FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS September 12, 2007 FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court
SON YA VIGIL; LOREN V IGIL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 06-2309 (D.C. No. CIV-05-1142 W J/AC T) SO U TH VA LLEY A CA D EM Y ; (D . N.M .) ALAN M ARKS, in his official and individual capacity; DA NIEL DOM INGUEZ, in his official and individual capacity; K A TA RIN A SA NDOVAL, in her official and individual capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before TA CH A, Chief Judge, M U RPH Y and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges.
Sonya Vigil worked as the office manager for South Valley Academy
(SV A), a school located in New M exico. Her husband, Loren Vigil, served on
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. SV A’s governing council. Both M r. and M s. Vigil claim they were forced from
their jobs in violation of state and federal law , and they therefore brought this
action against SVA and individual defendants A lan M arks, Katarina Sandoval,
and Daniel Dominguez. The district court, however, granted SVA’s motion for
summary judgment and the individual defendants’ request for qualified immunity.
W e have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I
According to the complaint, SV A is organized as a municipal corporation.
In 2001, M s. Vigil began working for SV A, but complained after completing her
first year that she had not been evaluated or given a raise. She also expressed
concern about the school’s security measures and what she perceived to be the
administration’s preferential treatment of certain staff members. Later, M s. Vigil
lodged additional complaints that faculty members were working without proper
certifications and that she had been denied the opportunity to enroll in further
schooling as promised at the time of her hire. The school’s head teacher, Alan
M arks, told M s. Vigil that a budget shortfall was to blame for her not receiving a
raise, although he later said it was because she lacked certification. M r. M arks
also agreed to hire a security guard, but then delegated the responsibility to a
janitor who had no experience with security issues. By 2004, M s. Vigil had been
assaulted by a student and confronted by another wielding a knife; she also
learned that a special education teacher w as hired during the budget deficit.
-2- Dissatisfied with the manner in which her complaints had been handled,
M s. Vigil’s relationship w ith M r. M arks and SVA’s assistant head teacher,
Katarina Sandoval, deteriorated. M s. Vigil requested a leave of absence for
medical reasons, but was told that no such option existed. Rather, M r. M arks
informed her that if she left, she would be paid until February 15, 2004, as
severance. M s. Vigil left despite this warning and never returned to work.
Although the parties attempted to mediate the terms of her departure, those efforts
failed. Consequently, in M arch of the same year, the president of the governing
council, Daniel Dominguez, asked M r. Vigil to resign “due to the potential legal
implications that may be brought by [M s. Vigil].” Aplt. App. at 15. M r. Vigil
refused to voluntarily resign and so the council’s members voted him out.
The Vigils then brought their grievance to federal court, alleging numerous
state and federal violations against SV A and the individual defendants. After the
district court dismissed several of the V igils’ claims, the court granted summary
judgment based on qualified immunity on the Vigils’ remaining claims for
freedom of association and M s. Vigil’s claims for freedom of speech, procedural
due process, and equal protection. The district court’s grant of summary
judgment based on qualified immunity is now the subject of this appeal. 1
1 The district court also granted summary judgment on various contract claims, but the Vigils do not appeal that ruling.
-3- II
A. Q ualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity generally shields from liability for civil damages
government officials performing discretionary functions insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1134
(10th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 676 (2006). “Because of the underlying purposes of qualified
immunity, we review summary judgment orders deciding qualified immunity
questions differently from other summary judgment decisions.” Ward v.
Anderson, – F.3d – , 2007 W L 2110901, at *3 (10th Cir. July 24, 2007) (quotation
omitted). W hen a defendant raises qualified immunity as an affirmative defense
on a motion for summary judgment, “the plaintiff bears the heavy two-part burden
of demonstrating that (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the
constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct.”
Reeves v. Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir. 2007). If a plaintiff meets
this burden, the defendant must then satisfy the usual summary judgment standard
of showing that no material facts are in dispute and that he or she is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Olsen v. Layton Hills M all, 312 F.3d 1304, 1312
(10th Cir. 2002). W e review the grant of summary judgment based on qualified
-4- immunity de novo, “considering all evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.” Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1043 (10th Cir. 2006).
