Victoria Abrahamson, Hana Schroeder, Jody Schroeder, Terry Schroeder, Samantha Johnson, Bre Ahna Boggess f/k/a Bre Ahna Payne, Rebecca Bates, Tawni Hanson, Darby Jones, Hunter Miner, and the State of Iowa, ex rel. v. Benjamin Scheevel, individually and in his official capacity as Officer for the Estherville Police Department, Brent Shatto, individually and in his official capacity as Chief of the Estherville Police Department, City of Estherville, Iowa

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: January 30, 2026
• Docket: 24-1133
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 24–1133

Submitted December 16, 2025—Filed January 30, 2026

Victoria Abrahamson, Hana Schroeder, Jody Schroeder, Terry Schroeder, Samantha Johnson, Bre Ahna Boggess f/k/a Bre Ahna Payne, Rebecca Bates, Tawni Hanson, Darby Jones, Hunter Miner, and State of Iowa ex rel. Victoria Abrahamson, Hana Schroeder, Jody Schroeder, Terry Schroeder, Samantha Johnson, Bre Ahna Boggess, Rebecca Bates, Tawni Hanson, Darby Jones, and Hunter Miner,

Appellees,

vs.

Benjamin Scheevel, individually and in his official capacity as Officer for the Estherville Police Department, Brent Shatto, individually and in his official capacity as Chief of the Estherville Police Department, City of Estherville, Iowa, Acadia Insurance Company, and John Doe,

Appellants.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Emmet County, Shayne Mayer,

judge.

The plaintiffs seek further review of a court of appeals decision reversing

a district court order denying dismissal of their action against a city and city

police officers on statute of limitations grounds. Decision of Court of Appeals

Affirmed; District Court Ruling Reversed and Case Remanded.

Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.

Zachary D. Clausen (argued) and Douglas L. Phillips (until withdrawal) of

Klass Law Firm, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellants City of Estherville, Iowa and

Brent Shatto. 2

L. Lars Hulsebus (argued) of Dickinson, Bradshaw, Fowler & Hagen, P.C.,

Des Moines; Adam D. Zenor and Sarah S. Hickman of Zenor Law Firm, P.L.C.,

Des Moines; and Keith M. Graham and Dan H. Ketcham of Engles, Ketcham,

Olson, & Keith, P.C., Omaha, Nebraska, for appellant Benjamin Scheevel.

Jack Bjornstad (argued) of Jack Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, for

appellees. 3

Mansfield, Justice.

I. Introduction.

Iowa law takes a public official’s misuse of confidential criminal history

data and intelligence data seriously—so seriously, in fact, that it deems wrongful

access or dissemination alone to be an act for which damages can be recovered,

without proof of anything else. See Iowa Code § 692.6 (2023). This case involves

a municipal police officer who allegedly accessed and disseminated the

confidential data of ten citizens for his own improper purposes. The improper

purposes included harassing some of the women involved and aiding a private

repossessor of vehicles.

The ten citizens have sued, and the defendants have raised the statute of

limitations. Under the relatively short time limitations of the Iowa Municipal Tort

Claims Act (IMTCA), each plaintiff had only two years to file suit from the date of

injury. See id. § 670.5. Yet according to the allegations of the petition, all the

improper access and dissemination occurred prior to May 3, 2019—i.e., the date

when the police officer resigned—whereas the plaintiffs did not sue until July 7,

2023.

We agree with the court of appeals that this action is time-barred.

Although the plaintiffs allege that they did not become aware of the improper

access and dissemination or suffer emotional injury from it until 2021 or 2022,

Iowa law provided each plaintiff a complete cause of action no later than 2019,

because each plaintiff suffered a legally compensable injury from the moment

that their confidential data were accessed and disseminated. We therefore affirm

the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the ruling of the district court, and

remand for dismissal of this action. 4

II. Facts and Procedural History.

This case arises out of a disturbing series of allegations involving a former

officer of the Estherville Police Department. The plaintiffs are residents of the

Estherville area.

