Village of Wintersville v. Argo Sales Co.
This text of 299 N.E.2d 269 (Village of Wintersville v. Argo Sales Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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Ordinance No. 186, as presented to the village council by the Planning Commission, provided a comprehensive zoning plan for the village of Wintersville, by dividing the village into various districts and prescribing standards for each of the districts, providing supplementary standards, and providing a method of administration and enforcement of the ordinance.
It was introduced in the village council at a special meeting on November 26, 1957, and read for the first time. According to the minutes of that meeting, a hearing was set for December 27, 1957, and the c]erk wps oj-4ere4 to post potices.
[150]*150On December 5, 1957, at a regular meeting of the council, Ordinance No. 186 was read for the second time..
On December 27,1957, at a special meeting of the council, Ordinance No. 186 was read for the third time. The minutes of that meeting indicated that no member of the public was present to object to the passing of this ordinance and it was passed by a vote of 5-0. The ordinance was then entered in the record of ordinances book kept by the clerk. There was no certification by the clerk showing publication or posting of the ordinance.
In conjunction with the consideration of Ordinance No. 186, a comprehensive zoning map of the village of Winters-ville was prepared and kept on file in the village hall during the reading of the ordinance and after the passage thereof.
The legislation was declared to be an emergency ordinance, and took effect and was in full force immediately upon its passage.
The above facts are stipulated by the village of Wintersville and the defendants. In addition, at the trial further evidence was offered by intervening plaintiffs.
In his testimony at the trial, Raymond E. Wilson, clerk of the village council in 1957 and 1958, testified upon cross-examination, in connection with the posting of Ordinance No. 186, as follows:
“Q. Now this map that you are talking about was not posted with the ordinance [Ordinance No. 186] in the five places?
“A. The map wasn’t, no.
“Q.. Do you recall the date that you posted this [Ordinance No. 186] ? Was that after the first reading?
“A. I didn’t post them until they were passed and signed by the mayor and signed by the clerk; then they were posted.”
Appellees argue that the provisions of R. G. 731.25, relative to the type of public notice to be given a proposed zoning ordinance, are mandatory; that when the council chooses to post the proposed ordinance in five public places, both the te?t of the ordinance and the map to which it [151]*151applies mast be posted in each of the five public places; and that posting the map at a single location is not compliance with the statute.
Appellants contend that since this ordinance was passed as an emergency ordinance it went into immediate effect under E. C. 731.30, notwithstanding the provisions of E. C. 731.23 requiring its publication, and that a subsequent failure to publish in approved form could not affect its validity. The case of Tirpack v. Maro (1967), 9 Ohio App. 2d 76, relied on by appellees, is distinguished because in that case the ordinance was not enacted as an emergency measure.
The advantage at this point seems to lie with appellants and their position that Ordinance No. 186 went into immediate effect on December 27, 1957, regardless of any defect in notice and posting required by E. C. 731.25. However, since the validity of the ordinance is the issue, it is necessary for this court to give consideration to the compliance or noncompliance, by the village council and the clerk of the council, to the provisions of E. C. 713.12.1
[152]*152Section 3 of Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, which confers home rule power, does not in and of itself empower an Ohio noncharter municipality to enact an emergency zoning ordinance; and such municipality, in the enactment of a zoning ordinance, must comply with R. C. 713.12, which requires a public hearing on the proposed ordinance, preceded by a 30-day notice of the time and place of such hearing.
The G-eneral Assembly, in adopting a statutory plan for the government of municipalities generally, as required by the Constitution, has specified the procedure to be followed with respect to the adoption of zoning ordinances. This procedure is designed to safeguard property rights and to give property owners a fair opportunity to enter a protest against an ordinance which may materially interfere with the use of their property or decrease its value.
Since the noncharter village of Wintersville was subject to the statutory enactments with respect to the procedure to be followed in the adoption of zoning ordinances, it was mandatory to adhere to the provisions of R. C. 713.12, which necessitate a public hearing, preceded by a 30-day notice of the time and place of such public hearing. Morris v. Roseman (1954), 162 Ohio St. 447,
Paragraph numbered “1” of the agreed statement of facts reads:
* According to the minutes of that meeting, a hearing was set for December 27, 1957 and the clerk was ordered to post notices.”
There is nothing in the record tending to establish [153]*153that the village council of Wintersville gave 30 days ’ notice of the time and place of the hearing as required by B.' C. 713.12.
On the contrary, the clerk of the village council, as a witness for the intervening plaintiffs, testified, as follows:
“Q. What—Did you have any duty in connection with that ordinance?
“A. Yes, I was to post these ordinances.
6 i # *
“A. I was to post these ordinances at five different places in the village of Wintersville after signed by the mayor and the clerk.
“Q. And do you recall of your own knowledge whether you did so with this ordinance?
“A. I posted all of them.”
Obviously, the witness was testifying about posting the ordinance in compliance with the provisions of E. C. 731.252, which refers to adoption of ordinances and resolutions of a general nature. However, in this case we are eon[154]*154cerned with a zoning ordinance, which is specifically covered by R. C. 713.12. And, as pointed out above, the provisions of R. C. 713.12 must be followed in the enactment of zoning legislation by a noncharter village. If those provisions are not followed, then the zoning ordinance adopted is ineffective and invalid. The record clearly demonstrates that a 30-day notice of the time and place of a public hearing on Ordinance No. 186 was not published by the clerk of the council
Accordingly, only and exclusively for the reasons hereinbefore stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
299 N.E.2d 269, 35 Ohio St. 2d 148, 64 Ohio Op. 2d 88, 1973 Ohio LEXIS 324, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/village-of-wintersville-v-argo-sales-co-ohio-1973.