OPINION
ROBERTS, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of marihuana. Trial was before the court and the only issue was whether the contraband was seized as the result of an illegal arrest and search. The offense occurred on April 7,1972; trial was held on December 7,1972; and appellant was found guilty and given a three-year probated sentence.
[267]*267The evidence surrounding appellant’s arrest and search is as follows. On April 7, 1972, Officers Wood and Fisher of the Houston Police Department were traveling westbound on Crane Street in Houston. They observed appellant, who was coming toward them on Crane in a 1965 pickup truck, turn right on Falls without signaling. The officers testified that they were about ten car lengths ahead of appellant when he made his turn and that there was traffic going in both directions on Crane at the time. The officers then turned left on Falls, behind appellant, and pulled him over.
As their respective vehicles were coming to a stop, the officers observed appellant make a move toward the glove compartment of his truck. Upon stopping, appellant got out of his truck and stood by the driver’s door. Fisher searched appellant and Wood opened the truck’s glove compartment, where he found the baggie of marihuana that is the subject of this prosecution.
Appellant first contends that his arrest was illegal since the evidence did not show that he had violated the traffic laws. In Willett v. State, 454 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.Cr.App.1970) and Hall v. State, 488 S.W.2d 788 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) convictions were reversed because they were based on evidence seized after traffic arrests for failure to signal a turn. At the times of the offenses in those cases, Art. 6701d, Sec. 68(a), V.A. C.S. required a turn signal only when other traffic in the area might be affected by the turn. Because of an insufficient showing of such effect on other traffic in those two cases this Court held that Willet and Hall were stopped illegally, and that the contraband subsequently seized was inadmissible.
Prior to the offense in this case, however, Art. 6701d, Sec. 68(a), V.A.C.S. was amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 68. (a) No person shall turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway, or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with safety. Except under conditions set out in Section 24(a) [not here applicable] no person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.”
It thus appears that turn signals are now mandatory, regardless of the traffic conditions at the time of the turn. Appellant was therefore in violation of the law when he made his turn, and the officers were legally justified in effecting his arrest. Art. 6701d, Sec. 153, V.A.C.S. Tores v. State, 518 S.W.2d 378 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
The more difficult question concerns the right of the officers to search appellant’s truck after the valid traffic arrest. This search was justified only if the search incident to appellant’s arrest was necessary for the officers’ protection and limited in scope to that purpose, United States Const., Amend. IV; Texas Const., Art. I, Sec. 9; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Wallace v. State, 467 S.W.2d 608 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Maldonado v. State, 528 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), or if the officers had independent probable cause to search the car. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L.Ed.2d 538 (1968); Trusley v. State, 505 S.W.2d 861 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). We conclude that the. facts of this case failed to establish a justification for the officers to conduct this search.
The warrantless search of appellant’s automobile can be upheld as incident to his lawful arrest if it was reasonably necessary to protect the officers from bodily injury during their brief detention of appellant. E. g. Garcia v. State, 440 S.W.2d 295 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). The case of Lewis v. State, 502 S.W.2d 699 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) is instructive here.
“An ‘officer should be permitted to take every reasonable precaution to safeguard his life in the process of making an arrest.’ State v. Riley, 240 Or. 521, 402 P.2d 741, 743 (1965); Wallace v. State, 467 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). [268]*268All searches incidental to arrest cannot be justified on this theory, for to do so would allow wholesale fishing expeditions whenever a legal arrest is made. United States v. Tate, [D.C.], 209 F.Supp. 762 (1962). See also Adair v. State, 427 S.W.2d 67, 75 (Tex.Cr.App.1968) (dissenting opinion). If, however, from the totality of the circumstances presented to the officer he has reasonable grounds to believe that he is in danger of bodily harm or injury or that the person he encounters is armed or dangerous, justification for a search for weapons exists. Brinegar v. State, 97 Okl.Cr. 299, 262 P.2d 464 (1953); State v. Scanlon, 84 N.J.Super. 427, 202 A.2d 448 (1964); Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203, 116 S.W.2d 1009 (1938).” Id. at 702.
