ERVIN, Circuit Judge:
Vernon Beigay, Inc. (Beigay) brought this action challenging the constitutionality of South Carolina’s obscenity statutes, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-15-260 to -440 (Law.Coop.1985). Beigay sought injunctive relief against the enforcement of these statutes. Beigay further sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) for the appellees’ enforcement actions, which allegedly chilled and violated Beigay’s U.S. Constitutional rights guaranteed under the first and fourteenth amendments. The district court rejected Beigay’s constitutional challenge and relief requests, granting summary judgment in appellees’ favor. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
I. FACTS
The Greenville County Sheriff’s Department received several complaints that business establishments throughout the county were engaged in the sale of video tape cassettes believed to contain sexually-oriented material in violation of the South Carolina obscenity statutes. Representatives of the Greenville County Sheriff’s Department obtained copies of several such cassettes which they delivered to the Solicitor for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit for a determination of whether sufficient cause existed to commence prosecution under the obscenity statutes.
As a result of his investigation, appellee Traxler, then Solicitor for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, determined that the video tape cassettes contained material violative of the obscenity statutes. As a consequence of that determination, the Green-ville County Sheriff’s Department compiled a list of business establishments believed to be engaged in the sale or distribution of video tape cassettes which might contain obscene material. Officers from the department made personal calls upon each such business establishment to provide notice that the distribution of obscene material is unlawful and to request the cooperation of the businesses by discontinuing the sale or distribution of video tape cassettes containing obscene material.
On March 28,1985, Officer M.L. Wheeler of the Greenville County Sheriff’s Department made several calls on business establishments located in Greenville County, including the Video Zone operated by Beigay, and informed operators of such establishments of the complaints received and the unlawfulness of distributing obscene materials. Beigay was requested to discontinue the sale or distribution of obscene materials and warned that if such activities continued after a reasonable period of time, offending parties would be subject to prosecution. No arrests were made. Nor were any video tape cassettes or other materials confiscated or seized.
II. STANDING
Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we note that Beigay’s standing to challenge the constitutionality of South Carolina’s obscenity statutes and to assert a section 1983 claim is questionable. No criminal charges have been made against Beigay or its employees; no films or other materials have been seized by law enforcement authorities, and no action has been taken to close or impair Beigay’s lawful business activities. Beigay has simply been cautioned by an officer of the Sheriff’s Department to obey the law or risk being prosecuted.
In order to invoke this court’s jurisdiction over Beigay’s constitutional challenge, a case or controversy must exist. U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2. The only possible case or controversy arises from Officer Wheeler’s warning to Beigay that offenders of the South Carolina obscenity statutes [1091]*1091would be prosecuted. We realize that a “threat of prosecution” under a statute may be sufficient to present a case or controversy. See Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1205 (4th Cir.1986). Beigay, however,
must show more than the fact that state officials stand ready to perform their general duty to enforce laws, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 [81 S.Ct. 1752, 1754, 6 L.Ed.2d 989] (1961); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 399 [61 S.Ct. 962, 966, 85 L.Ed. 1416] (1941). Even past threats of prosecution may not be sufficient to establish a controversy susceptible of resolution in federal court. See, e.g., Ellis, 421 U.S. 426 [95 S.Ct. 1691, 44 L.Ed.2d 274]. In short, one must show a threat of prosecution that is both real and immediate, Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-10 [89 S.Ct. 956, 960, 22 L.Ed.2d 113] (1969), before a federal court may examine the validity of a criminal statute.
Id. 782 F.2d at 1206. The record is less than ideal for Beigay to make this showing.
Beigay’s standing to raise a section 1983 claim requires proof that Beigay has suffered a deprivation of a constitutional right by appellees acting under color of governmental policy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982). We question whether appellees’ conduct was sufficiently threatening to have had a “chilling effect” on Beigay’s first amendment rights.
Although we are concerned by the little evidence showing that Beigay has indeed suffered an injury in fact, we will assume for purposes of this appeal that Beigay has standing to be before this court.1
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
Beigay challenges the constitutionality of the South Carolina obscenity statutes by claiming the statutes are void for vagueness and overbreadth.2 We find no merit [1092]*1092in Beigay's contentions, except for the overbreadth in sections 16-15-280(1) and (4) discussed infra. The South Carolina statutes, with those two exceptions, are grounded in language prescribed or approved in prior United States Supreme Court obscenity decisions.
