Village of Steger v. Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council

2024 IL App (1st) 232341-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: August 15, 2024
• Docket: 1-23-2341
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (1st) 232341-U Fourth Division Filed August 15, 2024 No. 1-23-2341

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT

) VILLAGE OF STEGER, ILLINOIS, an Illinois ) Municipal Corporation, ) Petitioner-Appellant, ) Appeal from the v. ) Circuit Court of Cook County ) ILLINOIS FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE ) No. 2022 CH 10814 LABOR COUNCIL, RONALD WOODSON, ) and BRIAN CLAUSS, ) The Honorable Caroline Kate Moreland, ) Judge, presiding. Respondents ) (Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor ) Council, Respondent-Appellee). )

JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Hoffman concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court’s order denying the petition to vacate an arbitration award requiring the employer to reinstate a terminated employee was affirmed where it derived its essence from the collective bargaining agreement and did not violate public policy.

¶2 Petitioner, the Village of Steger, petitioned to vacate an arbitrator’s decision in favor of

respondent, the Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council (the FOP), requiring the Village

to reinstate Ronald Woodson’s employment as a police officer with the Village. The circuit court

denied the petition. The Village appeals, and we affirm. No. 1-23-2341

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 The issue in this case arises under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) originally

entered into between the Metropolitan Alliance of Police (whose role as collective bargaining

representative was assumed by the FOP after a July 2020 election) and the Village of Steger that

came into effect on November 6, 2018. There are three specific provisions relevant to this case.

¶5 First, Section 1.2 of the CBA recognized an eighteen-month probationary period for new

officers. During the probationary period, an officer was “subject to discipline, including discharge,

without cause and with no recourse to the grievance procedure or any other forum.” Otherwise,

probationary officers were “entitled to all other rights, privileges, and benefits conferred by” the

CBA.

¶6 Second, Section 16.1 of the CBA provided for a disability benefit identical to the statutory

benefit conferred by the Public Employee Disability Act (5 ILCS 345/0.01 to 2 (West 2020)):

“For the purposes of this Section, ‘eligible employee’ means any full-

time employee.

An eligible employee who suffers any injury in the line of duty which

causes him to be unable to perform his duties, shall be governed by the

provisions of the Public Employee Disability Act (“PEDA”), 5 ILCS 345/1,

and any other applicable laws.”

That statute provides, in relevant part:

“Whenever an eligible employee suffers any injury in the line of duty which

causes him to be unable to perform his duties, he shall continue to be paid

by the employing public entity on the same basis as he was paid before the

injury, with no deduction from his sick leave credits, compensatory time for

overtime accumulations or vacation, or service credits in a public employee

pension fund during the time he is unable to perform his duties due to the

result of the injury, but not longer than one year in relation to the same

injury *** .” 5 ILCS 345/1(b) (West 2020).

-2- No. 1-23-2341

¶7 Third, Section 11.1 of the CBA set out the procedure for resolving any disagreements

“involving the meaning, interpretation, or application of the provisions of” the CBA. The first step

called for the affected employee, to, with or without a union representative, submit a written

grievance to the chief of police. If the chief of police did not “adjust[ ]” the grievance, then the

second step would be to submit it to the mayor. If the mayor’s decision did not satisfy the union,

it could then submit the dispute to arbitration. The CBA limited the arbitrator’s power “to the

interpretation and application of the written terms of this Agreement,” which the arbitrator had no

authority to change. The arbitrator was authorized to “decide only the specific issue raised by the

grievance as originally submitted in writing to the Village” and had “no authority to make his

decision on any issue not so submitted to him.” Upon finding “a violation of the Agreement,” the

arbitrator was to “determine an appropriate remedy,” and the arbitrator’s decision was “final and

binding on the parties.” A related provision in Section 13.2 authorized reinstatement as a remedy

for termination, but “only if accompanied by a finding of a violation of the employee’s substantive

rights.”

¶8 Ronald Woodson began working as a police officer for the Village on April 18, 2019. Under

the CBA, he was considered a probationary employee for the first eighteen months of his

employment (i.e. through October 17, 2020). Woodson was hurt while on duty in January 2020.

The record does not disclose the nature of the injury, but it prevented him from performing his

duties. For several months, the Village maintained Woodson’s employment and continued to pay

him, but in September 2020, an independent physician determined that Woodson needed surgery

and six more months of recovery before returning to work. Five days later, on September 23, the

Village fired Woodson.

