Victor Manuel Lopez Herrera v. Kevin Raycraft, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Director of Detroit Field Office, Enforcement and Removal, Kristi Noem, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General, and Executive Office for Immigration Review

E.D. Michigan

Victor Manuel Lopez Herrera v. Kevin Raycraft, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Director of Detroit Field Office, Enforcement and Removal, Kristi Noem, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General, and Executive Office for Immigration Review

DecidedDecember 3, 2025

Docket2:25-cv-13627

StatusUnknown

This text of Victor Manuel Lopez Herrera v. Kevin Raycraft, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Director of Detroit Field Office, Enforcement and Removal, Kristi Noem, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General, and Executive Office for Immigration Review (Victor Manuel Lopez Herrera v. Kevin Raycraft, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Director of Detroit Field Office, Enforcement and Removal, Kristi Noem, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General, and Executive Office for Immigration Review) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Victor Manuel Lopez Herrera v. Kevin Raycraft, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Director of Detroit Field Office, Enforcement and Removal, Kristi Noem, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General, and Executive Office for Immigration Review, (E.D. Mich. 2025).

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Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

VICTOR MANUEL LOPEZ HERRERA,

Case No. 25-cv-13627 Petitioner, Honorable Linda V. Parker

v.

KEVIN RAYCRAFT, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Director of Detroit Field Office, Enforcement and Removal, KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General, and EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW _____________________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Background

Petitioner, although having no lawful immigration status, has resided in the United States since 2008. During that time, he married a United States citizen with whom he has had two children who are currently six and seventeen years old, and he maintained valid employment authorization and employment. On November 4, 2025, Petitioner was taken into custody by immigration agents. He has been detained ever since without a bond hearing pending removal proceedings. Petitioner is currently being held at the North Lakes Processing Center in Baldwin, Michigan. His removal proceeding is being held before the Detroit Immigration Court.

On November 14, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming that his detention without a bond hearing violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the Due Process Clause

of the Fifth Amendment. Respondents argue that Petitioner’s detention is mandatory and, therefore, he is not being unlawfully detained. Respondents also argue that the Court should refrain from deciding the merits of the petition until Petitioner exhausts his administrative remedies. Finally, Respondents maintain

that the only proper respondent is his “custodian.” Legal Standard A district court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a person who is “in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, the court, when evaluating an application for the writ of habeas corpus, “shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be

granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant . . . is not entitled thereto.” Analysis The Proper Respondents

Petitioner names as Respondents: (1) Kevin Raycraft, Director of the Detroit Field Office for the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Enforcement and Removal Operations; (2) U.S. Department of Homeland

Secretary Noem; (3) Attorney General Bondi; (4) the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and (5) the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”). Respondents argue that the only proper respondent in this case is Director Raycraft.

Section 2243 instructs a habeas court to direct the writ “to the person having custody of the person detained.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. “The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him

in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973). As such, the proper habeas respondent must have “the power to produce the body of [the petitioner] before the court or judge, that he may be liberated if no sufficient reason is shown to the contrary.” Rumsfeld

v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 542 U.S. 416, 435 (2004) (quoting Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885)). In Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314 (6th Cir. 2003), the court held that the ICE Field Office Director is the immediate custodian of an individual

in immigration detention. Id. at 322. ICE maintains multiple regional field offices to oversee the day-to-day operations of its enforcement and detention apparatus. See https://perma.cc/6EPY-

QUKB. The Detroit Field Office is responsible for enforcement operations and detention in Michigan and Ohio. See id. As such, Director Raycraft is a proper respondent. This does not mean that the remaining individuals and entities are not

also properly named. Petitioner is being detained under a new ICE directive, issued in coordination with the Department of Justice, instructing that Section 235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), rather than Section 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), applies to all

illegal immigrants except those admitted to the United States and chargeable with deportability under Section 237 of the statute. See https://perma.cc/6JUM-ZNRJ. Petitioner is not seeking only his immediate release or a bond hearing in this

action, but also asks the Court to declare that § 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b)(2)(A), is the appropriate statutory provision governing the detention of noncitizens like him—that being, individuals who were not at the border or a port of entry seeking admission to the United States when they were detained, but who

were already residing in the country when they were apprehended and charged as inadmissible. Petitioner also seeks injunctive relief to prevent his transfer from this District pending removal proceedings. Secretary Noem, through Homeland

Security, and Attorney General Bondi, through the Department of Justice, are responsible for the directive at issue, the implementation and enforcement of the INA (including the detention and removal of noncitizens), and the immigration

court system where Petitioner is being denied a bond hearing. For these reasons, the Court finds no reason to dismiss these named Respondents from this action. However, the Court finds no reason to include the

EOIR. Exhaustion Respondents argue that Petitioner must exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding with his claims here. Exhaustion is required when Congress

“specifically mandates” it. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). When exhaustion is not mandated, the decision whether to require it is within the court’s “sound judicial discretion.” Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir.

2013) (citation omitted). A growing number of district judges have concluded, when ruling on habeas petitions like the current one, that no applicable statute or rule requires administrative exhaustion in this situation and exhaustion should not be required. See, e.g., Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL

2496379, at *4-5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (McMillion, J.); Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 2466670, at *5-6 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025); Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1250-54 (W.D. Wash. 2025); Morales-Martinez

v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-13303, 2025 WL 3124695, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2025) (Behm, J.) (“agree[ing] with the majority of district courts in this circuit and around the nation in deciding not to enforce an exhaustion requirement”).

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