According to the petition, Officer Ben Scheevel was hired by the Estherville

Police Department in 2015. While working as a police officer, until he resigned

on May 3, 2019, Scheevel improperly accessed confidential law enforcement

databases to obtain information about the plaintiffs. This included repeated

searches in the National Crime Information Center database, the Iowa On-Line

Warrants and Criminal Justice Information Network, and the Traffic and

Criminal Software database. Scheevel also improperly accessed the driver’s

license database.

Scheevel used some of the information for his own personal purposes, for

example, to repossess vehicles on behalf of a private company. Scheevel also

harassed and stalked some of the plaintiffs who were women, either in person or

via text and social media.

On April 12, 2019, the stepmother of lead plaintiff Victoria Abrahamson

complained about Scheevel’s conduct to Estherville Chief of Police Brent Shatto.

Shatto initially brushed off the concerns. However, on April 15, he put Scheevel

on administrative leave while he conducted an investigation. On May 1, Shatto

completed his investigation and, based on the results, he “gave Scheevel the

option to resign.” Scheevel quit two days later. Shatto allegedly knew about but

didn’t mention to others that there had been improper access to criminal history

and intelligence data.

On April 8, 2022, Scheevel was charged in an eighty-four-count trial

information with stalking, ongoing criminal conduct, misconduct in office, 5

perjury, and unauthorized access to or dissemination of criminal history data in

violation of Iowa Code section 692.7 (2019). Another officer was also criminally

charged; he is alleged to have assisted Scheevel in his improper searches on

Abrahamson but is not named a defendant in the current petition.

On July 7, 2023, the plaintiffs filed this action in Emmet County District

Court against Scheevel, Shatto, the City of Estherville, and Acadia Insurance

Company, as the surety on Scheevel’s and Shatto’s bonds. The plaintiffs’ petition

asserts four counts: (1) a statutory claim under section 692.6 for improper

dissemination, request, and receipt of criminal history or intelligence data; (2) a

common law invasion of privacy of claim based on violations of chapter 692; (3) a

common law conspiracy claim based on violations of chapter 692; and (4) an

action on the bond based on section 64.18 and the misconduct alleged in the

prior counts.1 See id. § 64.18 (2023); id. ch. 692; id. § 692.6

The plaintiffs do not allege that any improper access to or dissemination

of data occurred after May 3, 2019, when Scheevel resigned. However, plaintiff

Abrahamson alleges that she did not become aware of the wrongful access to

and dissemination of her criminal history or intelligence data until a disclosure

occurred in a separate lawsuit on July 9, 2021. The remaining plaintiffs allege

that they did not become aware of the wrongful access to and dissemination of

their criminal history or intelligence data until March or April 2022, around the

time when the criminal charges were brought against Scheevel.

The defendants filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss. They argued that any

alleged misconduct ended by May 3, 2019, that the plaintiffs had not filed suit

until July 7, 2023, and that their action was therefore barred by the two-year

1Iowa Code section 64.18 provides, “All bonds of public officers shall run to the state, and

be for the use and benefit of any corporation, public or private, or person injured or sustaining loss, with a right of action in the name of the state for its or the corporation’s or person’s use.” 6

statute of limitations in the IMTCA. See id. § 670.5 (“[A] person who claims

damages from any municipality or any officer, employee or agent of a

municipality for or on account of any wrongful death, loss, or injury within the

scope of section 670.2 or section 670.8 or under common law shall commence

an action therefor within two years after the alleged wrongful death, loss, or

injury.”). The defendants also maintained that no discovery rule is available

under the IMTCA. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Polk County, 278 N.W.2d 911, 917

(Iowa 1979) (en banc) (“Time to sue . . . runs from the wrongful death, loss, or

injury . . . .”).