The test of the constitutionality of such a search was put another way in Wood v. State, 515 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), relied upon by the State, in the following words:
“So long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop and has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to the purpose of enabling the officer to pursue investigation without fear of violence.” Id. at 306.
In any event, the officer’s apprehensions must be reasonable.
There was testimony at the trial that the search was for the officers’ self-protection, but at no time did either officer testify that he was in fear of danger to himself or others. In fact, the reasons for such apprehension would have been sparse indeed. _ The time was 8:00 p. m. and “it wasn’t quite dark.” The neighborhood was not a high crime area. The officers outnumbered the appellant. Neither officer suspected appellant to be intoxicated or under the influence of drugs. Most importantly, both officers testified that appellant could not have reached the glove compartment from where he was standing. This case is thus distinguishable from Imhoff v. State, 494 S.W.2d 919 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Madeley v. State, 488 S.W.2d 416 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), and Lewis v. State,
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OPINION
ROBERTS, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of marihuana. Trial was before the court and the only issue was whether the contraband was seized as the result of an illegal arrest and search. The offense occurred on April 7,1972; trial was held on December 7,1972; and appellant was found guilty and given a three-year probated sentence.
[267]*267The evidence surrounding appellant’s arrest and search is as follows. On April 7, 1972, Officers Wood and Fisher of the Houston Police Department were traveling westbound on Crane Street in Houston. They observed appellant, who was coming toward them on Crane in a 1965 pickup truck, turn right on Falls without signaling. The officers testified that they were about ten car lengths ahead of appellant when he made his turn and that there was traffic going in both directions on Crane at the time. The officers then turned left on Falls, behind appellant, and pulled him over.
As their respective vehicles were coming to a stop, the officers observed appellant make a move toward the glove compartment of his truck. Upon stopping, appellant got out of his truck and stood by the driver’s door. Fisher searched appellant and Wood opened the truck’s glove compartment, where he found the baggie of marihuana that is the subject of this prosecution.
Appellant first contends that his arrest was illegal since the evidence did not show that he had violated the traffic laws. In Willett v. State, 454 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.Cr.App.1970) and Hall v. State, 488 S.W.2d 788 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) convictions were reversed because they were based on evidence seized after traffic arrests for failure to signal a turn. At the times of the offenses in those cases, Art. 6701d, Sec. 68(a), V.A. C.S. required a turn signal only when other traffic in the area might be affected by the turn. Because of an insufficient showing of such effect on other traffic in those two cases this Court held that Willet and Hall were stopped illegally, and that the contraband subsequently seized was inadmissible.
Prior to the offense in this case, however, Art. 6701d, Sec. 68(a), V.A.C.S. was amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 68. (a) No person shall turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway, or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with safety. Except under conditions set out in Section 24(a) [not here applicable] no person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.”
It thus appears that turn signals are now mandatory, regardless of the traffic conditions at the time of the turn. Appellant was therefore in violation of the law when he made his turn, and the officers were legally justified in effecting his arrest. Art. 6701d, Sec. 153, V.A.C.S. Tores v. State, 518 S.W.2d 378 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
The more difficult question concerns the right of the officers to search appellant’s truck after the valid traffic arrest. This search was justified only if the search incident to appellant’s arrest was necessary for the officers’ protection and limited in scope to that purpose, United States Const., Amend. IV; Texas Const., Art. I, Sec. 9; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Wallace v. State, 467 S.W.2d 608 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Maldonado v. State, 528 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), or if the officers had independent probable cause to search the car. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L.Ed.2d 538 (1968); Trusley v. State, 505 S.W.2d 861 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). We conclude that the. facts of this case failed to establish a justification for the officers to conduct this search.
The warrantless search of appellant’s automobile can be upheld as incident to his lawful arrest if it was reasonably necessary to protect the officers from bodily injury during their brief detention of appellant. E. g. Garcia v. State, 440 S.W.2d 295 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). The case of Lewis v. State, 502 S.W.2d 699 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) is instructive here.
