Village of Bolingbrook v. Metropolitan Alliance of Police, Bolingbrook Police Officers Chapter 3

2023 IL App (3d) 220193-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: February 9, 2023
• Docket: 3-22-0193
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2023 IL App (3d) 220193-U

Order filed February 9, 2023 _____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE VILLAGE OF BOLINGBROOK, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Will County, Illinois. ) v. ) ) METROPOLITAN ALLIANCE OF ) Appeal No. 3-22-0193 POLICE, BOLINGBROOK POLICE ) Circuit No. 21-CH-422 OFFICERS CHAPTER #3 ) ) Defendant-Appellee. ) The Honorable ) John C. Anderson, ) Judge, presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Davenport concurred in the judgment. _____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The arbitrator did not exceed his authority when he resolved the question submitted to him by interpreting the terms of the contract.

¶2 Plaintiff, the Village of Bolingbrook (the Village), brought an action in Will County

circuit court to vacate an arbitrator’s decision in favor of Metropolitan Alliance of Police, Bolingbrook Police Officers Chapter #3 (MAP). The circuit court declined, thereby sustaining

the Union’s grievances. The Village appeals. We affirm the circuit court's judgment.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The Village of Bolingbrook police officers are represented by MAP. The Village and

MAP entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) governing the period between May

2018 and April 2023 concerning the terms of employment between the Village and members of

MAP. According to the Village, its Director of Public Safety learned in June 2018 that the

Village’s police department and fire department calculated the accrual of sick leave, vacation

leave, and holiday pay differently for members of their respective unions who were receiving

workers’ compensation disability benefits for longer than a year.

¶5 The Director then sought an opinion from the Village’s attorney. The attorney opined

that, pursuant to the Public Employee Disability Act (PEDA) (5 ILCS 345/1 et seq. (West 2018))

and the Village’s employee manual, employees do not accrue additional leave benefits following

the expiration of PEDA leave, and he instructed the police department to cease recording benefit

leave for the applicable employees.

¶6 PEDA provides that when a police officer is injured in the line of duty, the Village must

continue the officer’s full pay for one year. 5 ILCS 345/1 et seq. (West 2018). Thereafter, the

officer is compensated under workers’ compensation rates. During the period officers are paid

pursuant to PEDA, they are to maintain their full employment status and benefits associated

therewith.

¶7 Members of the police department filed grievances against the Village due to the actions

taken after the attorney issued his opinion. The grievances alleged that the Village made

2 unilateral changes to the officers’ benefits, violating the terms of the CBA. The Village and

MAP did not settle the grievance and proceeded to arbitration.

¶8 The parties jointly selected an arbitrator. At the hearing, MAP argued that the question

presented for the arbitrator to resolve was “did the Village have authority on October 23rd of

2018, to change the policy concerning benefit accrual for officers injured on duty[?] And if not,

what is the proper remedy[?]” In support of its position that its members continue to accrue sick

days, vacation days, and holiday pay after the one-year period set forth in PEDA, it relied on

Section 16.1 of the CBA, which provided:

Section 16.1 General Leave

In no case shall benefits accrue to a Police Officer while he is on an extended leave of

absence. This clause applies to unpaid leaves of absence; it does not apply to

workman’s compensation leave.

¶9 The Village stated the issue presented to the arbitrator as follows: “What we are talking

about this morning is the Village of Bolingbrook’s disability policy when PEDA expires and

Workers’ Compensation takes over.” It relied upon Section 8.6 of the CBA, which provided:

Section 8.6 Employee Disability

The Employer agrees that they shall maintain current disability policy as outlined in

the Village Rules and Regulations manual.

¶ 10 The Village asserted that Section 8.6 of the CBA incorporated the Village manual into

the CBA and that the manual’s provisions therefore controlled. The other relevant provisions of

the Village’s Rules and Regulations manual state:

Conflict with Collective Bargaining Agreements

3 The requirements of these Rules and Regulations shall not supersede the provisions of

written agreements between the Village and employee bargaining units.

***

WORKER’S COMPENSATION/DISABILITY

All employees injured while in the performance of their duties shall be compensated

with the Worker’s Compensation benefits as outlined by State Statute and funded by

the Village of Bolingbrook.

