This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-0403
Victor Legatt, et al., Appellants,
vs.
Dennis Legatt, et al., Respondents
Filed November 30, 2015 Affirmed in part and reversed in part Worke, Judge
Stearns County District Court File No. 73-CV-12-3629
James L. Noske, Noske Law Firm, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellants)
Benjamin B. Bohnsack, Matthew P. Lindeman, Rinke Noonan, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondents)
Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Worke, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WORKE, Judge
In this lease, easement, and surface-water-drainage dispute between neighboring
farmers, appellants argue that the district court erred by (1) finding that respondents’
replacement of a drainage swale with tiling did not violate the reasonable-use doctrine, (2) determining that appellants could not bring a breach-of-contract claim after
respondents leased land to a third party that was previously leased to appellants, (3)
concluding that respondents had a permanent easement across appellants’ land for their
irrigation pivot, and (4) finding that respondents were entitled to damages after appellants
violated respondents’ easement rights. Because the district court’s determinations that
(1) respondents did not violate the reasonable-use doctrine, (2) appellants could not bring
a breach-of-contract claim after first violating the lease, and (3) respondents were entitled
to damages were not clearly erroneous, we affirm in part. But because the district court
clearly erred in finding that the long-term land-use contract created a permanent
easement, we reverse in part.
FACTS
Appellants Victor and Mary Legatt (Victor) and respondents Dennis and Lois
Legatt (Dennis) own adjoining farmland in Stearns County. For over a decade, the
parties have jointly farmed portions of their adjoining acres and utilized numerous land-
use and related agreements. In April 2012, Victor filed a complaint alleging numerous
claims pertaining to the parties’ business relationship, and Dennis counterclaimed. In
February 2014, the district court heard Victor’s case-in-chief and subsequently dismissed
the matter pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b). The district court denied Victor’s
motion for amended findings or, alternatively, a new trial. In December 2014, the district
court heard Dennis’s counterclaims. Dennis was awarded monetary damages for lost
crop production and related costs and was granted a permanent easement over Victor’s
land. The facts relevant to the appealed issues are as follows.
2 Drainage
A meadow and swamp are located on the northeast portion of Victor’s land, where
the elevation is lowest. The meadow and swamp are both wetlands and cannot be drained
for crop production. Prior to this dispute, a natural grassway transported surface water
from the street, across Dennis’s land, and to Victor’s meadow. In 2006, Victor installed
an underground perforated tile system alongside the grassway. The tile that ran under the
meadow and into the swamp reduced surface water and improved crop production. In
2011, Dennis filled in the grassway and replaced it with tiling; it is undisputed that this
increased Dennis’s farming efficiency, increased farmable land, and reduced erosion.
Dennis also constructed a berm on his land. The tiling did not alter the natural flow and
direction of the water, and it carried water to Victor’s meadow just as the grassland did.
Victor claimed that Dennis’s actions caused water to back up on his field, flooded some
of his crops, and made areas of his land too wet to cross with machinery. But Victor
maintained that these water issues only occurred after an anomalously large amount of
rain. The district court found that Dennis’s actions did not alter the natural flow and
direction of water and that Victor presented no credible evidence that the flooding was
caused by the replacement of the grassway rather than natural variations in rainfall.
South Acres Crop Share
Dennis and Victor had a written contract allowing Victor to farm 73 of Dennis’s
acres (south acres) from 2004 through 2013. The contract required Victor to pay Dennis
4,760 bushels of dry corn for the use of the land and the use of Dennis’s irrigation pivot.
3 Beginning in 2009, Victor withheld corn bushels from Dennis’s annual corn payment as
follows:
(1) 180 bushels in 2009; (2) 951 bushels in 2010; and (3) 4,760 bushels, the entire rent, in 2011.
Victor admits that he had sufficient corn to pay Dennis and that he withheld payment for
leverage over the parties’ other disputes. Dennis requested his share of the corn crop and
when Victor refused to release it, Dennis notified Victor that continued withholding
would result in lease termination.
In April 2012, before Victor began preparing the south acres for planting, he
noticed a neighbor picking rock on Dennis’s land. Victor showed the neighbor his land-
use agreement, but the neighbor continued picking rock and eventually planted crops on
the land. Victor then delivered the withheld corn to Dennis around June 2012.