“An ‘officer should be permitted to take every reasonable precaution to safeguard his life in the process of making an arrest.’ State v. Riley, 240 Or. 521, 402 P.2d 741, 743 (1965); Wallace v. State, 467 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). [268]*268All searches incidental to arrest cannot be justified on this theory, for to do so would allow wholesale fishing expeditions whenever a legal arrest is made. United States v. Tate, [D.C.], 209 F.Supp. 762 (1962). See also Adair v. State, 427 S.W.2d 67, 75 (Tex.Cr.App.1968) (dissenting opinion). If, however, from the totality of the circumstances presented to the officer he has reasonable grounds to believe that he is in danger of bodily harm or injury or that the person he encounters is armed or dangerous, justification for a search for weapons exists. Brinegar v. State, 97 Okl.Cr. 299, 262 P.2d 464 (1953); State v. Scanlon, 84 N.J.Super. 427, 202 A.2d 448 (1964); Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203, 116 S.W.2d 1009 (1938).” Id. at 702.
The test of the constitutionality of such a search was put another way in Wood v. State, 515 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), relied upon by the State, in the following words:
“So long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop and has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to the purpose of enabling the officer to pursue investigation without fear of violence.” Id. at 306.
In any event, the officer’s apprehensions must be reasonable.
There was testimony at the trial that the search was for the officers’ self-protection, but at no time did either officer testify that he was in fear of danger to himself or others. In fact, the reasons for such apprehension would have been sparse indeed. _ The time was 8:00 p. m. and “it wasn’t quite dark.” The neighborhood was not a high crime area. The officers outnumbered the appellant. Neither officer suspected appellant to be intoxicated or under the influence of drugs. Most importantly, both officers testified that appellant could not have reached the glove compartment from where he was standing. This case is thus distinguishable from Imhoff v. State, 494 S.W.2d 919 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Madeley v. State, 488 S.W.2d 416 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), and Lewis v. State, 490 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) in which the defendants in those cases could have lunged for weapons in their cars.
As to the question of the reasonableness of the officers’ apprehensions, the case of Keah v. State, 508 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) is closely in point. There, officers stopped an automobile around midnight for failure to signal a right turn and observed appellant lower his left shoulder as if to place something under the seat. Outside of the stopped car, they observed a large bulge in appellant’s left pocket after he removed his hand therefrom. After receiving no reply to questions concerning the nature of the bulge in the pocket, one of the officers reached in appellant’s pocket and retrieved a plastic bottle containing amphetamines. This Court held that the facts of Keah were insufficient to justify a self-protective search for weapons. The present case is distinguishable from Keah, supra, in that there was no hint that the officers there felt any apprehension, but the bulge in Keah’s pocket, alone, was more forboding than any of the facts sought to justify the self-protective search in this case.
This record presents nothing that would have given the officers reasonable grounds to believe that they were in danger of bodily harm or injury or that the person they encountered was armed or dangerous. The hour was not late; the area was not dangerous; the appellant did not appear intoxicated and did not cause any trouble; there was no suspicion of criminal activity or any evidence of such activity in plain view. The case is thus distinguishable from the other cases cited above. The search herein was not reasonably incident to appellant’s arrest.
Wilson v. State, 511 S.W.2d 531 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) appears to be dispositive of the probable cause aspects of this case. That case also involved a routine traffic arrest and the movement of an arm on the part of the defendant. Wilson was detained behind his car by one officer while the other searched the car and discovered the contraband. As in this case, the de[269]*269fendant was not in a position to lunge for any weapon in the car and there was no express testimony that the officers feared for their physical safety. This Court held that the defendant’s gestures, alone, did not give the officers sufficient probable cause to search the car. There is nothing more in this case except the officers’ unexplained belief that a protective search was necessary. See also Keah v. State, supra, and Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), and In re S. E. B., 514 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1974). We therefore conclude that the search of appellant’s truck in this case was unsupported by probable cause.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.