EXTENDED LEAVE/ACCRUAL OF BENEFITS AND ADDITIONAL

COMPENSATION

Employees on extended leave, including worker’s compensation *** or such other

leave as may be authorized by the Mayor for periods exceeding thirty (30) days, shall

be subject to the following:

2. No sick leave will be accrued while an employee is on extended leave ***

3. Employees shall not accrue vacation or holiday leave while on extended leave.

¶ 11 At the hearing, the Village Administrator, who was the former Director of Public Safety,

testified that the Village did not have a policy on accrual of benefits after the one-year period

provided by PEDA, which is why he consulted with the attorney. The attorney’s memorandum

stated that “the Village policy going forward” would be that benefit accrual ceased when PEDA

leave expired. The policy set forth in the attorney’s memorandum was put into effect in January

2019.

4 ¶ 12 At the same time the Village attorney issued his opinion, the parties were negotiating for

their next CBA. Benefit accrual was not discussed during negotiations. MAP informed the

arbitrator that it did not raise the benefit accrual issue because it believed that the contract

language already addressed it. The Village stated that it did not raise the issue because there were

“bigger issues” to discuss.

¶ 13 The arbitrator noted that MAP relied upon Section 16.1 of the CBA, which specifically

excluded workers’ compensation leave from its extended leave benefit accrual prohibition.

Alternatively, the Village relied upon Section 8.6, which incorporated the manual’s provision

including workers’ compensation leave in its ban of benefit accrual.

¶ 14 The arbitrator sustained MAP’s grievance, finding that a conflict existed between the

CBA and the Village’s policy manual regarding when benefit leave accrued during extended

leave. First, he found that Section 16.1 of the CBA specifically excluded workers’ compensation

leave from its prohibition on benefit leave accrual, while the manual expressly included its ban

on benefit leave accrual. That conflict, the arbitrator found, must be resolved in favor of the

CBA, because the manual also provided it would not supersede any written agreement between

the Village and its employees’ bargaining units. Any conflicts between the manual and CBA

must follow the CBA’s provisions. Thus, under the CBA, benefit leave must still accrue for those

on workers’ compensation leave even after PEDA leave expires. Therefore, the arbitrator found

that the Village violated the CBA when it unilaterally changed contractual terms regarding

benefit accrual during post-PEDA workers’ compensation leave.

¶ 15 The Village subsequently filed an application and complaint to vacate the arbitrator’s

decision and award. After briefings and oral arguments, the court issued an order denying the

5 Village’s complaint. In so finding, it stated that the arbitrator’s award was supported by the

language of the CBA. The Village now appeals.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 On appeal, the Village argues that the arbitrator erred in sustaining the grievances.

Specifically, the Village asserts the arbitrator’s decision should be vacated because the arbitrator

exceeded his authority by ignoring the provisions in the Village manual to read into the CBA a

provision that did not exist. Rather than interpret the CBA, the Village argues that the arbitrator

ignored the plain language to reach the outcome he desired. Further, because the arbitrator

exceeded his authority, his decision did not draw its essence from the collective bargaining

agreement. The Village asks that we reverse the circuit court’s judgment and vacate the

arbitrator’s decision.

¶ 18 It is well established that judicial review of an arbitrator’s review is extremely limited.

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. State of Illinois, 124 Ill. 246,

254 (1988) (AFSCME). The award must be construed as valid whenever possible. Id. The

standard of limited review reflects the legislature’s intent through the Uniform Arbitration Act to

provide finality for labor disputes submitted to arbitration. See 710 ILCS 5/12 (West 2018);

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Department of

Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 304 (1996) (AFL-CIO). An arbitration award

should be disturbed only in cases of fraud, corruption, partiality, misconduct, mistake, or for

failure to submit the issue to arbitration. AFL-CIO, 173 Ill. 2d at 304. On review, the court must

enforce a labor-arbitration award if the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority and the

award draws its essence from the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement. Id. at 304-05.

6 ¶ 19 The authority given to the arbitrator is determined by the provisions of the parties’

agreement. Village of Posen v. Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, 2014 IL App

(1st) 133329, ¶ 37. “On judicial review, there is a presumption the arbitrator did not exceed his

authority.” Decatur Police Benevolent and Protective Ass’n Labor Committee v. City of Decatur,

2012 IL App (4th) 110764, ¶ 21. An arbitrator exceeds his authority when he decides matters that

were not submitted to him for resolution. Board of Trustees of Community College District No.

508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600, 74 Ill. 2d 412, 419 (1979) (District

No. 508). Further, the scope of an arbitrator’s power is dependent upon what the parties agreed to

submit to arbitration. Id. Because the parties agreed to have disputes settled through arbitration,

the court may not overrule an award simply because it would interpret the contract differently.

