Viacao Aerea Sao Paulo v. International Lease Finance Corp.

119 F.R.D. 435, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2696, 1988 WL 27026
CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedMarch 24, 1988
DocketNo. CV 86-3758 AHS (Bx)
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 119 F.R.D. 435 (Viacao Aerea Sao Paulo v. International Lease Finance Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Viacao Aerea Sao Paulo v. International Lease Finance Corp., 119 F.R.D. 435, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2696, 1988 WL 27026 (C.D. Cal. 1988).

Opinion

OPINION ON ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RETAX COSTS AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO RETAX COSTS

STOTLER, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Viacao Aerea Sao Paulo, S.A. (Viacao) subleased a Boeing 727-212 from International Lease Finance Corporation (ILFC) who in turn had leased the aircraft from the owner, Singapore Airlines, Ltd. After the plane crashed in 1982, plaintiff caused the insurance proceeds to be paid to defendant and the owner to the extent of their respective interests.

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant in 1986 to recover certain moneys paid to defendant during the lease term, which moneys were to be held in reserve pending plaintiff’s purchase of the plane. Because plaintiff never exercised its option to purchase, defendant refused any refunds and disputed plaintiff’s claim that the aircraft was “purchased” with the insurance proceeds so as to trigger the lease’s refund provisions.

After the conclusion of extensive and costly discovery, the Court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on October 19, 1987. Judgment was entered October 26, 1987, and ILFC filed a notice of entry of judgment November 5, 1987.

Defendant timely filed a bill of costs pursuant to the Local Rules of the Central District of California (Local Rules), claiming $38,203.52. By this Order, the Court permits defendant to tax costs in the amount of $13,579.22. By application of 28 U.S.C. § 1920, Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d), Local Rule 16.4 and subdivisions thereof, and in light of Crawford Fitting Company v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987), defendant is precluded from recovering certain costs as [437]*437discussed hereinafter. More importantly, the Court concludes that portions of Local Rule 16.4 can no longer be honored.1

[438]*438PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

ILFC filed its bill of costs and a notice of application to clerk to tax costs on November 10, 1987. Viacao filed objections November 18,1987, and ILFC filed a response November 20,1987. The Clerk held a hearing November 25, 1987, and ILFC filed a supplemental declaration December 1, 1987. The Clerk taxed costs in the amount of $24,978.82, disallowing $5,544.70 for costs incident to depositions (counsel’s travel expenses) and $7,680.00 for expert witness fees (for defendant’s expert on Brazilian law).

Each party filed a motion to retax costs December 8, 1987. Viacao filed opposition to ILFC’s motion December 21,1987; ILFC filed opposition to Viacao’s motion December 28, 1987. Each side filed its respective reply January 4, 1988.

On January 5, 1988, the Court issued a minute order directing the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and Crawford, supra, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed.2d 385, to the parties’ motions. The parties filed their respective supplemental briefs January 14, 1988, and the matter came on for hearing January 19, 1988.

At the hearing, the Court took the matter under submission and directed defendant to file a declaration regarding deposition original and copy costs not later than February 2, 1988, and inviting plaintiff to file a response thereto not later than February 10, 1988. Defendant filed a draft calculation of costs recovered and two accompanying declarations February 2, 1988. Plaintiff filed its response February 10, 1988.

DISCUSSION

In Crawford, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed.2d 385, the Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1920 defines the term “costs” as used in Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d). In its conclusion, the Court emphasized that taxation of expenses is governed by explicit statutory or contractual authorization and that federal courts are bound by § 1920. Id. — U.S. at-, 107 S.Ct. at 2498-99, 96 L.Ed.2d at 393. Section 1920 in its entirety provides:

A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.
A Bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the judgment or decree.

The area left for local regulation of costs in the face of the stringent Crawford ruling appears miniscule. Local Rule 16.4 lists taxable costs as including the following: the cost of the original and one copy of all depositions (16.4.6); and fees paid to interpreters and translators as well as fees for translation of documents (16.4.8). These provisions, as applied to the costs in this case, cannot be invoked without limitation.

A.

Depositions

Defendant initially claimed $28,370.34 for all depositions, including copies thereof. Plaintiff challenged this item on the ground that the depositions were not “necessary” within the meaning of § 1920(2).

First, such costs do fall within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2) as fees of the court reporter. Hudson v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 758 F.2d 1237, 1242-43 (7th Cir.1985); see also Local Rule 16.4.6(b). [439]*439Second, in this case the depositions appeared reasonably necessary at the time they were taken. The plaintiff had brought a motion for summary judgment within five months of the filing of the complaint. Defendant established what then appeared to be triable issues. It does not matter whether intervening developments later rendered the depositions unneeded, so long as the depositions were not purely investigative in nature. Hudson, 758 F.2d at 1243.

The Court does not conclude the depositions were either investigative or merely for counsel’s convenience. While federal courts do not enjoy unrestrained discretion to tax costs to reimburse a winning litigant for every expense he or she has seen fit to incur, it is the duty of the Court, having given costs careful scrutiny, to award those to which a party is entitled. Farmer v. Arabian American Oil, 379 U.S. 227, 235, 85 S.Ct.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
119 F.R.D. 435, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2696, 1988 WL 27026, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/viacao-aerea-sao-paulo-v-international-lease-finance-corp-cacd-1988.