Irrigation Pivots
The parties had a written contract that leased Victor an irrigation pivot (Pivot A)
from Dennis in exchange for corn from 2005 to 2013. The pivot turned 360 degrees and
covered four 40-acre sections (two northerly and two southerly). Thus, Pivot A crossed
and irrigated both parties’ lands. Dennis paid for the installation of Pivot A, and Victor
provided the power source and well. Victor then refused to allow Pivot A to cross his
property, prohibiting parts of Dennis’s land from being irrigated.
Since 1994, the parties had agreements permitting Victor to farm portions of
Dennis’s north acres in exchange for a portion of the crops produced. In 2008, Dennis
purchased and installed Pivot B, for a cost of $129,000, and Victor purchased and
4 installed Pivot C, for a cost of $40,000. Both pivots crossed the opposing party’s land.
The parties utilized an oral agreement for the 2008 pivot use and entered into a written
agreement in July 2008 at the request of the Minnesota DNR.
Dennis claims that in 2009, Victor informed him that Pivot B could no longer
cross Victor’s property and physically blocked the pivot. Victor contends that Dennis
voluntarily moved the pivot after deciding not to cross the land; Dennis contends that
Victor would only allow Dennis to cross the land if Dennis paid for reinstallation of the
pivot. Victor testified that in 2009 he changed his mind and decided to allow the pivot to
cross his property, but the district court found this testimony to not be credible and
concluded that Victor would only have allowed Dennis to cross the land if Dennis rented
his north acres to Victor. Because Pivot B’s blockage prevented Dennis from irrigating
some of his crops in 2009, the district court awarded Dennis $2,543 for decreased crop
production and $29,914 for the cost of reconfiguring the pivot, finding that this was the
least expensive means to remedy the blockage. Dennis was also granted a permanent
easement to cross Victor’s land with his irrigation pivot.
The district court also concluded that there was an implied-in-fact contract term
which indicated that the parties intended the Pivot A agreement to extend beyond 2013.
The district court estopped Victor from preventing Pivot A from crossing his property
and granted Dennis an easement to continue using Pivot A indefinitely.
This appeal follows.
5 DECISION
The district court first dismissed Victor’s claims pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P.
41.02(b) which states that:
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of evidence, the defendant, without waiving the right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. In an action tried by the court without a jury, the court as trier of the fact may then determine the facts and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.
We will not set aside the district court’s findings under a rule 41.02(b) involuntary
dismissal unless they are clearly erroneous.
Reasonable-Use Doctrine
Victor argues that Dennis violated the reasonable-use doctrine when he filled in
the swale and grassway on his property and thus altered the natural watercourse. We
review a district court’s findings for clear error. Highview N. Apartments v. Cty. Of
Ramsey, 323 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Minn. 1982). A finding is clearly erroneous if it “is
palpably and manifestly against the weight of the evidence.” Kral v. Boesch, 557
N.W.2d 597, 598 (Minn. App. 1996). Minnesota has adopted the reasonable-use doctrine
which “permits a property owner to drain surface waters onto another’s land if the
elements of the reasonable-use doctrine are met.” Goerke Family P’ship v. Lac qui
Parle-Yellow Bank Watershed Dist., 857 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Minn. App. 2014). Under the
reasonable-use doctrine, a landowner may divert surface water to another’s land, even if
some of the water would not have naturally gone to the other’s land, if:
6 (a) there is a reasonable necessity for such drainage; (b) reasonable care be taken to avoid unnecessary injury to the land receiving the burden; (c) the utility or benefit accruing to the land drained reasonably outweighs the gravity of the harm resulting to the land receiving the burden; (d) where practicable, it is accomplished by reasonably improving and aiding the normal and natural system of drainage according to its reasonable carrying capacity, or if, in the absence of a practicable natural drain, a reasonable and feasible artificial drainage system is adopted.
Kral, 557 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation omitted). When evaluating reasonableness, the court
should consider (1) the extent of the harm, (2) the foreseeability of the harm, and (3) the
motive for the action. Id. “The reasonable use rule cannot be reduced to a cut-and-dried
formula. What is reasonable use is a fact question to be resolved according to the
peculiar facts of each case.” Duevel v. Jennissen, 352 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Minn. App. 1984).
Victor does not directly challenge the district court’s finding that filling in the
swale and grassway was reasonably necessary because it “improved farming efficiency
and production” and “reduced erosion.” And this court has previously upheld a district
court’s determination that drainage that improves crop output is reasonably necessary,
Goerke, 857 N.W.2d at 56, and that installing a drainage system that significantly
increased tillable land was permissible under the reasonable-use doctrine, Duevel, 352
N.W.2d at 96-97. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err in finding that filling in
the grassway was reasonably necessary.