¶9 The next day, the FOP filed a grievance alleging that the Village had violated Section 16.1

when it “failed to pay disability benefits to Officer Nathan Woodson.” The grievance was

ultimately submitted to arbitration, where the issue was framed as “whether the Employer violated

the Agreement when it discharged Grievant, and if so, what remedy.” The arbitrator determined

that, because the CBA incorporated the Public Employee Disability Act, he had the authority to

-3- No. 1-23-2341

decide whether the Village had violated that statute’s provisions. On the merits, he found that,

regardless of Woodson’s probationary status, he was still a full-time employee and therefore

eligible for the benefit conferred by the Public Employee Disability Act, as incorporated in the

CBA. Because that benefit requires the employer to continue the injured employee continue to be

paid for up to one year following the injury, the arbitrator found that the Village violated the CBA

by terminating Woodson’s employment only nine months after Woodson’s injury. For those

reasons, the arbitrator granted the grievance and ordered that Woodson “be made whole.” After the

parties sought clarification about the remedy, the arbitrator specified that the Village was required

to reinstate Woodson’s employment. Finding that the purpose of Public Employee Disability Act

was to “ensure[ ] that the employment relationship is maintained for a year to allow an injured

officer *** to recover,” the arbitrator rejected the Village’s argument that Woodson could be made

whole by simply paying out his salary for the remaining one-year period.

¶ 10 The Village then filed a petition to vacate the award in the circuit court on the ground that

the arbitrator had exceeded his power and contravened public policy by ordering reinstatement,

which, it argued, was not an available remedy under the Public Employee Disability Act. The

circuit court denied the petition. It determined that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority

because the award derived its essence from his interpretation of the CBA, and it found that the

Village had not shown that reinstatement violated an explicit and well-defined public policy. In

support of the latter conclusion, the circuit court cited, as persuasive authority, the unpublished

decision in Village of Bolingbrook v. Metropolitan Alliance of Police, Bolingbrook Police Officers

Chapter #3, 2023 IL App (3d) 220193-U, for the proposition that “employees paid pursuant to [the

Public Employee Disability Act] are to maintain their employment status.” See id. ¶ 6.

¶ 11 ANALYSIS

¶ 12 On appeal, the Village alleges two errors. First, it asserts that the circuit court “improperly

enforced an arbitral award that was in contravention of an explicit and well-defined public policy.”

Second, it complains that the circuit court improperly relied on an unpublished decision to

-4- No. 1-23-2341

conclude that the award was not contrary to public policy. Whether an arbitration award violates

public policy is a question of law that we review de novo. City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan

Alliance of Police, Chapter No. 240, 2015 IL App (1st) 140957, ¶ 20.

¶ 13 Initially, we reject the Village’s contention that the circuit court’s reliance on the

unpublished decision in Village of Bolingbrook, 2023 IL App (3d) 220193-U, was error. When our

review is de novo, as it is here, the only question is whether the circuit court’s judgment was

correct; the reasoning it used to support that judgment is not relevant to our analysis. See Khan v.

Fur Keeps Animal Rescue, Inc., 2021 IL App (1st) 182694, ¶ 25. Additionally, it was not at all

improper for the circuit court to rely on Village of Bolingbrook. While unpublished Rule 23(b)

orders are not precedential, any such orders entered on or after January 1, 2021, “may be cited for

persuasive purposes” by any party. Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023). Here, the FOP cited

Village of Bolingbrook in its response to the Village’s petition, as it was permitted to do by Rule

23(e). The court was not bound by that unpublished decision, but it was entitled to consider it for

its persuasive value.

¶ 14 Turning to the merits, the Village argues that the arbitration award should be vacated

because it is contrary to public policy. Specifically, the Village contends that the benefit conferred

by the Public Employee Disability Act is limited to pay and that the statute does not authorize the

reinstatement remedy chosen by the arbitrator in this case.

¶ 15 Arbitration awards are subject to “extremely limited” judicial review. American Federation

of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill.

2d 299, 304 (1996) (AFSCME). This is especially true when the underlying arbitration was

conducted in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement, as is the case here. Generally, “a

court is duty bound to enforce a labor-arbitration award if the arbitrator acts within the scope of

his or her authority and the award draws its essence from the parties’ collective-bargaining

agreement.” Id. at 304-05. The only exceptions are those recognized at common law. Board of

Education of the City of Chicago v. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, 86 Ill. 2d 469, 474

(1981); see 710 ILCS 5/12(e) (West 2020). One such exception is for arbitration awards that

-5- No. 1-23-2341

contravene public policy. Just as a court will not enforce a contract “that is repugnant to the

established norms of public policy,” a court “may not ignore the same public policy concerns when

they are undermined through the process of arbitration.” AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 306-07. This

exception is narrow, and it applies only when it is clearly shown that the arbitrator’s interpretation

of the collective bargaining agreement, as reflected by the award, violates an “explicit public

policy.” Id. at 307.