The plaintiffs resisted. They conceded that the IMTCA applied and that no

discovery rule was available. Yet they urged that the injuries they had pleaded,

i.e., emotional distress, could not have occurred before each plaintiff became

aware of Scheevel’s wrongful acts in 2021 or 2022. In the plaintiffs’ words: “[T]he

forces wrongfully put in motion by Officer Scheevel and Chief Shatto didn’t

produce an injury until each Plaintiff became aware of Officer Scheevel’s

wrongful acts.”

Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion. It first ruled sua

sponte that the plaintiffs’ count one—for violations of Iowa Code section 692.6—

was not governed by the two-year statute of limitations in the IMTCA. It noted

that section 692.6 states that a person or governmental body proven to have

violated chapter 692 shall be liable for damages, costs, expenses, and reasonable

attorney fees “notwithstanding any provisions of chapter 6[6]9 [or] 670 to the

contrary.” (Quoting id.) This language, according to the district court, supplanted

the two-year IMTCA statute of limitations in section 670.5, leaving the section

692.6 action subject to the general five-year statute of limitations in Iowa Code 7

section 614.1(4) for “all other actions not otherwise provided for,” which includes

a discovery rule.

The district court also concluded that the remaining counts should not be

dismissed because “the date of injury for purposes of Count II and Count III is

the date the Plaintiffs discovered the wrongful acts of Defendant Scheevel and

the alleged involvement of others in said wrongful acts.”2

The defendants applied for an interlocutory appeal. See Iowa R. App. P.

6.104(1). We granted the application and transferred the case to the court of

appeals. In a 4–1 decision, the court of appeals reversed the district court and

remanded for dismissal of counts one through three. One member of the panel

dissented. Although she agreed with the rest of the panel that counts one, two,

and three were all governed by the IMTCA’s two-year statute of limitations, she

agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs did not suffer injuries until they

learned that Scheevel had improperly accessed their confidential data.

We granted the plaintiffs’ application for further review.

III. Standard of Review.

“We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for the correction

of errors at law.” Benskin, Inc. v. W. Bank, 952 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Iowa 2020)

(quoting Shumate v. Drake Univ., 846 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Iowa 2014)). “For

purposes of reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the

petition’s well-pleaded factual allegations, but not its legal conclusions.” Id.

(quoting Shumate, 846 N.W.2d at 507). “A defendant may raise the statute of

limitations by a motion to dismiss if it is obvious from the uncontroverted facts

contained in the petition that the applicable statute of limitations bars the

2With respect to count four, the action on the bond, the district court found that it was

“not a separate cause of action unto itself” and denied the motion “insofar as [the bond] serves as a potential remedy for judgment.” 8

plaintiff’s claim for relief.” Id. at 299 (quoting Venckus v. City of Iowa City, 930

N.W.2d 792, 809 (Iowa 2019)).

IV. Legal Analysis.

A. Does the IMTCA’s Statute of Limitations Apply to All Claims? We

first consider whether the IMTCA’s statute of limitations applies to damage

claims against a municipality or a municipal employee under Iowa Code section

692.6.

The IMTCA has its own distinctive statute of limitations for damage actions

against a municipality or municipal employee. Subject to one exception not at

issue here, the plaintiff must commence their action “within two years after the

alleged wrongful death, loss, or injury.” Id. § 670.5. Thus, our court has

“repeatedly held the IMTCA bars any claim not filed within the requisite time

period as measured from the date of injury rather than date of accrual.” Venckus,

930 N.W.2d at 807–08 (citing cases). “We reached this conclusion based upon

the absence of language like ‘accrue’ or ‘accrual’ in the IMTCA to suggest that

something other than the date of injury might be the starting point for the statute

of limitations.” Doe v. New Lond. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 848 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Iowa

2014).

Nonetheless, the district court reasoned that damage claims against

municipalities and municipal employees under Iowa Code section 692.6 receive

different treatment. Section 692.6 states,

Any person may institute a civil action for damages under chapter 669 or 670 or to restrain the dissemination of the person’s criminal history data or intelligence data in violation of this chapter. Notwithstanding any provisions of chapter 669 or 670 to the contrary, any person, agency, or governmental body proven to have disseminated or to have requested and received criminal history data or intelligence data in violation of this chapter shall be liable for actual damages and exemplary damages for each violation and shall be liable for court costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney 9

fees incurred by the party bringing the action. In no case shall the award for damages be less than one hundred dollars.