In this case, M s. Vigil alleged that she was terminated. The district court,
however, found that she resigned. The court then relied on this finding
throughout its qualified immunity analysis to determine that no constitutional
violations had occurred. Yet, our precedent required the court to accept as true
her allegation that she was terminated. See Lawrence v. Reed, 406 F.3d 1224,
1230 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that qualified immunity analysis begins with the
court asking “whether the plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a constitutional
violation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). By finding that M s. Vigil resigned
and incorporating that finding into its qualified immunity analysis, the district
court blended its qualified immunity analysis with a merits analysis and
improperly undercut M s. Vigil’s claims. Instead, the court should have accepted
as true M s. Vigil’s allegation that she w as terminated and determined whether,
based on that or any other allegation, she established a constitutional violation.
Therefore, given our de novo standard of review , and because “[w]e are free to
affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record
sufficient to permit conclusions of law,” Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1174
(10th Cir. 2001), we accept M s. Vigil’s allegation that she was terminated and
proceed to consider w hether there is any merit to the contentions now before us.
-5- 1. Freedom of Association
The First Amendment implicitly protects the freedom to expressive
association. Grace United M ethodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643,
658 (10th Cir. 2006). Although there has been some debate as to its source, the
right to familial association also is constitutionally protected. See Trujillo v. Bd.
of County Com m’rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1188-89, 1190 n.7 (10th Cir. 1985). A
plaintiff alleging a violation of the right to expressive association may support his
or her claim by demonstrating, inter alia, some form of government action to
impose penalties for the expression of political views, see Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984), while a plaintiff claiming a violation of
the right to familial association must show that the defendant had the specific
intent to interfere with the familial relationship, Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190.
Here, the Vigils maintain that their rights to expressive and familial
association were violated when the individual defendants punished them for their
political views and their marriage to one another. They fail to present, however,
any specific evidence to support these allegations. W ith respect to M s. Vigil, the
record supports neither her argument that she was fired for expressing concerns
about proper faculty certification, inequitable treatment, and safety issues, nor her
argument that she w as fired for sharing views common with her husband. Rather,
the record suggests that she was fired because she took an unauthorized leave of
absence. Indeed, M r. M arks warned M s. Vigil prior to her departure that she
-6- would be compensated “until February 15, 2004 as severance pay.” Aplt. App. at
117. This warning signaled to M s. Vigil that her unauthorized leave of absence
would result in termination because she later acknowledged that if she were not
paid while on medical leave, it could “only be taken as a statement that I have
been fired.” Id. at 128. M oreover, she specifically disputed the implication of
M r. M arks’ statement, arguing that “[p]ay received while on medical leave cannot
be considered severance pay.” Id. And despite M s. Vigil’s growing frustration
and repeated threats of resignation, it was not until after she took an unauthorized
leave of absence that SV A refused to allow her back.
As for M r. Vigil, the evidence concerning his removal shows not that he
was punished for his wife’s actions, but because there were “obvious conflict of
interest issues involved with the actions [she was] taking.” Id. at 136. Both
M r. M arks and M s. Sandoval were governing council members and both w ere
enmeshed in a dispute that now names them as defendants. M ediation had proven
unsuccessful, M s. Vigil had threatened legal action, and the council was caught in
the unenviable position of forcing M r. Vigil to resign or allowing him the choice
to either engage in or abstain from proceedings necessarily implicating his wife.
Given these circumstances, the fact that the council forced him to resign does not
indicate an intent to punish him for any political views he may have expressed.
N or does it evidence a specific intent to interfere with his marriage. It shows
only that the council sought to avoid the conflict of interest that clearly existed.
