filed his complaint within two years 14 of when he “ha[d] reason at least to suspect a factual basis for” the elements of his claims. Fox, 35 15 Cal. 4th at 807 (quoting Norgart, 21 Cal.4th at 398). Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude 16 from the face of the complaint that Villagrana’s claims are time-barred. See Cobb v. Cook, No. 17 2:12-cv-1666 JAM AC P, 2013 WL 1704992, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2013), report and 18 recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 3146813 (June 18, 2013) (denying motion to dismiss for 19 untimeliness where “Defendant does not address . . . the impact (if any) of California Code of 20 Civil Procedure section 352.1(a)” and “the face of the complaint does not permit determination of 21 the facts material to the running of the statute”). Thus, the Court declines to dismiss Villagrana’s 22 claims on this ground. 23 B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim 24 In the Court’s order on Defendants Kernan, Allison, and Hatton’s motion for judgment on 25 the pleadings, ECF No. 76, the Court dismissed Villagrana’s section 1983 claim as to those 26 defendants on qualified immunity grounds. See id. at 7. In Stronghold’s supplemental brief, 27 Stronghold asserts that “[p]ursuant to, and consistent with,” that order, Villagrana’s Section 1983 1 Villagrana responds that “[q]Jualified immunity is not available to private actors.” ECF No. 85 at 2 || 6. 3 Villagrana has the better argument. Under Ninth Circuit law, qualified immunity is not 4 available to private defendants in a section 1983 suit. Danielson v. Inslee, 945 F.3d 1096, 1099- 5 1100 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[P]rivate parties cannot avail themselves of qualified immunity to a section 6 1983 lawsuit.”) (emphasis omitted) (citing Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 385 n.10 (9th Cir. 7 1983); FE. Trotter, Inc. v. Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit 8 || has stated that private defendants are not entitled to qualified in section 1983 actions.”) (citing 9 || Howerton, 708 F.2d at 385 n.10). On reply, Stronghold cites a handful of cases from other 10 circuits. See ECF No. 86 at 2 (citing Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2000); Camilo- 11 Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998); Cullinan v. Abramson, 128 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 1997); 12 Meadows v. Rockford Hous. Auth., 861 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2017)). This Court must follow binding 5 13 || Ninth Circuit precedent and thus will not dismiss Villagrana’s section 1983 claim against 14 Stronghold, a private defendant, on qualified immunity grounds. 3 15 CONCLUSION a 16 For the reasons set forth above, Stronghold’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is 3 17 || denied. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 || Dated: June 12, 2025 C □ p A .

20 JON S. TIGA 71 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28