Victoriano Gonzalez v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 18, 1995
• Docket: 03-93-00427-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Gonzalez v. State IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS,

AT AUSTIN



NO. 3-93-427-CR

VICTORIANO GONZALEZ,

APPELLANT

vs.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY, 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. CR93-32, HONORABLE CHARLES R. RAMSAY, JUDGE PRESIDING

Victoriano Gonzalez, appellant, was convicted by a jury of aggravated possession of marihuana. Controlled Substances Act, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 678, sec. 1, § 481.121(d)(1), 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 2230, 2939 (Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.121(d)(1), since amended). The court assessed punishment at twenty years' imprisonment. In three points of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure in violation of the United States and Texas Constitutions and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23 (West Supp. 1995). We will affirm.

BACKGROUND

On December 8, 1992, the Alamo Area Narcotics Task Force ("Task Force") ⁽¹⁾ established a narcotics checkpoint under the Kohlenburg overpass on Interstate 35 in Comal County. Approximately one-half mile before the checkpoint, the Task Force placed a large flashing sign in the median that alternately displayed: "Narcotics Checkpoint Ahead," "Drive Safely," and "Thank You." In between the sign and the actual checkpoint was the Kohlenburg exit from I-35.

Twenty-five officers from various law enforcement agencies were involved in the checkpoint. Task Force officer Kenneth Schmidt was a "spotter." Positioned between the sign and the checkpoint, his task was to observe vehicles to see if they committed traffic offenses or crossed the median after they saw the sign. Schmidt testified that, while working as a spotter, he saw a white Chevy Blazer pull onto the right shoulder without signalling. The vehicle continued to drive on the shoulder, then returned to the highway, again without signalling. As the Blazer approached the Kohlenburg exit, Schmidt saw it break hard and make a sudden sharp right turn to exit the highway, again without signalling. Because of these maneuvers, the Blazer never reached the checkpoint. Based on these observations, Schmidt notified other officers that the driver had committed several traffic violations and instructed them to stop the Blazer for these violations.

Officer Darrell Sanders was positioned to intercept vehicles that made a U-turn to evade the checkpoint. After Sanders received the radioed information, he saw the Blazer with a police car already behind it; Sanders joined in the pursuit. The Blazer led the officers on a five-mile high-speed chase, at times traveling in excess of eighty miles per hour. In all, at least five police cars were involved in the chase. Sanders testified that in addition to the traffic violations Officer Schmidt had observed, the driver of the Blazer committed several additional offenses, including evading arrest, attempting to elude a peace officer, and speeding.

Eventually the Blazer stopped. Appellant was placed under arrest for evading arrest and attempting to elude a police officer. Officer Sanders approached the vehicle to conduct what he described as an "inventory search." ⁽²⁾ When Officer Sanders opened the vehicle's door, he immediately noticed an "overwhelming smell" of marihuana. This strong odor emanated from ninety-one pounds of marihuana concealed in duffle bags in the rear of the vehicle. Appellant was arrested, charged, and indicted for aggravated possession of marihuana.

Appellant's contention at trial and now on appeal is that the marihuana seized from his Blazer was the product of an illegal search. The thrust of his argument is that the narcotics checkpoint was illegal under the United States Supreme Court's pronouncement in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), and the recent Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision in State v. Holt, No. 599-93 (Tex. Crim. App. June 15, 1994), because the checkpoint was not operated according to a legislatively authorized administrative scheme. Appellant contends that the marihuana would not have been seized "but for" the illegal narcotics checkpoint and, therefore, must be excluded under the U.S and Texas Constitutions and article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

DISCUSSION

Despite appellant's contention, this is not a checkpoint case. Had appellant proceeded to the checkpoint and been one of the cars searched there, presumably the analysis in Sitz as applied by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Holt would apply. ⁽³⁾ However, the legality of the checkpoint is not at issue because the evidence was not seized by virtue of having gone through the checkpoint. ⁽⁴⁾