Everen Securities, Inc. v. A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc., 308 Ill. App. 3d 268, 273 (1999).

However, if the arbitrator exceeded his authority, the award must be vacated. AFL-CIO, 173 Ill.

2d at 304-05.

¶ 20 Here, the issue submitted to the arbitrator to resolve was whether the Village’s policy to

terminate benefit leave accrual after PEDA leave expired for members of MAP on workers’

compensation after January 2019, made in response to its attorney’s opinion, violated the terms

of the CBA, and if so, what the appropriate remedy was. The arbitrator’s written decision found

that the CBA excluded workers’ compensation leave from the prohibition on benefit accrual for

those on extended leave, thus employees on workers’ compensation were still entitled to benefit

leave accrual when PEDA benefits expired. Further, the arbitrator found that the change in policy

created by the attorney’s opinion violated the terms of the CBA. Clearly, the arbitrator answered

the question presented to him.

7 ¶ 21 Once it is determined that the arbitrator answered the question submitted, the court may

review the arbitrator’s decision only to determine whether the award “draws its essence” from

the collective bargaining agreement. AFSCME, 124 Ill. 2d at 254-55. Questions as to how the

collective bargaining agreement should be interpreted are not for the court to decide as the

parties bargained for the arbitrator to decide them. AFL-CIO, 173 Ill. 2d at 305. “[E]ven where

the award is based upon the arbitrator’s misreading of the contract, the court must uphold the

award so long as the arbitrator’s interpretation is derived from the language of the contract.”

Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241 v. Chicago Transit Authority, 342 Ill. App. 3d 176, 180

(2003).

¶ 22 The parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator rather than the court.

It is therefore the arbitrator’s view of the facts and interpretation of contract that the parties have

agreed to accept. Griggsville-Perry Community Unit School District No. 4 v. Illinois Educational

Labor Relations Board, 2013 IL 113721, ¶ 18 (Griggsville). We will inquire into the merits of

the arbitrator’s interpretation only to the extent necessary to determine whether the decision drew

its essence from the agreement. District No. 508, 74 Ill. 2d at 421; Griggsville, 2013 IL 113721,

¶ 18.

¶ 23 The Village argues that the arbitrator’s award did not draw its essence from the CBA

because the arbitrator modified the language of Section 16.1 of the CBA to read into it that

anyone on workers’ compensation leave can still receive benefit accrual. However, the Village

cannot merely argue that the arbitrator committed error; it must show that there is no

“interpretive route to the award, so a noncontractual basis can be inferred and the award set

aside.” Id. ¶ 20 (quoting Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935

F. 2d 1501, 1506 (1991)).

8 ¶ 24 It is clear from the written ruling of the arbitrator that he did not manifestly disregard the

law or the CBA in making his decision. In ruling in favor of the Union, the arbitrator specifically

discussed the issue presented to him – whether leave benefits continue to accrue after PEDA

leave expires. The arbitrator interpreted the relevant provisions of the CBA, which he found in

Section 16.1. He further reviewed the relevant provisions in the Village manual that were

incorporated into the CBA and determined that a conflict existed between these provisions. In

resolving the conflict, he found in favor of the language of the CBA due to the provision in the

manual clearly stating that it did not supersede any collective bargaining agreement the Village

may have with its employees. The arbitrator rejected the Village’s argument that the language in

the manual controlled. The arbitrator’s decision was not a result of exceeding his authority, but

rather the arbitrator’s interpretation of the language of the agreement within the context of what

he understood the law to be.

¶ 25 After having reviewed the record and the arbitrator’s decision, we find that the Village’s

argument must be rejected. Despite the Village’s arguments to the contrary, it is clear from his

decision that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority. There is no evidence that the arbitrator

disregarded any applicable rules, regulations, or provisions of the CBA. It is clear the arbitrator’s

written decision derived from his interpretation of the CBA and its interaction with the Village

manual. It is not for us to decide whether that interpretation was correct. See District No. 508, 74

Ill. 2d at 421; Griggsville, 2013 IL 113721, ¶ 18. The arbitrator’s decision addressed the essence

of the contract and answered the question submitted by the parties. Because of this, the Village’s

assertion that he exceeded his authority must be rejected, and his decision upheld.

¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Will County.

9 ¶ 28 Affirmed.