Veronica Ragland v. Department of Health and Human Services

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJuly 19, 2024
DocketDC-1221-22-0243-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Veronica Ragland v. Department of Health and Human Services (Veronica Ragland v. Department of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Veronica Ragland v. Department of Health and Human Services, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

VERONICA RAGLAND, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-1221-22-0243-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND DATE: July 19, 2024 HUMAN SERVICES, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Veronica Ragland , Phoenix, Arizona, pro se.

Suzanne Nicole Nardone , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied the appellant’s request for corrective action in this individual right of action appeal. On petition for review, the appellant argues that the agency failed to rebut her prima facie case of reprisal for her protected disclosures about 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

budgetary matters. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. She argues that the evidence in support of her June 2021 performance overview and September 2021 probationary termination is weak, id. at 10-14, 16-23, and the motive to retaliate on the part of relevant officials was strong, id. at 7-10, 15, 23-26. The appellant also suggests that the agency may have had relevant evidence about potential comparators that the agency simply failed to produce. 2 Id. at 15-16, 26. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to find that the appellant did not prove that an alleged disclosure about reimbursement for Government Accounting Office (GAO) engagements was protected, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

2 Even if the lack of comparator evidence caused the third factor of the clear and convincing analysis to weigh slightly against the agency, we believe that the strength of the agency’s reasons for taking the action and the slight motive to retaliate still support a finding that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions absent the appellant’s protected disclosures. See Miller v. Department of Justice, 842 F.3d 1252, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that while the absence of evidence on the third factor may remove it from the analysis, its absence may also “cut slightly against” the agency); see also Rickel v. Department of the Navy, 31 F.4th 1358, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (noting that the absence of evidence on the third factor “will not necessarily” prevent the agency from meeting its burden). 3

The administrative judge substantively addressed, on the merits, the appellant’s allegations of reprisal for one alleged disclosure about the possible misdirection of funds allocated for Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) to other agency priorities and another alleged disclosure about the agency preventing some states and localities from claiming federal financial participation of FPLS fees. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 32, Initial Decision (ID) at 8-39. She found that the appellant proved that those disclosures were protected based on the appellant’s reasonable belief that she was revealing the kinds of wrongdoing covered under the whistleblower protection statutes. ID at 12-20. The administrative judge also found that the agency established that these protected disclosures were a contributing factor in the appellant’s June 2021 performance overview and her September 2021 probationary termination. ID at 20-21. But the administrative judge denied corrective action after finding that the agency proved that it would have taken the same personnel actions in the absence of the aforementioned disclosures. ID at 21-39. Separately, the administrative judge indicated that the appellant seemed to abandon a third disclosure about the agency failing to obtain reimbursement for GAO engagements, which was mentioned in an initial pleading. ID at 12; IAF, Tab 1 at 22, 26. Nothing in the appellant’s petition for review suggests otherwise. PFR File, Tab 1. We nevertheless modify the initial decision to find that, even if the appellant did not abandon the disclosure, the appellant failed to meet her burden of proving that it was a separate protected disclosure. A protected disclosure is a disclosure that an appellant reasonably believes evidences a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. Turner v. Department of Agriculture, 2023 MSPB 25, ¶ 14. A close-out letter from the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), which first investigated the appellant’s claims of whistleblower reprisal, described the alleged disclosure at issue as one revealing that the agency had failed to collect 4

and seek reimbursement for GAO engagements. IAF, Tab 1 at 26. We found what seem to be some corresponding references in the appellant’s initial complaint to OSC. Id. at 22. However, the appellant has not directed us to any further argument or evidence to prove that she made this disclosure or prove that it is protected under the whistleblower statute. We nevertheless reviewed the appellant’s various pleadings and found numerous instances of the appellant indicating that she complained to GAO but no further mention of her making protected disclosures about reimbursements for GAO engagements. IAF, Tabs 4, 6, 26. We recognize, as the administrative judge did, that each of the appellant’s alleged disclosures generally involve budget and funding issues made over the same period. ID at 12. But it was the appellant’s burden of proving by preponderant evidence that she made protected disclosures. In the absence of further argument and reference to specific evidence, we find that the appellant has not proven, by preponderant evidence, that she made an additional protected disclosure about reimbursements for GAO engagements, separate from her other protected disclosures. We modify the initial decision accordingly. Regardless of her intent to pursue or abandon this disclosure, the appellant did not prove that it was protected.

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Related

Miller v. Department of Justice
842 F.3d 1252 (Federal Circuit, 2016)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Rickel v. Navy
31 F.4th 1358 (Federal Circuit, 2022)
Calvin Turner v. Department of Agriculture
2023 MSPB 25 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2023)

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Bluebook (online)
Veronica Ragland v. Department of Health and Human Services, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/veronica-ragland-v-department-of-health-and-human-services-mspb-2024.