Victor also argues that because Dennis used perforated tiling, which is meant to
draw down saturated soils rather than transport flowing or surface water, the district court
erred in finding that Dennis took reasonable care to avoid unnecessary injury. Victor
7 argues that Dennis was forced to build a berm to impede water flow across his land
because the tiling was inadequate. But the record lacks detail as to why the berm was
constructed and how it affects water flow, including whether it directs water onto
Victor’s land. We give “great deference to a [district] court’s findings of fact because it
has the advantage of hearing the testimony, assessing relative credibility of witnesses and
acquiring a thorough understanding of the circumstances unique to the matter before it.”
Hasnudeen v. Onan Corp., 552 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1996). The district court found
that “[n]o credible evidence was presented establishing that the 2011 tiling transports
additional water to Victor’s meadow,” and other than photographs showing the fields
after an “exceptionally rainy period in May, there is no evidence that Victor’s land is
flooded.” The district court further found that Victor’s testimony about increased water
flow to his fields was not credible and noted that he did not present any expert testimony
about the flow, rate, or volume of water being transported. Without this testimony, there
is no concrete evidence that Dennis’s tiling system was inadequate. Therefore, the
district court did not clearly err in finding that the tiling system constituted reasonable
care to avoid injury.
Because filling in the grassway and swale indisputably improved Dennis’s
production and the district court found that there was no harm to Victor, the benefit to
Dennis outweighs the gravity of harm to Victor. Although Victor adamantly disputes the
district court’s finding that there was no harm to him, he did not provide any evidence to
rebut the district court’s findings that the standing water was due to an anomalous rain.
Without evidence that the area regularly receives rainstorms akin to the one that preceded
8 the flooding, we cannot conclude that the district court’s finding that the heavy rain
caused the damage was clearly erroneous.
Victor argues the fourth factor, that where practicable, drainage is accomplished
by reasonably improving and aiding the normal and natural system of drainage or, if no
natural drain, a reasonable and feasible artificial drainage system, “overshadows” the
other factors and requires a ruling in his favor. Victor relies upon the concurring opinion
in Sheehan v. Flynn for his assertion that Dennis was required to use the natural grassway
and swale for drainage. 59 Minn. 436, 451, 61 N.W. 462, 466-67 (1894) (Mitchell, J.,
concurring). The Sheehan concurrence states that “[o]f course, a man cannot change or
divert, to the prejudice of his neighbor, the natural outlet or drainage of surface water.”
Id. But Victor overstates the significance of this phrase, misinterpreting it to mean that a
person may never alter a natural channel; prior to the cited phrase, the concurrence states
that “[t]his does not mean, however, that the owner of land is not permitted to improve it,
but must abandon it to perpetual sterility, simply because its drainage would produce
some change in the manner of discharging surface water, or in the amount discharged.”
Id. at 450, 61 N.W.2d at 466. The supreme court ultimately held that the drainage was a
permissible improvement provided that the defendant did “what is reasonable under all
the circumstances.” Sheehan v. Flynn, 59 Minn. 436, 442-43, 449, 61 N.W.2d 462, 463,
466 (1894). There is no bright-line requirement that Dennis could not alter the manner of
drainage, particularly where the district court found that the new tiling system did not
alter drainage.
9 Victor also cites several cases where landowners were required to remove water
blockages. But these cases are factually distinguishable and do not negate the application
of the reasonable-use doctrine. In Town of King v. Brekke, the defendant built a dike that
caused the flooding of a highway bridge that crossed a natural water-carrying depression.
151 Minn. 474, 475, 187 N.W. 515, 515 (1922). The supreme court held that the
defendant was prohibited from obstructing the water, stating that
[t]he owner of lower land has no more right, in dealing with surface water for the purpose of drainage, to cast it back upon his upper neighbor in times of freshets by means of a dike, than an upper owner has to change or divert it to the prejudice of his lower neighbor.
Id. at 476-77, 187 N.W. at 516. The supreme court noted that the dike did not aid
drainage of the defendant’s land and that he had the “duty to continue the water in a
natural channel” because his method of disposing the surface water was unreasonable
“when considered in connection with the benefits and damages resulting therefrom.” Id.
Although Brekke held that the defendant—who unlike Dennis owned the lower-
elevation land—had a duty to continue the water in the accessible natural channel, it
considered this duty in terms of reasonableness. Id. This case does not stand for the
proposition that natural channels must be used in all circumstances.