-7- Accordingly, because M r. and M s. Vigil fail to show a violation of their rights to
expressive or familial association, they cannot satisfy the first prong necessary to
overcome a qualified immunity defense, and we therefore need not consider the
second. See Eaton v. M eneley, 379 F.3d 949, 954 (10th Cir. 2004) (“But if a
plaintiff fails to demonstrate that a defendant’s conduct violated the law , the court
need not determine w hether the law was clearly established.”).
2. Freedom of Speech
Turning to M s. Vigil’s individual claims, she maintains that she was
terminated in retaliation for speaking out against inequitable staff treatment,
unethical employment practices, and inadequate security measures at SVA.
“[T]he First Amendment bars retaliation for protected speech.” Crawford-El v.
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592 (1998). In Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951
(2006), the Supreme Court recently altered the traditional free speech retaliation
claim analysis set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
See Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1202
(10th Cir. 2007) (“it is apparent that the ‘Pickering’ analysis of freedom of
speech retaliation claims is a five step inquiry which we now refer to as the
‘Garcetti/Pickering’ analysis”); see also Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist.,
473 F.3d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that Garcetti “profoundly alters
how courts review First Amendment retaliation claims”). W e now begin by
asking whether the employee spoke “pursuant to [her] official duties.” Garcetti,
-8- 126 S. Ct. at 1960. Public employees who speak pursuant to their official duties
are afforded “no constitutional protection because the restriction on speech simply
reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has
comm issioned or created.” Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1202 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Next, if the employee has not spoken pursuant to her
official duties, but rather as a citizen, we must determine whether the speech
relates to a matter of public concern. See G reen v. Bd. of County Com m’rs,
472 F.3d 794, 798 (10th Cir. 2007). Speech that is of no public concern is not
protected and the inquiry ends. However, once it is determined that the employee
has spoken as a citizen on a matter of public concern, we ask “whether the
employee’s interest in commenting on the issue outweighs the interest of the state
as employer.” Casey, 473 F.3d at 1327 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the
employee’s interest is greater than that of the employer, she must then show that
the speech was a motivating factor behind the adverse employment decision.
Belcher v. City of M cAlester, 324 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation
omitted). Finally, if an employee makes this showing, the employer may
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that its action would have been
the same toward the employee even without the protected speech. Id.
In this case, M s. Vigil’s claim does not survive beyond the first tw o steps.
W ith respect to whether she spoke pursuant to her official duties, although
M s. Vigil insists that it was not her “job responsibility” to report wrongdoing,
-9- Aplt. Br. at 35, “[a]n employee’s official job description is not dispositive,”
Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1203. Rather, “[t]he ultimate question is whether
the employee speaks as a citizen or . . . in his or her professional capacity.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). And on this score, M s. Vigil’s complaints of
falsely reported student statistics clearly were made in her professional capacity
as office manager because she was the one charged with filing these reports.
As for the remainder of her speech, it does not relate to matters of public
concern. M s. Vigil’s complaints that the administration favored certain staff
members, failed to evaluate her performance and increase her salary, and hired a
new teacher during the budget deficit are not matters of public concern because
they are “internal in scope and personal in nature.” Id. at 1206 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Further, even if her statements about the school’s inadequate
security measures w ere sufficiently related to matters of public concern, there is
absolutely no evidence that she was fired for voicing this concern. Thus,
M s. Vigil fails to advance a viable free speech retaliation claim, and the
individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
3. Procedural Due Process
Next, M s. Vigil asserts that she was denied due process because she was
terminated without notice. “Procedural due process ensures that a state will not
deprive a person of life, liberty or property unless fair procedures are used in
making that decision.” Kirkland v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist., 464 F.3d 1182,
-10- 1189 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). In deciding whether a plaintiff was
denied procedural due process, we ask first, whether she possessed a protected
interest to which due process protection was applicable; and second, whether she
was afforded an appropriate level of process. Id.