¶ 16 A claim that an arbitration award should be vacated as contrary to public policy requires a

two-step inquiry. We first “determine if there is a well-established and dominant policy implicated

by the arbitration award.” City of Des Plaines, 2015 IL App (1st) 140957, ¶ 22; see AFSCME, 173

Ill. 2d at 307. We then “determine whether the arbitrator’s award, as reflected in his interpretation

of the [collective bargaining] agreement, violated the public policy” identified at the first step.

AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 308. Although “[t]his inquiry ‘is necessarily fact dependent,’ ” the question

is one of law. City of Des Plaines, 2015 IL App (1st) 140957, ¶ 20 (quoting AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d

at 311).

¶ 17 Our state’s public policy is ascertained principally from its constitution and statutes,

although it may also be found in judicial decisions and the consistent practices of government

officials. AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 307. Here, the public policy relied on by the Village is the one

expressed in section 1(b) of the Public Employee Disability Act itself:

“Whenever an eligible employee suffers any injury in the line of duty which

causes him to be unable to perform his duties, he shall continue to be paid

by the employing public entity on the same basis as he was paid before the

injury, with no deduction from his sick leave credits, compensatory time for

overtime accumulations or vacation, or service credits in a public employee

pension fund during the time he is unable to perform his duties due to the

result of the injury, but not longer than one year in relation to the same

injury.” 5 ILCS 345/1(b) (West 2020).

-6- No. 1-23-2341

Eligible employees include police officers, firefighters, correctional officers, and a handful of other

public workers who take on unusually dangerous duties. Id. § 1(a). The statute, therefore, expresses

a public policy in favor of ensuring that those who accept those risks for the public’s benefit do

not lose their paychecks, sick leave, personal time off, or progress toward pension benefits when

they suffer an injury in the line of duty that temporarily prevents them from working. See id. § 1(d)

(prohibiting other employment during injury). There can be no serious dispute that the arbitrator’s

award here did not contravene that policy.

¶ 18 The Village, however, argues the Public Employee Disability Act expresses not only a

public policy in favor of the benefit it provides but also against any further benefits for the injured

employees it protects. Even accepting the premise that the section 1(b) disability benefit is limited

to pay and does not require continued employment—which, to be clear, we express no view on—

that hardly represents a public policy against more generous disability benefits. Taken seriously,

the Village’s argument would mean that the minimum benefit required by the Public Employee

Disability Act is also a cap. A firefighter’s union would not, for instance, be able to bargain for a

two-year benefit in exchange for a modest reduction in pay; the resulting collective bargaining

agreement would violate the supposed public policy against extending disability benefits for more

than one year. We simply cannot agree that a statute that is plainly designed to promote the welfare

of police officers (and others) who are hurt in the line of duty represents a public policy against

doing anything more than the bare legal minimum.

¶ 19 In fairness, the absurdity of the Village’s argument is an unavoidable side effect of trying

to force a round peg through a square hole. Although couched in terms of public policy, the

Village’s true complaint is that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the collective bargaining

agreement’s disability provision, which incorporated the Public Employee Disability Act by

reference, was too generous. That may be a reasonable argument, but it is not the question before

us. By entering into the CBA, the Village agreed to have an arbitrator, not the courts, resolve

disputes over “the interpretation and application” of the CBA’s provisions and to “determine an

appropriate remedy” for any violations. See AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 305 (“Because the parties

-7- No. 1-23-2341

have contracted to have their disputes settled by an arbitrator, rather than by a judge, it is the

arbitrator’s view of the meaning of the contract that the parties have agreed to accept.”). Our role

is limited to verifying that the arbitrator’s award “derive[d] its essence” from the CBA. Id. at 306.

And here, it did: the arbitrator interpreted the CBA as incorporating the Public Employee Disability

Act’s one-year disability benefit, he interpreted that benefit as requiring maintenance of the

employment relationship during the benefit period, and he found that terminating Woodson’s

employment was, therefore, a violation of the CBA. Whether or not we agree with it, the

arbitrator’s interpretation plainly drew its essence from the CBA itself. See id. at 305 (“We will

not overrule that construction merely because our own interpretation differs from that of the

arbitrator.”). Similarly, because the CBA contemplated that the remedy for any violation would be

determined by the arbitrator, we “have no authority to disagree with his honest judgment in that

respect.” Id. at 306. And, as we have already explained, neither the arbitrator’s understanding of

the Public Employee Disability Act, as incorporated in the CBA, or his selection of reinstatement

as a remedy contravened public policy. For those reasons, the Village’s petition to vacate was

properly denied.

¶ 20 CONCLUSION

¶ 21 Because the arbitrator’s award directing the Village to reinstate Woodson derived its

essence from the CBA and was not contrary to public policy, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment

denying the Village’s petition to vacate the arbitration award.

¶ 22 Affirmed.

-8-