In Will v. Boler, adjacent landowners permanently widened a natural swale,
increasing drainage of surface water. 212 Minn. 525, 526-27, 4 N.W.2d 345, 346-47
(1942). Thirty-five years later, the defendants, owners of the lower land, filled in
portions of the ditch, diverting water onto and harming the plaintiff’s land. Id. The
supreme court cited Sheehan’s holding as follows:
10 The old common-law rule that surface water is a common enemy, which each owner may get rid of as best he can, is in force in this state, except that it is modified by the rule that he must so use his own as not unnecessarily or unreasonably to injure his neighbor. Under this rule, it is the duty of an owner draining his own land to deposit the surface water in some natural drain, if one is reasonably accessible; and he is entitled to deposit the same in such natural drain, though it is thereby conveyed upon the land of his neighbor, if it does not thereby unreasonably injure him.
Id. at 529, 4 N.W.2d at 348 (quoting Sheehan, 59 Minn. at 436, 61 N.W. at 462). The
supreme court concluded that the defendant was estopped from closing the ditch because
the parties’ previous expansion of drainage was a joint project that benefited both parties
and the modification violated the reasonable-use doctrine. Id. at 530, 4 N.W.2d at 348.
Here, like the parties in Will, Dennis previously expanded the natural swale to
increase its drainage. But the expansion was not a joint project, and we cannot conclude
that Dennis had a duty to maintain the swale in its previous condition when there was no
damage.
Alternatively, even if there was damage to Victor’s land from the change in
drainage, we conclude, under all the reasonable-use doctrine factors, that Dennis’s
actions were permissible. The balance of the factors weighs in favor of Dennis, and there
is no strict requirement prohibiting alteration of the swale.
South Acres Breach of Contract
Victor argues that the district court clearly erred by concluding that he could not
bring a breach-of-contract claim against Dennis because Victor first breached the land-
use agreement by withholding rental payments. The district court concluded that Victor’s
11 withholding of corn constituted anticipatory repudiation, and that this breach excused
Dennis’s future performance. Victor additionally contends that Dennis was required to
bring an eviction action and that the district court erred by determining that an eviction
action would have been an inappropriate action because Victor was not actually in
possession of the land.
Anticipatory breach occurs when there is “an unconditional repudiation of a
contract, either by words or acts, which is communicated to the other party prior to the
time fixed by the contract for his performance.” In re Haugen, 278 N.W.2d 75, 79 n.6
(Minn. 1979). “An anticipatory breach by repudiation occurs where a vendor cannot
possibly perform and where by its conduct it demonstrates an unequivocal intent not to
perform.” State ex rel. Friends of the Riverfront v. City of Minneapolis, 751 N.W.2d 586,
593 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted) (holding that where it was still possible for a
party to perform a contract, the other party could not establish anticipatory breach),
review denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008). The adversarial party may treat the renouncement
as a breach of contract and bring an action for damages. Space Ctr., Inc. v. 451 Corp.,
298 N.W.2d 443, 450 (Minn. 1980).
It is undisputed that Victor had the corn available as payment for rent but chose
not to release it because it gave him leverage over Dennis on other issues. Victor
repeatedly declared that his intention was to withhold the 2011 corn payment when it
came due. Victor also left a voicemail for Dennis’s attorney in November 2011. In it he
stated that “I have no problem giving him the corn, but I am not releasing a kernel of corn
until we get the 2008 issues that we had on hand resolved.” We agree with the district
12 court’s finding that this was an unqualified renunciation of the contract. The record thus
supports the finding of anticipatory repudiation. The conclusion of anticipatory
repudiation supports Dennis’s nonperformance of the contract, warranting his rescission
of the contract. See Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 76 Credit Union v. Hufnagle, 295
N.W.2d 259, 262 (Minn. 1980) (stating that the remedy for anticipatory repudiation is “to
treat the entire contract as broken”). The district court did not err in determining that
Dennis had no further obligation to continue renting his portion of the south acres to
Victor.
Victor next asserts that he can maintain his breach-of-contract action against
Dennis even though Victor first breached the contract by withholding payment. The
district court concluded that because Victor materially breached the contract, Dennis
could treat it as a total breach and was excused from performing under the contract. A
material breach is “a breach of contract that is significant enough to permit the aggrieved
party to elect to treat the breach as total (rather than partial), thus excusing that party
from further performance and affording it the right to sue for damages.” BOB Acres,
LLC v. Schumacher Farms, LLC, 797 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn. App. 2011) (quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary 214 (9th ed. 2009). A material breach is one that “goes to the
root or essence of the contract.” Whether a breach is material is a question of fact.
