Johanna McDonough v. Anoka County

799 F.3d 931, 2015 WL 4940110
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedAugust 20, 2015
Docket14-1754, 14-1756, 14-1765, 14-1974
StatusPublished
Cited by170 cases

This text of 799 F.3d 931 (Johanna McDonough v. Anoka County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johanna McDonough v. Anoka County, 799 F.3d 931, 2015 WL 4940110 (8th Cir. 2015).

Opinion

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

In this consolidated appeal, Brooke Nicole Bass, Johanna Beth McDonough, Dawn Mitchell, and Brian Potocnik (collectively, Drivers) challenge the dismissal of their separate actions against numerous cities, counties, and other government-entities, known and unknown (collectively, Local Entities); numerous unknown law enforcement or other government personnel and supervisors, officers, deputies, staff, investigators, employees, or agents of Local Entities or other government entities in Minnesota (collectively, Law Enforcement Does); current and former Commissioners of the Minnesota Department of Public Safety (DPS) Ramona Dohman .and Michael Campion (collectively, Commissioners); and various unknown officers, supervisors, staff, employees, independent contractors, and agents of DPS (collectively, DPS Does). 1 Drivers allege in their complaints that the above entities and individuals (collectively, Defendants) violated the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA or Act), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725, by accessing or disclosing Drivers’ personal information from motor vehicle records without a permissible purpose. 2 The district courts dismissed Drivers’ actions for failure to state a claim. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

To obtain a driver’s license or motor vehicle registration from a state motor vehicle department (DMV), individuals must disclose personal information, such as names, addresses, telephone numbers, social security numbers, medical information, vehicle descriptions, and photographs. *938 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143, 120 S.Ct. 666, 145 L.Ed.2d 587 (2000). Concerned over the dissemination and misuse of this personal information, Congress enacted the DPPA in 1994 to regulate the sale and disclosure of information that state DMVs collect in the process of registering and licensing drivers of motor vehicles. Maracich v. Spears, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2191, 2195, 186 L,Ed.2d 275 (2013).

The DPPA prohibits state DMVs from disclosing personal information in a motor vehicle record except for uses explicitly enumerated in the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)-(b). “Personal information”, is defined as “information that identifies an individual, including an individual’s photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information.” Id. § 2725(3). As relevant here, personal information in a motor vehicle record may be disclosed by a state DMV for, among other permissible uses, “use by any government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its functions,” or for use by a private person acting on behalf of a government agency in carrying out its functions. Id. § 2721(b)(1). Personal information may also be disclosed by a state DMV “[f]or use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding” or for “investigation in anticipation of litigation.” Id. § 2721(b)(4). A person who “knowingly obtains, discloses or uses” an individual’s personal information, “from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted” is liable to the individual, and the court may award “actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the amount of $2500,” attorney’s fees, and “punitive damages upon proof of willful or reckless disregard of the law.” Id. § 2724.

According to Drivers’ allegations, DPS maintains or contributes to the Driver and Vehicle Services database and the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension database, which contain personal information from Drivers’ motor vehicle records. 3 Law enforcement officers, government agents, and other individuals were given passwords to access the database through an internet portal or website. During the relevant time period, the website’s login page included the following admonition, or something similar: “Access to this service is for authorized personnel only conducting official business.” Suspecting that law enforcement officers were accessing their information without a proper purpose, Drivers contacted DPS and requested audits detailing past accesses of their motor vehicle records. Each Driver’s audit showed that his or her personal information had been accessed through the database hundreds of times, primarily through Local Entities’ police departments, sheriffs offices, or other agencies.

Drivers allege that none of the Law Enforcement Does’ accesses fell within the DPPA’s permitted exceptions for the disclosure, use, and obtainment of personal information. Several Drivers’ complaints state that the true purpose for the Law Enforcement Does’ accesses was “to satisfy their shallow desires to peek behind the curtain” into Drivers’ private lives. Bass and Mitchell allege that they do not have criminal records and have committed no crimes that would justify the accesses of their personal information. McDonough and Potocnik do not allege that they have no criminal records, but do allege that Law Enforcement Does obtained their personal information “without probable cause or *939 reasonable suspicion” and that at no time did they “behave in a manner that would provide any legal justification” for the accesses. Drivers claim that their personal data was obtained through queries that used their names rather than their license plate numbers. Drivers attach as exhibits to the complaints their audits, which show the date and time of each access, as well as the “source station” — ie., “the police department, sheriffs office, or other government entity through which” Law Enforcement Does accessed the information. The audits show that government users— through the stations of different agencies, departments, branches, or other government divisions (collectively, agencies) across the state — accessed Drivers’ data during late-night or early-morning hours and often at times in close proximity to one other. Furthermore, several Drivers allege that testimony by the legislative auditor at a Minnesota Legislative Audit Subcommittee hearing in February 2013 reflects that at least fifty percent of law enforcement officers were misusing the database by accessing, using, or disclosing personal information for an impermissible purpose. McDonough, Mitchell, and Bass claim that they had had professional contact with numerous law enforcement personnel and, in some cases, a degree of local fame, which could explain Law Enforcement Does’ high level of interest in their personal information. 4

The district courts dismissed the complaints, determining that each Driver’s allegations failed to state a claim. The district courts held that the statute of limitations began to run at the time of each alleged obtainment or disclosure of the personal data, rather than at the time Drivers became aware of the alleged violations. The district court in Bass, McDonough,

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799 F.3d 931, 2015 WL 4940110, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johanna-mcdonough-v-anoka-county-ca8-2015.