Id. (emphasis added). The district court took the view that the phrase

“notwithstanding any provisions of chapter 669 or 670 to the contrary” means

that “no provision in Iowa Code Chapter 669 or 670 can defeat a claim under

Iowa Code § 692.6 if the elements of [a section] 692.6 claim are proven.” So

section 692.6 trumps section 670.5.

The court of appeals had another view. It applied the notwithstanding

qualifier only to the clause that came afterward. Thus, as the court of appeals

analyzed the matter, the notwithstanding phrase in section 692.6 “only overrides

a provision of chapter 670 that is contrary to the rest of that sentence—imposing

liability for actual damages, exemplary damages, costs, expenses, and attorney

fees.”

The plaintiffs ask us to adopt the district court’s reasoning. They argue

that section 692.6 renders section 670.5 inapplicable. Therefore, we should find

that count one is governed by the general statute of limitations in Iowa Code

section 614.1(4) and the discovery rule therein.

We think the court of appeals has the sounder interpretation. For one

thing, as the court of appeals points out, the first sentence of Iowa Code section

692.6 authorizes the plaintiff to commence “a civil action for damages under

chapter 669 or 670.” (Emphasis added.) So plainly some parts of chapters 669

and 670 apply to section 692.6 claims. What parts? The parts that govern the

cause of action as opposed to the parts that directly eliminate liability or

damages. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation

of Legal Texts 126 (2012) (“A dependent phrase that begins with notwithstanding

indicates that the main clause that it introduces or follows derogates from the

provision to which it refers.”). Thus, for example, in an appropriate case, section 10

692.6 could trump the liability and damage exclusions of section 670.4(1). But

the statute of limitations is different.

Section 670.5’s statute of limitations is not really “contrary” to the

damages liability authorized by section 692.6. It is just a statute of limitations,

which regulates the time period for bringing actions. It is no more “contrary” to

that damages liability than any other statute of limitations would be, such as

the default statute of limitations in section 614.1(4) favored by the plaintiffs.

We also consider the breadth of what the plaintiffs are arguing. If the

plaintiffs were correct, then a plaintiff bringing a section 692.6 claim against the

state or a state official could entirely bypass the administrative claims process

of the Iowa Tort Claims Act. See Iowa Code §§ 669.3, .5(1) (describing the

administrative claims process). Compliance with that administrative process

would also be “contrary” to the damages liability established by section 692.6.

For these reasons, we conclude that the IMTCA’s statute of limitations

governs all the claims brought by the plaintiffs.

B. Calculating the Date of Injury. Since the IMTCA’s statute of

limitations applies, we must now determine the date of injury—the starting point

for the statute of limitations. See id. § 670.5 (“within two years after the

alleged . . . injury”). The plaintiffs argue that they did not suffer injury until they

learned in 2021 or 2022 that their confidential data had been previously

accessed by Scheevel. They contend that this is when they first suffered mental

distress and the other harms for which they are asking compensation.3

Section 692.6 is not a model of clarity, as we noted almost fifty years ago.

Feeney v. Scott County, 290 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1980) (“Again, the act is not

3In other words, even if a discovery rule doesn’t apply, the plaintiffs argue that no injury

occurred until they discovered the wrongdoing. 11

clear; it does not elaborate on what constitutes a ‘request and recei[pt] in

violation of this chapter’ under section 692.6.” (alteration in original)). Still, it

seems clear that the triggering event for liability under section 692.6 is a

violation. See Iowa Code § 692.6 (“shall be liable for actual damages and

exemplary damages for each violation”). And, under the terms of the statute, any

violation results in an immediate injury. We know that because the statute

authorizes recovery of a minimum of $100, regardless of whether any other

damages are proven. See id. (“In no case shall the award for damages be less

than one hundred dollars.”).