A. Void for Vagueness Doctrine
It is well settled that a state has the power to regulate the distribution of obscene materials, for obscenity is not protected by the first amendment. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). The regulations, however, must be in accordance with the Supreme Court’s enunciated guidelines, which read:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact [in determining if materials are obscene] must be: (a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, ...; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24, 93 S.Ct. at 2615 (citations omitted). These guidelines are recited, almost verba[1093]*1093tim, in the South Carolina statute. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-15-260(a). Thus, Beigay’s complaint that the South Carolina
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ERVIN, Circuit Judge:
Vernon Beigay, Inc. (Beigay) brought this action challenging the constitutionality of South Carolina’s obscenity statutes, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-15-260 to -440 (Law.Coop.1985). Beigay sought injunctive relief against the enforcement of these statutes. Beigay further sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) for the appellees’ enforcement actions, which allegedly chilled and violated Beigay’s U.S. Constitutional rights guaranteed under the first and fourteenth amendments. The district court rejected Beigay’s constitutional challenge and relief requests, granting summary judgment in appellees’ favor. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
I. FACTS
The Greenville County Sheriff’s Department received several complaints that business establishments throughout the county were engaged in the sale of video tape cassettes believed to contain sexually-oriented material in violation of the South Carolina obscenity statutes. Representatives of the Greenville County Sheriff’s Department obtained copies of several such cassettes which they delivered to the Solicitor for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit for a determination of whether sufficient cause existed to commence prosecution under the obscenity statutes.
As a result of his investigation, appellee Traxler, then Solicitor for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, determined that the video tape cassettes contained material violative of the obscenity statutes. As a consequence of that determination, the Green-ville County Sheriff’s Department compiled a list of business establishments believed to be engaged in the sale or distribution of video tape cassettes which might contain obscene material. Officers from the department made personal calls upon each such business establishment to provide notice that the distribution of obscene material is unlawful and to request the cooperation of the businesses by discontinuing the sale or distribution of video tape cassettes containing obscene material.
On March 28,1985, Officer M.L. Wheeler of the Greenville County Sheriff’s Department made several calls on business establishments located in Greenville County, including the Video Zone operated by Beigay, and informed operators of such establishments of the complaints received and the unlawfulness of distributing obscene materials. Beigay was requested to discontinue the sale or distribution of obscene materials and warned that if such activities continued after a reasonable period of time, offending parties would be subject to prosecution. No arrests were made. Nor were any video tape cassettes or other materials confiscated or seized.
II. STANDING
Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we note that Beigay’s standing to challenge the constitutionality of South Carolina’s obscenity statutes and to assert a section 1983 claim is questionable. No criminal charges have been made against Beigay or its employees; no films or other materials have been seized by law enforcement authorities, and no action has been taken to close or impair Beigay’s lawful business activities. Beigay has simply been cautioned by an officer of the Sheriff’s Department to obey the law or risk being prosecuted.
In order to invoke this court’s jurisdiction over Beigay’s constitutional challenge, a case or controversy must exist. U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2. The only possible case or controversy arises from Officer Wheeler’s warning to Beigay that offenders of the South Carolina obscenity statutes [1091]*1091would be prosecuted. We realize that a “threat of prosecution” under a statute may be sufficient to present a case or controversy. See Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1205 (4th Cir.1986). Beigay, however,
must show more than the fact that state officials stand ready to perform their general duty to enforce laws, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 [81 S.Ct. 1752, 1754, 6 L.Ed.2d 989] (1961); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 399 [61 S.Ct. 962, 966, 85 L.Ed. 1416] (1941). Even past threats of prosecution may not be sufficient to establish a controversy susceptible of resolution in federal court. See, e.g., Ellis, 421 U.S. 426 [95 S.Ct. 1691, 44 L.Ed.2d 274]. In short, one must show a threat of prosecution that is both real and immediate, Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-10 [89 S.Ct. 956, 960, 22 L.Ed.2d 113] (1969), before a federal court may examine the validity of a criminal statute.
Id. 782 F.2d at 1206. The record is less than ideal for Beigay to make this showing.
Beigay’s standing to raise a section 1983 claim requires proof that Beigay has suffered a deprivation of a constitutional right by appellees acting under color of governmental policy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982). We question whether appellees’ conduct was sufficiently threatening to have had a “chilling effect” on Beigay’s first amendment rights.
