VidStream LLC v. Twitter Inc

District Court, N.D. Texas·Decided April 1, 2022·No. 3:16-cv-00764·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

VIDSTREAM, LLC § § Plaintiff, § § § Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-0764-N § TWITTER, INC., § § Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This Order addresses Defendant Twitter, Inc.’s (“Twitter”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff VidStream, LLC’s (“VidStream”) Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) [194]. Although the Court previously granted a similar motion, recent authority from the Federal Circuit persuades the Court that it must deny the current motion. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Original plaintiff Youtoo Technologies LLC filed this action against Twitter for patent infringement. Twitter moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) arguing that the patents were addressed to unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Motion to Dismiss [28]. The Court eventually granted the motion to dismiss. See Order (Nov. 10, 2016) [39] (the “First MTD Order”). A somewhat complicated process followed. Twitter filed for inter partes review with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. Eventually the IPR proceedings were resolved in favor of Youtoo. See Notice [181]; Notice [183]. Meanwhile, Youtoo went into bankruptcy. During the bankruptcy process, VidStream acquired the rights to the patents-in-suit. Eventually, the Court let VidStream in, let Youtoo out, granted VidStream’s motion to reconsider the First MTD Order, and granted

VidStream leave to file its SAC. See Order (Apr. 19, 2021) [190]. VidStream filed its SAC and Twitter’s motion to dismiss followed. II. ALICE IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT Section 101 states a patent can be obtained for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. “Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue of law.” SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[w]hether a claim is drawn to patent- eligible subject matter under § 101 is a threshold inquiry”). The Supreme Court articulated a two step approach for resolving whether a claim falls outside the scope of section 101. First, “the Court must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, [573 U.S. 208,]134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). If so, the Court then “consider[s] the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298, 1297).

First MTD Order at 2. One of the first Federal Circuit cases to address Alice was Enfish. Under the first step, the Court determines if the claim at issue falls into an exception to section 101. Courts have “long grappled with the exception that ‘[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., [569 U.S. 576,]133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)). Not “all improvements in computer-related technology are inherently abstract.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335. Where claims “simply [add] conventional computer components to well-known business practices,” they are directed toward an abstract idea because computers are merely invoked as a tool. Id. at 1338. On the other hand, if “the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities,” then the claim may not be directed at an abstract idea. Id. In Enfish, the Court concluded that the claims at issue were not directed to an abstract idea but instead focused on an “improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.” Id.

First MTD Order at 2-3. Enfish dealt with a patent for a novel method of organizing data in a database unlike the traditional table method. The backdrop for this was the distinction that Alice drew between “do it on a computer” and something that actually improves the operation of the computer itself. Compare Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“Stating an abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it with a computer’ simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result.”) with id. at 225 (“The method claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself.”). At first blush, this would suggest a distinction between hardware and software. As the Federal Circuit later described Enfish, the line drawing is not quite so simple: The claims here are unlike the claims in Enfish. There, we relied on the distinction made in Alice between, on one hand, computer-functionality improvements and, on the other, uses of existing computers as tools in aid of processes focused on “abstract ideas” (in Alice, as in so many other § 101 cases, the abstract ideas being the creation and manipulation of legal obligations such as contracts involved in fundamental economic practices). Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36; see Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2358–59. That distinction, the Supreme Court recognized, has common-sense force even if it may present line-drawing challenges because of the programmable nature of ordinary existing computers. In Enfish, we applied the distinction to reject the § 101 challenge at stage one because the claims at issue focused not on asserted advances in uses to which existing computer capabilities could be put, but on a specific improvement—a particular database technique—in how computers could carry out one of their basic functions of storage and retrieval of data. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36; see Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1348–49, 2016 WL 3514158, at *5; cf. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (noting basic storage function of generic computer). The present case is different: the focus of the claims is not on such an improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools.

Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (2016). The next case significant to the Court’s analysis is BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).1 BASCOM dealt with the subject of internet filtering. Given the proliferation of inappropriate content on the internet, it is desirable to be able to filter out such content. Id. at 1343. The prior art included two filtering approaches: (1) a customizable filter on the client device, and (2) a noncustomizable filter on the internet service provider’s (ISP) server. Each approach had strengths and weaknesses, Id. at 1343-44. The invention in BASCOM was a customizable filter on the ISP server. Id. at 1344. The Court readily found the patent was directed to the abstract idea of filtering under step 1 of Alice. Id. at 1348-49. Turning to Alice step 2, the Court noted: The inventive concept inquiry requires more than recognizing that each claim element, by itself, was known in the art.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

VidStream LLC v. Twitter Inc, (N.D. Tex. 2022).

VidStream LLC v. Twitter Inc (VidStream LLC v. Twitter Inc) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

In Re Bilski
545 F.3d 943 (Federal Circuit, 2008)
SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International Trade Commission
601 F.3d 1319 (Federal Circuit, 2010)
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA)
792 F.3d 1363 (Federal Circuit, 2015)
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corporation
822 F.3d 1327 (Federal Circuit, 2016)
Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A.
830 F.3d 1350 (Federal Circuit, 2016)