Veto v. the Boeing Company

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 6, 2026
• Docket: 24-7060
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 6 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTOPHER VETO, No. 24-7060 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 8:24-cv-00509-DOC-KES v. MEMORANDUM* THE BOEING COMPANY, a corporation,

Defendant - Appellee,

and

DOES, 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 3, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: LEE, KOH, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Appellant Christopher Veto appeals the district court’s order granting

summary judgment to Appellee The Boeing Company (“Boeing”) on Veto’s

California Labor Code §§ 1102.5 and 6310 retaliation claims and California

common law wrongful termination claim. As the parties are familiar with the

facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

and affirm.

A district court’s decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed de novo.

Desire, LLC v. Manna Textiles, Inc., 986 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2021).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we must

determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the

district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Soc. Techs. LLC v.

Apple Inc., 4 F.4th 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2021).

1. The district court did not err in granting Boeing summary judgment

on Veto’s Section 1102.5 claim. In relevant part, Section 1102.5 prohibits an

employer from retaliating against an employee for disclosing information to a

supervisor if the employee has “reasonable cause” to believe the information

discloses a violation of state or federal statute. CAL. LABOR CODE §

1102.5(b). The “reasonable cause” standard “imposes a requirement of objective

reasonableness.” People ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s, Inc., 14 Cal. 5th 719,

734 (Cal. 2023). “The reasonableness of an act or omission is a question of fact,

2 24-7060 that is, an issue which should be decided by a jury and not on a summary judgment

motion,” unless “there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.” Killgore

v. SpecPro Pro. Servs., LLC, 51 F.4th 973, 990 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Terry v.

Atl. Richfield Co., 140 Cal. Rptr. 510, 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)) (internal brackets

omitted).

Here, there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion, and no

genuine dispute of material fact, that Veto lacked an objectively reasonable belief

that his complaints of smelling marijuana at the workplace disclosed a violation of

state or federal law. Each of Veto’s eight written complaints to security personnel

and half dozen verbal complaints to his manager were investigated and resulted in

no evidence corroborating any of Veto’s complaints. Namely, those investigating

the complaints did not smell marijuana, did not see marijuana paraphernalia, and

did not observe signs that an employee was impaired in any way. This case is

therefore unlike Killgore where “other members of the . . . team may have also

believed they were violating federal law,” which “illustrated the reasonableness of

[the whistleblower’s] disclosures of illegality was a factual matter better left for the

jury.” Id. In fact, although Veto complained on several occasions that a particular

coworker smelled of marijuana, Veto also confirmed that fourteen employees who

worked in the immediate vicinity of that coworker did not indicate that they

suspected any marijuana use. Veto further admitted that he never saw an employee

3 24-7060 use marijuana, have marijuana in their possession, or exhibit signs of impairment.

While a security supervisor stated in a declaration that he had “received similar

complaints from other personnel [of] alleged Narcotic use” at Veto’s workplace,

the declaration is not specific enough to create room for a reasonable difference of

opinion or a genuine dispute of material fact that Veto lacked an objectively

reasonable belief that his complaints disclosed a violation of state or federal law.

2. The district court did not err in granting Boeing summary judgment

on Veto’s Section 6310 claim. In relevant part, Section 6310 provides that an

employee who is retaliated against by their employer because the employee made a

“bona fide . . . complaint” to their employer of unsafe working conditions or work

practices “shall be entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and

work benefits.” CAL. LABOR CODE § 6310(b). “Bona fide” in this context means

“good faith.” Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 759 (9th Cir. 2003);

see also Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 64

(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“We agree that an employee must be protected against

discharge for a good faith complaint about working conditions which he believes

to be unsafe.”). In other words, Section 6310 applies a subjective reasonableness

standard. See Dinslage v. City & County of San Francisco, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 809,

820 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (concluding that “subjective[]” belief means “good faith”

belief).

4 24-7060 There is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion, and no genuine

dispute of material fact, that Veto’s complaints were not bona fide complaints of

unsafe working conditions or work practices. Veto’s complaints to his supervisor

and security personnel were primarily concerned with allowing him to move his

desk or work remotely and demonstrated no express concerns about workplace

safety. See Ferrick v. Santa Clara Univ., 181 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68, 81 (Cal. Ct. App.

2014) (concluding that employee’s complaint that her supervisor drove a golf cart

without a license did not state a cause of action under Section 6310 because the

complaint “did not convey a workplace safety hazard”).

3. The district court did not err in granting Boeing summary judgment

on Veto’s common law wrongful termination claim. Veto’s common law claim

relies on his Section 1102.5 and Section 6310 claims. Because the underlying

statutory claims are unavailing, the common law claim is also unavailing. See

Stevenson v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4th 880, 889–90 (Cal. 1997).1

AFFIRMED.

1 Boeing argues that Veto is not entitled to punitive damages. However, we need not address this issue because the district court did not reach it. See Planned Parenthood of Greater Wash. & N. Idaho v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 946 F.3d 1100, 1110 (9th Cir. 2020) (“In general, an appellate court does not decide issues that the trial court did not decide.”). In any case, this issue is moot as Veto’s claims are unavailing.

5 24-7060