UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
VICENTE RODRIGUEZ AYON,
Petitioner, Case No. 1:26-cv-1803
v. Honorable Robert J. Jonker
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents. ____________________________/
OPINION Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee, initiated this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice. Discussion I. Procedural History The habeas petition challenges the lawfulness of Petitioner’s current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.16.) In an order entered on June 16, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on June 22, 2026, (ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed a reply on June 25, 2026, (ECF No. 5). II. Factual Background Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cuba. (I-94, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.19.) He was paroled into the United States in 1981 and has remained here since that time. (Id.; Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) On July 15, 2010, after Petitioner agreed to a stipulated removal, an immigration judge (IJ) with the Detroit Immigration Court ordered Petitioner removed. (Swarts Decl. ¶¶ 12–14, ECF
No. 4-1, PageID.51.) Because Petitioner agreed to a stipulated removal, Petitioner did not reserve the right to appeal, and the removal order became final that day.1 Petitioner was released on an order of supervision pending his removal. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) On or about February 22, 2026, ICE agents arrested Petitioner. (Swarts Decl. ¶ 16, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.52.) Respondents revoked Petitioner’s order of supervision because a change in circumstances revealed “that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” (Notice, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.56.) Petitioner is currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers upon the federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
1 For the purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025). IV. Merits Discussion The parties agree that Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) because he has a final order of removal. However, Petitioner contends that his continued detention is improper.
(See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.9.) Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by arguing that Petitioner’s detention is proper under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). Here, as noted above, Petitioner’s order of removal became final on July 15, 2010. The 90-day removal period following the order expired before Petitioner filed the present action. See id. § 1231(a)(1) (“The [90-day] removal period begins on . . . [t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.”). In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that after expiration of the 90-day removal
period, the Government may continue to detain the noncitizen for a “presumptively reasonable period” of time, which the Supreme Court concluded equaled six months. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). Following that six-month period, “once [a noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.2 “[O]nce
2 The Court notes that the Supreme Court has held that § 1231(a)(6) does not require the “Government to offer detained noncitizens bond hearings after six months of detention in which the Government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.” See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, [a noncitizen’s] removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. Petitioner has been detained less than six months. “Although the Supreme Court established a six-month period of presumptively reasonable detention,” courts have found that Zadvydas does “not preclude a detainee from challenging the reasonableness of his detention
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
VICENTE RODRIGUEZ AYON,
Petitioner, Case No. 1:26-cv-1803
v. Honorable Robert J. Jonker
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents. ____________________________/
OPINION Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee, initiated this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice. Discussion I. Procedural History The habeas petition challenges the lawfulness of Petitioner’s current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.16.) In an order entered on June 16, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on June 22, 2026, (ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed a reply on June 25, 2026, (ECF No. 5). II. Factual Background Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cuba. (I-94, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.19.) He was paroled into the United States in 1981 and has remained here since that time. (Id.; Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) On July 15, 2010, after Petitioner agreed to a stipulated removal, an immigration judge (IJ) with the Detroit Immigration Court ordered Petitioner removed. (Swarts Decl. ¶¶ 12–14, ECF
No. 4-1, PageID.51.) Because Petitioner agreed to a stipulated removal, Petitioner did not reserve the right to appeal, and the removal order became final that day.1 Petitioner was released on an order of supervision pending his removal. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) On or about February 22, 2026, ICE agents arrested Petitioner. (Swarts Decl. ¶ 16, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.52.) Respondents revoked Petitioner’s order of supervision because a change in circumstances revealed “that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” (Notice, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.56.) Petitioner is currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers upon the federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
1 For the purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025). IV. Merits Discussion The parties agree that Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) because he has a final order of removal. However, Petitioner contends that his continued detention is improper.
(See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.9.) Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by arguing that Petitioner’s detention is proper under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). Here, as noted above, Petitioner’s order of removal became final on July 15, 2010. The 90-day removal period following the order expired before Petitioner filed the present action. See id. § 1231(a)(1) (“The [90-day] removal period begins on . . . [t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.”). In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that after expiration of the 90-day removal
period, the Government may continue to detain the noncitizen for a “presumptively reasonable period” of time, which the Supreme Court concluded equaled six months. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). Following that six-month period, “once [a noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.2 “[O]nce
2 The Court notes that the Supreme Court has held that § 1231(a)(6) does not require the “Government to offer detained noncitizens bond hearings after six months of detention in which the Government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.” See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, [a noncitizen’s] removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. Petitioner has been detained less than six months. “Although the Supreme Court established a six-month period of presumptively reasonable detention,” courts have found that Zadvydas does “not preclude a detainee from challenging the reasonableness of his detention
before such time.” See, e.g., Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d 387, 395–96 (D.N.J. 2025) (citing, inter alia, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–701; Ali v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 451 F. Supp. 3d 703, 706–07 (S.D. Tex. 2020); Hoang Trinh v. Homan, 333 F. Supp. 3d 984, 994 (C.D. Cal. 2018)); Ali v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 451 F. Supp. 3d 703, 707 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (“This six- month presumption is not a bright line, however, and Zadvydas did not automatically authorize all detention until it reaches constitutional limits.” (citations omitted)). That is, during the six-month period of detention, “[t]he presumption of reasonableness is the default,” and “the government bears no burden to justify detention,” “but if a person ‘can prove’ that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, then he can overcome that presumption.” Id. at 397 (citations omitted).
In this case, Petitioner has not offered any evidence or argument to prove that “there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Accordingly, the Court will deny Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
576 (2022). The Court, however, did not reach Arteaga-Martinez’s constitutional or Zadvydas claims, concluding that such claims were not properly before the Court. See id. at 583–84. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment denying Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Dated: July 11, 2026 /s/ Robert J. Jonker Robert J. Jonker United States District Judge