VIENNA METRO LLC v. Pulte Home Corp.

786 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57157, 2011 WL 2164126
District Court, E.D. Virginia·Decided May 25, 2011·No. Civil Action 1:10cv502·Published·Cited by 6 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND FINAL JUDGMENT ORDER

GERALD BRUCE LEE, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Parties’ non-jury trial regarding specific performance. This case concerns the stagnation of a construction project that was to be completed in 2007, and the Parties’ inability to resolve any dispute without the intervention of an arbiter.

There is one issue before the Court. The issue is whether Plaintiff Vienna Metro LLC (“Vienna Metro”) is entitled to specific performance from Defendant Pulte Home Corporation (“Pulte”) when (1) Vienna Metro cannot recover monetary damages, and (2) Pulte materially breached its contract with Vienna Metro. The Court holds that Vienna Metro is entitled to specific performance because (1) there is no adequate remedy at law, (2) the Parties contracted for this remedy, and (3) the balance of equities weigh in its favor. This issue is discussed below.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 14, 2010, Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. In addition to a claim for specific performance, Plaintiff alleged that Pulte breached the Parties’ contract, and that it was entitled to monetary damages for real estate taxes, loan interest, and lost return on equity investment. Alternatively, Plaintiff sought money damages for default interest and wasted costs.

On February 11, 2011, the Parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. On March 29, 2011, the Court granted Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment, determining that (1) Pulte materially breached the contract, and (2) Pulte’s affirmative defenses to breach of contract fail as a matter of law. The Court further granted in part Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Vienna Metro could not recover in breach of contract because it could not prove damages.

In its ruling, the Court held that Vienna Metro has no adequate remedy at law for breach of contract. The Court concluded that “[t]he Declaration is a valid, enforceable written contract that defines the scope and deadlines for completion of Pulte’s Work, and [that] Pulte materially *1092 breached the [Declaration] by not completing the work.” See Vienna Metro LLC v. Pulte Home Corp., 1:10cv502, Dkt. No. 135 at 7, 786 F.Supp.2d 1076, 2011 WL 2020861 (E.D.Va. Mar. 29, 2011) (hereinafter “Mem. Order”); see also Horton v. Horton, 254 Va. 111, 487 S.E.2d 200, 204 (1997) (holding that a material breach is a failure to comply with a fundamental aspect of the contract, so that the “failure to perform that obligation defeats an essential purpose of the contract”).

The Court explicated that (1) “it is undisputed that the dates initially set in the Declaration have passed, and that the work set forth in the Declaration is incomplete”; “[t]he Declaration prefaces each aspect of Pulte’s [W]ork by a time period of not greater than eighteen months after the [Effective [D]ate”; and (3) “Pulte admits that it failed to complete all of its work within eighteen months after the [Effective [D]ate.” Mem. Order at 5.

The Court further explained that the Declaration makes timely performance of Pulte’s Work a fundamental aspect of the contract. In particular, “the Declaration requires timely completion of each construction phase, as exhibited by the ‘shall’ language of the contract.” Id. Additionally, the Court ruled that “[t]he Declaration provides timeliness provisions in over fifteen clauses, unequivocally stating that [Pulte] is to complete its construction responsibilities within a given timeframe.” Id. at 9, Pulte materially breached the Declaration by “frustrating] the [Declaration’s] essential purpose of building infrastructure by violating the Declaration’s express timeliness provision, [Section] 1.18,” and “by not completing all phases of the construction by [the deadlines].” Id. at 7, 8. Accordingly, the Court ruled that specific performance was an appropriate remedy.

On May 2, 2011, the Court began a four-day bench trial. The Court’s findings follow.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a non-jury case, the court must make specific findings of fact and separately state its conclusions of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(1). The trial judge has a function of finding the facts, weighing the evidence, and choosing from among conflicting inferences and conclusions those which he considers most reasonable. Penn-Texas Corp. v. Morse, 242 F.2d 243, 247 (7th Cir.1957) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The trial judge has the inherent right to disregard testimony of any witness when satisfied that the witness is not telling the truth, or testimony is inherently improbable due to inaccuracy, uncertainty, interest, or bias. Penn-Texas Corp., 242 F.2d at 247 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see Columbus-America Discovery Group v. At. Mut. Ins. Co., 56 F.3d 556, 567 (4th Cir.1995) (stating that that factfinder is in a better position to make judgments about the reliability of some forms of evidence, including evaluation of the credibility of witnesses) (quotation marks and citations omitted). It is the duty of a trial judge sitting without a jury to appraise testimony and demeanor of witnesses. See Burgess v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 335 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1964). To satisfy the demands of Rule 52(a), a trial court must do more than announce statements of ultimate fact. United States ex rel. Belcon, Inc. v. Sherman Const. Co., 800 F.2d 1321, 1324 (4th Cir.1986) (citation omitted). The court must support its rulings by spelling out the subordinate facts on which it relies. Id.

The language of Rule 52 has been construed

*1093 not to require a court to make findings on all facts presented or to make detailed evidentiary findings; if the findings are sufficient to support the ultimate conclusion of the court they are sufficient. Nor is it necessary that the trial court make findings asserting the negative of each issue of fact raised. It is sufficient if the special affirmative facts found by the court, construed as a whole, negative each rejected contention. The ultimate test as to the adequacy of the findings will always be whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for decision and whether they are supported by the evidence.

Darter v. Greenville Cmty. Hotel Corp., 301 F.2d 70, 75 (4th Cir.1962).

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VIENNA METRO LLC v. Pulte Home Corp., 786 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57157, 2011 WL 2164126 (E.D. Va. 2011).

786 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (VIENNA METRO LLC v. Pulte Home Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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