This means that regardless of what other harms the plaintiffs may have

incurred later, each of them suffered an injury for which they could have sued

at the time Scheevel misused their confidential data. That occurred on or before

May 3, 2019.

“The general rule is that a cause of action accrues when the aggrieved

party has a right to institute and maintain a suit.” Diggan v. Cycle Sat, Inc., 576

N.W.2d 99, 102 (Iowa 1998) (quoting Sandbulte v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 343

N.W.2d 457, 462 (Iowa 1984), overruled on other grounds by, Langwith v. Am.

Nat’l Gen. Ins., 793 N.W.2d 215 (Iowa 2010), superseded by statute, 2011 Iowa

Acts ch. 70, § 45 (codified at Iowa Code § 522B.11(7) (Supp. 2011))); see also

Vaudt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 4 N.W.3d 45, 52 (Iowa 2024) (“A claim ordinarily

accrues, thereby triggering the relevant limitations period, when a plaintiff has

a complete and present cause of action.” (quoting 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of

Actions § 128, West (database updated Feb. 2024))); Skadburg v. Gately, 911

N.W.2d 786, 793 (Iowa 2018) (“Generally, ‘a cause of action accrues when the

aggrieved party has a right to institute and maintain a suit.’ ” (quoting

Chrischilles v. Griswold, 150 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Iowa 1967), superseded by statute 12

on other grounds, 1975 Iowa Acts ch. 239, § 26 (codified at Iowa Code § 614.1(9)

(1977)))); Bevel v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 426 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Iowa 1988)

(“Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run at a time when a complete

cause of action has accrued.”)

Simply stated, the plaintiffs had a complete cause of action on which they

could have sued no later than May 3, 2019. Because the discovery rule does not

apply to claims under the IMTCA, see Venckus, 930 N.W.2d 807–08, they cannot

bring an action over four years later.

We think our reasoning is supported by federal precedent interpreting a

federal statute that fulfills a similar role—the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act

(DPPA). See 18 U.S.C. § 2724. The DPPA provides, “A person who knowingly

obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for

a purpose not permitted under this chapter shall be liable to the individual to

whom the information pertains, who may bring a civil action in a United States

district court.” Id. § 2724(a). The DPPA also authorizes $2,500 in liquidated

damages for a violation. Id. § 2724(b)(1). Reading this statute, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has concluded that the statute of

limitations for a civil action under the DPPA starts to run when a violation

occurs, because (among other things) this is when the plaintiff has a complete

and present cause of action on which they can sue. McDonough v. Anoka County,

799 F.3d 931, 942–43 (8th Cir. 2015).

The plaintiffs cite to Koeppel v. Speirs, an invasion of privacy case where

we said that “harm from intrusion arises when the plaintiff reasonably believes

an intrusion has occurred.” 808 N.W.2d 177, 185 (Iowa 2011). But Koeppel was

a different case. The defendant installed a camera in a bathroom with the intent

of spying on his two female assistants. Id. at 178. The plaintiff—one of the 13

assistants—discovered the camera the next day. Id. at 179. During that time, the

camera had not functioned properly; it had produced static or a “no signal”

message. Id. at 178–79. We reversed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to the defendant, though, on the basis that a reasonable person in the

plaintiff’s situation would have believed her privacy had been invaded when she

discovered a camera in the bathroom that was capable of operation. Id. at 185.

