Viator v. Miller

Fifth Circuit

Viator v. Miller

136 F. App'x 615

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedJune 13, 2005

Docket04-30814

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 136 F. App'x 615 (Viator v. Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Viator v. Miller, 136 F. App'x 615 (5th Cir. 2005).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM: *

Judge Wendell Miller of the Louisiana 31st Judicial District Court appeals the imposition of contempt sanctions by the United States District Court for the West *616 ern District of Louisiana. Judge Miller was sanctioned in connection with his violation of a consent judgment prohibiting contact with appellee Heather Viator for the duration of her employment discrimination action against him. Judge Miller contends for the first time on appeal that the $500 fine and gag order were criminal sanctions imposed in violation of his due process rights and were not supported by the evidence. We now affirm the judgment of the district court.

Although the gag order was clearly a civil contempt sanction, the $500 fine constitutes a criminal contempt sanction because it was punitive rather than coercive or remedial. Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1050, 1052 (5th Cir.1980); see also 3A Charles A. Wright, Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Federal Practice and Procedure § 704 (3d ed.2004). However, it was a “petty fine” that “the district court has been traditionally allowed to impose in a summary manner.” Crowe v. Smith, 151 F.3d 217, 228 (5th Cir.1998). The actions taken by the district court were sufficient to fulfill the notice and opportunity to be heard requirements that are necessary to satisfy due process. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 498-99, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (citing Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 502-03, 92 S.Ct. 582, 30 L.Ed.2d 632 (1972)). In any event, Miller made no objection below, either before or during the contempt hearing or in his motion for reconsideration of the judgment of contempt, that his rights as a criminal defendant were violated, and even if there were plain error in this respect, we would nonetheless decline to reverse because affirmance would not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).

Miller’s sufficiency of the evidence claim fails because the evidence before this Court supports the finding that Miller willfully violated a clear and unambiguous order. Cooper v. Texaco, Inc., 961 F.2d 71, 72 n. 3 (5th Cir.1992). Miller’s remaining claims are without merit. We AFFIRM Miller’s contempt sanctions.

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

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PER CURIAM: *

Judge Wendell Miller of the Louisiana 31st Judicial District Court appeals the imposition of contempt sanctions by the United States District Court for the West *616 ern District of Louisiana. Judge Miller was sanctioned in connection with his violation of a consent judgment prohibiting contact with appellee Heather Viator for the duration of her employment discrimination action against him. Judge Miller contends for the first time on appeal that the $500 fine and gag order were criminal sanctions imposed in violation of his due process rights and were not supported by the evidence. We now affirm the judgment of the district court.

Although the gag order was clearly a civil contempt sanction, the $500 fine constitutes a criminal contempt sanction because it was punitive rather than coercive or remedial. Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1050, 1052 (5th Cir.1980); see also 3A Charles A. Wright, Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Federal Practice and Procedure § 704 (3d ed.2004). However, it was a “petty fine” that “the district court has been traditionally allowed to impose in a summary manner.” Crowe v. Smith, 151 F.3d 217, 228 (5th Cir.1998). The actions taken by the district court were sufficient to fulfill the notice and opportunity to be heard requirements that are necessary to satisfy due process. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 498-99, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (citing Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 502-03, 92 S.Ct. 582, 30 L.Ed.2d 632 (1972)). In any event, Miller made no objection below, either before or during the contempt hearing or in his motion for reconsideration of the judgment of contempt, that his rights as a criminal defendant were violated, and even if there were plain error in this respect, we would nonetheless decline to reverse because affirmance would not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).

Miller’s sufficiency of the evidence claim fails because the evidence before this Court supports the finding that Miller willfully violated a clear and unambiguous order. Cooper v. Texaco, Inc., 961 F.2d 71, 72 n. 3 (5th Cir.1992). Miller’s remaining claims are without merit. We AFFIRM Miller’s contempt sanctions.

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

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