Cloverdale Foods of Minn., Inc. v. Pioneer Snacks, 580 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Minn. App.
1998). Although in the first two years of breach, Victor only withheld a small portion of
the bushels of corn, the third year he withheld the entire rent payment for the land and
13 pivot use. Here, payment of corn in exchange for land use essentially encompassed the
parties’ agreement. Therefore, nonpayment constituted a material breach.
Where there is a material breach, the nonbreaching party may rescind the contract
if the injury is irreparable, or where damages would be inadequate, difficult, or
impossible to determine. Johnny’s, Inc. v. Njaka, 450 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Minn. App.
1990). Here, Dennis rescinded the contract after a material breach by renting the land to
another farmer. Even though forfeitures are disfavored, Cloverdale, 580 N.W.2d at 49,
Victor does not have a breach-of-contract claim against Dennis because Dennis was
justified in rescinding the contract.
Victor alternatively asserts that Dennis’s proper action for nonpayment of rent was
an eviction action because the parties had a landlord-tenant relationship, which gave
Victor a “right of redemption.” Even if the parties had a landlord-tenant relationship,
“[e]viction actions are summary proceedings that are intended to adjudicate only the
limited question of present possessory rights to the property.” Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust
Co. v. Hanson, 841 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn. App. 2014). Because Victor did not
actually possess the land at the time Dennis rented it to a third party, an eviction action
would be inappropriate.
Damages
Victor argues that the district court erred in awarding damages to Dennis for Pivot
B’s blockage because its findings of fact are erroneous. Victor asserts that the district
court erred in finding that he “physically blocked Pivot B with a field stop” and in finding
Victor’s testimony that he changed his mind about allowing access not credible. We
14 defer to a district court’s findings on credibility. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210
(Minn. 1988).
Victor claims that the district court erred in finding that he blocked the pivot’s
access because the parties had a series of discussions, and he agreed to let Dennis cross
the field if Dennis filled in the wheel tracks with rock. But Victor’s assertion that he
decided to allow access is not supported by the record: although Dennis admitted that
Victor said Dennis could cross the land, he also said that permission was “tied in” with
Victor receiving the contract he wanted, and Dennis did not recall actually agreeing to fill
in the wheel tracks. Dennis also sent Victor a letter in July 2009 in which Dennis states
that he “decided to run the pivot up to [Victor’s] property line” because they were unable
to reach an agreement.
Victor also claims that he never installed a field stop on the tire track. But the
court implicitly found Dennis’s testimony, that Victor told him many times he could not
cross the field, threatened to put up a property-line fence, and created a physical
blockage, credible. While there is no testimony that Victor put an actual “field stop” on
the track, there is testimony that the track was physically blocked. Victor admits that a
dismantled pivot was placed where Pivot B would cross, but he argues that the finding of
blockage is erroneous because the pivot could have easily been moved. Even if that
assertion is correct, there is no legal basis to require Dennis to move Victor’s equipment
from Victor’s land without permission. On this record, we cannot find that the district
court’s findings of facts regarding damages were clearly erroneous.
15 Easement
Victor asserts that the district court erred in granting Dennis a permanent easement
allowing Pivot A to cross Victor’s land. First, Victor argues that the easement could not
be “implied in fact” because of the statute of frauds. “The statute of frauds applies to
grants of easements.” Berg v. Carlstrom, 347 N.W.2d 809, 812 (Minn. 1984). “[T]he
difference between a contract expressed orally and one implied in fact involves no
difference in legal effect.” Capital Warehouse Co. v. McGill-Warner-Farnham Co., 276
Minn. 108, 114, 149 N.W.2d 31, 36 (1967). While an easement may be taken out of the
statute of frauds through part performance or through the doctrines of equitable or
promissory estoppel, there is no such similar requirement for implied-in-fact contracts.
See Berg, 347 N.W.2d at 812 (applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel to an
agreement normally limited by the statute of frauds). Therefore, the district court erred
by considering the easement under an implied-in-fact theory. Additionally, there is no
evidence that both parties intended the easement to continue; Dennis only testified that he
would not have purchased Pivot A without intending a longer usage period. There is no
evidence as to Victor’s intent.