The present case is distinguishable because legal harm occurs under

section 692.6 as soon as the confidential data are accessed, see Iowa Code

§ 692.6, not when a reasonable person would believe their confidential data had

been accessed.4

Relatedly, the plaintiffs insist that they are not pursuing statutory

damages; they only want to recover damages for emotional harm. But the

plaintiffs cannot avoid the running of the statute of limitations by limiting the

damages they are seeking for a single wrong. As we have said,

The test to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run against an action sounding in tort is whether the act causing the damage does or does not of itself constitute a legal injury; that is, an injury giving rise to a cause of action because it is an invasion of some right of plaintiff. . . . [I]f the act of which the injury is the natural sequence is of itself a legal injury to plaintiff, a completed wrong, the cause of action accrues, and the statute begins to run from the time the act is committed, be the actual damage however slight, and the statute will operate to bar a recovery, not only for the present damages, but for damages developing subsequently and not ascertainable at the time of the wrong done; for in such a case the subsequent increase in the damages resulting gives no new cause of action. Nor does plaintiff’s ignorance of the tort or injury, at least if there is no fraudulent concealment by defendant, postpone the running of the statute until the tort or injury is discovered. Where

4Moreover, Koeppel involved a camera that didn’t work. 808 N.W.2d at 178–79. Koeppel

doesn’t address whether a person who had been spied on with a functioning camera—analogous to Sheevel’s consummated acts of improper access and dissemination here—would have had a cause of action for the mere act of spying without proof of emotional harm. 14

the doing of an act is attended immediately by resulting actual damage, the statute begins to run at once.

Baie v. Rook, 273 N.W. 902, 903 (Iowa 1937) (quoting Ogg v. Robb, 162 N.W. 217,

220–21 (Iowa 1917)).

In Baie v. Rook, we held that the statute of limitations on a statutory cause

of action against a county recorder for failing to properly index a chattel mortgage

began to run at the time of the faulty indexing, and not when a second mortgage

was recorded. Id. That was true even though the plaintiff-mortgagee alleged that

she did not sustain a loss or injury until she was deprived of her security by a

second mortgagee obtaining a mortgage on the same property. Id.

Additionally, although the plaintiffs do not distinguish among their counts

for date of injury purposes, it should be noted that counts two and three are

framed as common law claims for invasion of privacy and civil conspiracy. Does

this mean that something like the Koppel definition of injury applies? We believe

not, because both counts two and three define the tort purely in terms of

violations of chapter 692:

Defendants disseminated Plaintiffs’ criminal history data in violation of Chapter 692. . . . Defendants requested and received Plaintiffs’ criminal history data in violation of Chapter 692. . . . Defendants disseminated Plaintiffs’ Intelligence Data in violation of Chapter 692. . . . Defendants requested and received Plaintiffs’ Intelligence Data in violation of Chapter 692. .... . . . Defendants unreasonably intruded upon the solitude and seclusion of Plaintiffs by disseminating Plaintiffs’ criminal history data in violation of Chapter 692. 15

. . . Defendants unreasonably intruded upon the solitude and seclusion of Plaintiffs by requesting and receiving Plaintiffs’ criminal history data in violation of Chapter 692. . . . Defendants unreasonably intruded upon the solitude and seclusion of Plaintiffs by disseminating Plaintiffs’ Intelligence Data in violation of Chapter 692. . . . Defendants unreasonably intruded upon the solitude and seclusion of Plaintiffs by requesting and receiving Plaintiffs’ criminal history data in violation of Chapter 692. .... . . . Defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy with others to disseminate, or request and receive, in violation of Chapter 692. “In order to determine the appropriate statute of limitations for a cause of

action, we look to the foundation of the action.” Legg v. W. Bank, 873 N.W.2d

763, 774 (Iowa 2016); see also Hallett Constr. Co. v. Meister, 713 N.W.2d 225,

230 (Iowa 2006) (“[W]e look beyond the label placed on the claim by the parties

and instead focus on ‘the actual nature of the action’ to determine the applicable

limitations period.” (quoting Bob McKiness Excavating & Grading, Inc. v. Morton

Bldgs., Inc., 507 N.W.2d 405, 411 (Iowa 1993))). Here, chapter 692 is the

foundation of the common law claims. And, as we have already explained, the

violations of chapter 692 and the initial legal injuries all occurred no later than

V. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the ruling of the district court, affirm

the decision of the court of appeals, and remand for dismissal of this action.

Decision of Court of Appeals Affirmed; District Court Ruling Reversed

and Case Remanded.