Mamadou v. Cho

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedAugust 30, 2023
Docket1:20-cv-00146
StatusUnknown

This text of Mamadou v. Cho (Mamadou v. Cho) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mamadou v. Cho, (E.D. Va. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division

BINTA P. MAMADOU, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-146 (AJT/IDD) ) STANLEY KYUNGJIN CHO, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ____________________________________)

ORDER On June 24, 2022, following an entry of default judgment as to liability, Plaintiffs Binta P. Mamadou and Visions Braid Bar, LLC moved for a default judgment as to damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs against Defendants Shadetree Management LLC, Ellen Kim, and Stanley Kyungjin Cho (together, the “Shadetree Defendants”). [Doc. No. 198] (the “Motion”). Plaintiffs sought $32,966.49 in damages, $649,228.50 in attorneys’ fees, and $10,099.43 in litigation costs with post-judgment interest at the statutory rate. Id. The Shadetree Defendants opposed the Motion. [Doc. No. 204]. On March 28, 2023, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”), [Doc. No. 240], granting the Motion and recommending a total award of $692,294.42 to Plaintiffs. No objection to the R&R has been filed. The Court has conducted a de novo review of the evidence in this case1 and adopts and incorporates the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge with respect to compensatory damages and litigation

1 The Shadetree Defendants did not file an objection to the R&R. While the Court is therefore not required to review the magistrate judge’s factual or legal conclusions if there is no objection, Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985), it is nevertheless “free, after review, to accept, reject, or modify any of the magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations.” Wallace v. Hous. Auth. of Columbia, 791 F. Supp. 137, 138 (D.S.C. 1992) (citation omitted). costs, and for the reasons that follow adopts in part the R&R with respect to attorneys’ fees and will instead award $323,625.38 in fees. I. BACKGROUND The Court has previously summarized this case at length, but in relevant part, Plaintiffs

filed suit in 2020 against Bae’s Woodberry, LLC; Chan Hee Bae; and Young Woo Bae (together, the “Bae Defendants”) and the Shadetree Defendants. Centrally, Plaintiffs alleged discrimination and tortious interference with prospective economic relations based on Defendants’ alleged refusal to lease commercial property to Plaintiffs on account of Mamadou’s race and West African ancestry. See [Doc. No. 125] (summarizing the case). On November 6, 2020, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bae Defendants, leaving only the Shadetree Defendants remaining in the case. Id. On February 19, 2021, Plaintiffs moved for default judgment as to liability against the Shadetree Defendants. [Doc. No. 144]. The Magistrate Judge then recommended default judgment be entered against the Shadetree Defendants as to Counts I and II, but limited its recommendation

to those two “discrimination counts in violation of federal law because they are central allegations in this matter, and the facts alleged support a finding of liability.” [Doc. No. 155] at 14-18. The Magistrate Judge did not make any recommendations or findings with respect to Counts III-V as alleged in the Amended Complaint. The Court then declined to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, finding “entry of a default judgment is not warranted at this point.” [Doc. No. 163] at 3. However, roughly two months later the Court considered Plaintiffs’ renewed request for entry of default judgment and entered judgment against the Shadetree Defendants as to their liability on Counts I and II—claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and § 1981, respectively. [Doc. No. 178]. Default was not, and has not, been entered against the Shadetree Defendants on the remaining Counts III-V. Plaintiffs later moved for a default judgment as to damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs against the Shadetree Defendants. [Doc. No. 198] (the “Motion”). The Magistrate Judge ultimately recommended granting the Motion and awarding in full the requested $32,966.49 in compensatory damages, $10,099.43 in costs, and $649,228.50 in attorneys’ fees. [Doc. No. 240].

On June 6, 2023, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to advise on their position as to how the case should proceed with respect to the outstanding Counts III-V. [Doc. No. 241]. In response, Plaintiffs proposed “to withdraw Counts III through V in the Complaint so long as doing so does not affect their right to full recovery as recommended by Magistrate Judge Davis.” [Doc. No. 242] at 1. Plaintiffs’ position is based on their assumption that “analysis of the additional counts is not necessary to award full relief,” and they therefore “support the Court’s efforts to preserve resources and accordingly propose to withdraw the additional counts to facilitate resolution of the matter.” Id. at 2. II. LEGAL STANDARD While ordinarily a prevailing party in a civil suit is not entitled to attorneys’ fees, statutory

schemes can provide otherwise. Ohio River Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Green Valley Coal Co., 511 F.3d 407, 413 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)). In § 1981 and § 1982 actions, courts, “in [their] discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Under Fourth Circuit precedent, to award appropriate attorneys’ fees district courts are to engage in a three-step process by (1) calculating the lodestar by multiplying the reasonable hours worked by a reasonable rate, (2) using the factors from Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)2 to determine the reasonability of the lodestar, and (3)

2 In adopting Johnson, the Fourth Circuit has characterized the twelve factors therein as follows: subtracting hours on unsuccessful claims. McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 88 (4th Cir. 2013). Notably, McAfee quoted Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that the lodestar’s presumption of reasonableness “can only be overcome ‘in those rare circumstances where the lodestar does not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in

determining a reasonable fee.’” Id. at 88-89 (quoting Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 553-54 (2010)). But Perdue was about a 75 percent enhancement that was applied, resulting in an attorneys’ fee award of roughly $10.5 million, which was above the lodestar. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 548. In other words, it was not about a lodestar presumption where a court contemplates reducing attorneys’ fees, and thus is distinguishable from the case now before the Court. Within the twelve-factor test, the Fourth Circuit has declared a plaintiff’s degree of success to be the most crucial component of a fee award inquiry: As the Supreme Court has recognized, ‘the most critical factor’ in calculating a reasonable fee award ‘is the degree of success obtained,’ and when ‘a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the [lodestar] may be an excessive amount.’ Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983) . . . . In accounting for the plaintiff’s limited success, a court should examine ‘the size of the proposed attorney’s fee . . .

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Related

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society
421 U.S. 240 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Hensley v. Eckerhart
461 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Blanchard v. Bergeron
489 U.S. 87 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Peacock v. Thomas
516 U.S. 349 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Wallace v. Housing Authority of City of Columbia
791 F. Supp. 137 (D. South Carolina, 1992)
VIENNA METRO LLC v. Pulte Home Corp.
786 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (E.D. Virginia, 2011)
Eileen McAfee v. Christine Boczar
738 F.3d 81 (Fourth Circuit, 2013)
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn
176 L. Ed. 2d 494 (Supreme Court, 2010)
Thomas v. Peacock
39 F.3d 493 (Fourth Circuit, 1994)
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.
488 F.2d 714 (Fifth Circuit, 1974)

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Bluebook (online)
Mamadou v. Cho, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mamadou-v-cho-vaed-2023.