Victor next challenges the district court’s conclusion that the “Pivot Agreement
did not specifically state that the easement would continue past 2013 because it was a
fundamental and implied term of the agreement.” While this relates to the continued
easement being an implied-in-fact-term, “easement by implication” is a term of art. See
Black’s Law Dictionary 458 (5th ed. 1979) (defining “implied easement” as “[o]ne which
the law imposes by inferring the parties to a transaction intended that result, although
16 they did not express it.” Three essential factors are required for an easement by
implication: “(1) a separation of title; (2) the use which gives rise to the easement shall
have been so long continued and apparent as to show that it was intended to be
permanent; and (3) that the easement is necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the land
granted.” Clark v. Galaxy Apartments, 427 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Minn. App. 1988). “The
existence of an implied easement is determined at the time of severance.” Lake George
Park, L.L.C. v. IBM Mid-Am. Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 576 N.W.2d 463, 465 (Minn.
App. 1998), review denied (Minn. Jun 17, 1998). A subsequent change of conditions
does not create an implied easement. Niehaus v. City of Litchfield, 529 N.W.2d 410, 412
(Minn. App. 1995). The party attempting to establish the easement bears the burden of
proving its necessity at the time of severance. Id. Here, the parties owned their
respective acres prior to installing Pivot A; therefore, no implied easement existed at the
time of severance. Further, the lease specifically defined the period that Pivot A could
cross the land; thus, the use is not continued. Finally, although irrigation increases
production, it is not necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the land. We therefore
conclude that there is no implied easement.
An easement by estoppel “is created from a voluntary servitude after a person,
mistakenly believing the servitude to be permanent, acted in reasonable reliance on the
mistaken belief.” Black’s Law Dictionary 586 (9th ed. 2009). The Minnesota Supreme
Court has adopted two descriptions of easement by estoppel:
When a grantor conveys part of his land to a grantee with knowledge of the latter’s intended use of the land so conveyed, and the use so intended necessarily involves some
17 curtailment of the grantor’s use of his retained land, an easement arises in favor of the grantee as against the grantor. The grantor is estopped to deny that the grantee acquired the necessary easement. Similarly, when a vendor represents to his purchaser that the land sold will be served by an easement over reserved land of the vendor, the vendor is estopped to deny the existence of such easement although it is unmentioned in the conveyance.” . . . . The gist of the doctrine is that if a vendor who has reserved some property to himself represents to the vendee that he will have an easement over the vendor's property as part of the sales transaction, the vendor may be later estopped from denying the easement. The key requirement is that of “representation”; Tiffany refers to the doctrine as “estoppel by representation, by means of conduct of a particular character.”
Highway 7 Embers, Inc. v. Nw. Nat’l Bank, 256 N.W.2d 271, 277-78 (Minn. 1977)
(quotations omitted). The statute of frauds does not apply to equitable estoppel. Poksyla
v. Sundholm, 259 Minn. 125, 129, 106 N.W.2d 202, 205 (1960).
Victor first asserts that there was no conveyance. But Victor and Dennis entered
into an agreement whereby the pivot could cross the land. This constitutes a conveyance.
Although the district court found Dennis’s testimony that he would not have purchased
the pivot if he believed the use would be limited to 10 years credible, there is no evidence
that Victor represented the agreement would last longer than 10 years.
Dennis is attempting to make an easement out of a contract issue. The lease
agreement is not ambiguous and clearly states that the lease, which both parties benefited
from, was enforceable for 10 years. The original agreement was for a set-term lease, not
an indefinite easement. Nothing indicates that both parties actually considered that the
land-use agreement would last longer than 10 years. In fact, if Dennis truly had an
indefinite easement, a 10-year lease would not have been necessary. Victor’s potential
18 benefit from a greater than the expressly agreed upon period also does not require a lease
extension. See Highway 7 Embers, 256 N.W.2d at 278 (“Embers bargained for and
received an express easement over a part of the . . . property. The equities do not balance
so heavily in favor of Embers as to require an extension of that express grant.”).
On the other hand, Victor provides no reason for preventing the pivot from
crossing the land—the pivot provided irrigation to both Dennis’s and Victor’s lands, and
Victor built his own pivot after he determined that Dennis could not cross his land.
While the parties may have contemplated something longer, especially given the expense
of installing a pivot, this possibility does not provide evidence in the record that Victor
made any kind of representation. Therefore, the district court erred by determining that
Dennis had an indefinite easement for Pivot A.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.