In M s. Vigil’s case, she was employed under a binding contract until
June 30, 2004, and therefore had a protected property interest in continued
employment until that date. See Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1206
(10th Cir. 1998) (“Protected property interests arise, not from the Constitution,
but from state statutes, regulations, city ordinances, and express or implied
contracts.”). Her contract, however, expressly provided that it could “be
terminated by the School for cause, including . . . insubordination . . . physical or
mental inability to perform the required duties or for any other good and just
cause . . . .” Aplt. A pp. at 66.
M s. Vigil argues that she took a leave of absence for medical reasons,
notwithstanding M r. M arks’ warning that no such form of leave existed. Thus,
under the express terms of her contract, her inability to perform the duties
required of her and the fact that she took leave without authorization provided the
school with just cause to terminate her contract. M oreover, the fact that M s. Vigil
negotiated the circumstances of her departure during mediation clearly establishes
that she received adequate due process. Consequently, we conclude that
M s. Vigil’s claim is w ithout merit.
-11- 4. Equal Protection
M s. Vigil also contends that she was treated differently from similarly
situated employees because she was not allowed to attend further schooling,
receive pay raises, take medical leave, or arrive late to work without reprimand.
Quoting our decision in M imics, Inc. v. Village of Angel Fire, 394 F.3d 836, 849
(10th Cir. 2005), she asserts that this disparate treatment constituted a “campaign
of official harassment directed against her out of sheer malice.” Aplt. Br. at 46
(alteration omitted).
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment comm ands that
no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). Although M s. Vigil
does not claim to be a member of a protected class, she may bring an equal
protection claim as a “class of one” by proving that she was “singled out for
persecution due to some animosity . . . wholly unrelated to any legitimate state
activity.” M imics, Inc., 394 F.3d at 848-49 (quotations and citation omitted).
M s. Vigil’s claim is wholly without merit. Initially, we think her
comparison to M imics, Inc. is ill-conceived. In that case, we found that the
plaintiffs w ere selectively targeted and treated differently from others similarly
situated due to their alignment with an opposing political faction. Id. at 849.
-12- That conclusion was based on specific evidence that the defendant building
inspector twice entered the plaintiffs’ place of business without authorization. Id.
at 843-44, 847 n.5.
Here, by contrast, M s. Vigil offers no evidence to suggest that she was
singled out for illegitimate reasons. Instead, we note that the individual
defendants have legitimate interests in regulating faculty development, the use of
medical leave, and the provision of salary increases. They also have a legitimate
interest in ensuring that their staff is punctual. Further, although M s. Vigil
asserts that unlike other employees, she was not allowed to have summers off,
pursue additional schooling, receive pay raises, take medical leave, or arrive late
to work without penalty, she fails to demonstrate that she was similarly situated
to these other employees. “Similarly situated employees are those who deal with
the same supervisor and are subject to the same standards governing performance
evaluation and discipline.” Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1404
(10th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). M s. Vigil likens herself to other staff
members by virtue of the fact that they all answ ered to M r. M arks, but she fails to
demonstrate that they were subject to the same performance and disciplinary
standards. Therefore, because M s. Vigil has not shown that she was similarly
situated and cannot show that she was singled out for illegitimate reasons, her
equal protection claim fails.
-13- B . Summary Judgment For SVA
Finally, we consider whether liability may be imposed on SVA, which, as
an entity defendant, is not eligible for qualified immunity. W e review the grant
of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard as the district
court. Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1214 (10th Cir. 2002).
W e have previously held that municipal liability may not be imposed on an entity
defendant where individual defendants are found to have committed no
constitutional violation. See Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 747
(10th Cir. 1999) (“Because our conclusion that the individual defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity rests on the determination that none of them
violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the City may not be found to have
violated his rights.”); Wilson v. M eeks, 98 F.3d 1247, 1255 (10th Cir. 1996)
(quotation omitted) (“A municipality may not be held liable where there was no
underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers.”). Our conclusion here
that the individual defendants committed no constitutional violation therefore
precludes a finding of liability against SVA. Accordingly, SVA was entitled to
summary judgment.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Jerome A. Holmes Circuit Judge
-14-