This situation is nearly identical to Johnson v. State, 833 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd). Johnson involved the use of a spotter in conjunction with a DWI task force roadblock. 833 S.W.2d at 321. The spotter's job was to watch for cars attempting to avoid the roadblock. The spotter saw Johnson approach the roadblock and make a left turn on a street before the roadblock while accelerating at a high rate of speed. Id. The officer followed Johnson and observed him commit several additional traffic violations. Id. Johnson was eventually stopped and arrested for DWI. On appeal, Johnson contested the legality of the stop because "but for the illegal roadblock" he would not have been followed. Id. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals rejected this argument because Johnson was not arrested by virtue of having gone through the roadblock. Id. Rather, the court framed the issue as whether Johnson's stop was legal based on the officer's reasonable suspicion and probable cause. Id. The same is true in the present case.

The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. However, it is consistent with the Fourth Amendment for an officer to stop a vehicle and detain the driver when the officer observes traffic violations. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Failure to signal a lane change is, by itself, sufficient probable cause for arrest. Beck v. State, 547 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Owens v. State, 861 S.W.2d 419, 420-21 (Tex. App.Dallas 1993, no pet.). Further, an officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (West 1977); see also Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701d, § 153 (West 1977) (authorizing arrest of persons violating traffic regulations). Where there has been cooperation between officers, the cumulative information known to the officers at the time of the stop is considered in determining whether the stop was reasonable. Hoag v. State, 728 S.W.2d 375, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Once a valid custodial arrest of an occupant of a vehicle is made, the officer may conduct a "search incident to arrest" of the passenger compartment, including all containers. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981).

Applying these principles, the search that uncovered the ninety-one pounds of marihuana in appellant's Blazer was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. When Officer Schmidt observed appellant commit several traffic violations, ⁽⁵⁾ he was entitled to stop appellant and detain him for those offenses. In an attempt to do so, Schmidt enlisted the help of fellow officers, including Sanders. When Sanders observed appellant commit additional offenses, including evading arrest, ⁽⁶⁾ attempting to elude a police officer, ⁽⁷⁾ and speeding, ⁽⁸⁾ he had probable cause to arrest appellant for those offenses as well. Incident to this valid arrest, the officers were entitled to search the vehicle and all containers. During this valid search, they uncovered the marihuana. Under these circumstances, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. Point of error one is overruled.

Appellant also raises points of error under article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution and the Texas statutory exclusionary rule. These arguments, however, address the legality of the checkpoint. Because we conclude that the legality of the checkpoint is irrelevant to the search of appellant's vehicle, we overrule these points of error.

CONCLUSION

The search of appellant's car was consistent with the constitutional protection of the Fourth Amendment. We affirm the conviction.

J. Woodfin Jones, Justice

Before Justices Powers, Jones and Kidd

Affirmed

Filed: January 18, 1995

Do Not Publish

1.   The Task Force is a federally funded unit, with locally matched funds, providing drug enforcement to a number of participating agencies primarily in Bexar and Comal counties.

2.   It is immaterial whether the search is characterized as an inventory search (as Officer Sanders testified) or as a search incident to arrest (as characterized in the State's brief). The State does not have the burden of articulating every possible basis for holding a search legal. Sullivan v. State, 564 S.W.2d 698, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (on rehearing); accord Lewis v. State, 664 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). A trial court's decision on issues of evidence suppression will be sustained if the decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

3.   In Holt, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Sitz requires that DWI roadblocks must be authorized by a statewide policy emanating from a politically accountable governing body. Holt, No. 599-93, slip op. at 5. Such roadblocks are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment until "a politically accountable governing body sees fit to enact constitutional guidelines regarding such roadblocks." Id.

4.   In the statement of facts portion of his brief, appellant states that he was in the "checkpoint zone." However, appellant does not cite any state or federal authority to support the concept that a checkpoint has a penumbra extending beyond the actual checkpoint itself. We decline to create such an expansion.

5.   See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701d, § 68 (West 1977) (requiring signalling before lane change); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701d, §§ 54A(a), 55(b) (West Supp. 1995) (limiting operation of a motor vehicle on the shoulder). 

6.   Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04 (West 1994).

7.   Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701d, § 186 (West Supp. 1995).

8.   Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701d, § 166(a) (West Supp. 1995).