Although we are concerned by the little evidence showing that Beigay has indeed suffered an injury in fact, we will assume for purposes of this appeal that Beigay has standing to be before this court.1
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
Beigay challenges the constitutionality of the South Carolina obscenity statutes by claiming the statutes are void for vagueness and overbreadth.2 We find no merit [1092]*1092in Beigay's contentions, except for the overbreadth in sections 16-15-280(1) and (4) discussed infra. The South Carolina statutes, with those two exceptions, are grounded in language prescribed or approved in prior United States Supreme Court obscenity decisions.
A. Void for Vagueness Doctrine
It is well settled that a state has the power to regulate the distribution of obscene materials, for obscenity is not protected by the first amendment. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). The regulations, however, must be in accordance with the Supreme Court’s enunciated guidelines, which read:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact [in determining if materials are obscene] must be: (a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, ...; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24, 93 S.Ct. at 2615 (citations omitted). These guidelines are recited, almost verba[1093]*1093tim, in the South Carolina statute. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-15-260(a). Thus, Beigay’s complaint that the South Carolina
Legislature has simply failed to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement officials as well as the triers of fact. Nor does the statute draw reasonably clear lines between that which is prohibited and that which is not
is without merit. (Brief for Appellant at 9-10).
The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that when the Miller prerequisites are used in a state’s regulatory scheme, a dealer in obscene materials is provided with fair notice that his public and commercial activities may bring prosecution. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27, 93 S.Ct. at 2616.3 The regulated materials need not be defined with “ultimate, god-like precision.” Id. at 28, 93 S.Ct. at 2617.
Because we recognize that “unavoidable imprecision is not fatal and celestial precision is not necessary,” Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821, 833 (4th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929, 100 S.Ct. 3028, 65 L.Ed.2d 1124 (1980), we also reject Beigay’s claim that because numerous words throughout the statutes are not defined, the statutes are void for vagueness. We find the words used in these statutes reasonably specific and precise under the requirements of Miller.4 Moreover, “[a] fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 314, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979). Cf. Matala v. Consolidation Coal Co., 647 F.2d 427, 429 (4th Cir.1981). Applying such meaning to the challenged words herein, the statutes are not unconstitutionally vague.5
B. Overbreadth Doctrine
Beigay attacks three specific statutes as being unconstitutionally overbroad. The first statute, section 16-15-260(b), defines prurient interest:
“Prurient interest” means a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion and is reflective of an arousal of lewd and lascivious desires and thoughts.
S.C.Code Ann. § 16-15-260(b)(emphasis added).
Beigay argues that the emphasized language renders the statute unconstitutionally overbroad, since materials that should be protected by the Constitution will be considered obscene under this definition of prurient interest. Beigay reasons that the unemphasized language provides one definition of prurient interest, and the emphasized, another. Therefrom, Beigay concludes that, as “lewd” and “lascivious” desires are healthy, wholesome reactions protected by the first amendment, the statute prohibits constitutionally protected speech.
Beigay’s argument is flawed in two aspects. The section defining prurient interest is a single definition, requiring both a [1094]*1094morbid interest and reflection of arousal.6 Thus, South Carolina’s definition places a more stringent standard on the prosecution than required by the definition Beigay claims Miller mandates.7 Accordingly, we can find no reason why the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad.
The second flaw in Beigay’s argument is that “lewd” and “lascivious” desires or thoughts have not been construed by the Supreme Court as terms depicting “good old fashion healthy interest in sex.” To the contrary, the Supreme Court has recognized these terms as proper definitions for “prurient interest.” See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n. 20, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1310 n. 20, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957).8 Thus, the inclusion of “lewd” and “lascivious” in the definition of prurient interest does not make the statutes overbroad.
Beigay also asserts that sections 16-15-280(1) and (4) are overbroad because these sections allow the trier of fact, in deciding if material is obscene, to consider the material in the context in which it was used and the potential effects on the behavior of a group of people.9 We agree with Beigay, that these sections exceed the Miller guidelines in distinguishing protected first amendment expression from that which is obscene, thereby potentially reaching a substantial amount of protected activity.
The Miller three-part test is a limitation beyond which neither legislatures nor juries may go. Cf. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974), Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, 93 S.Ct. at 2615. Miller requires that the trier of fact evaluate how “the average person, applying contemporary standards” would find the material. Considering the character of the audience or the predominant appeal of the material to a select audience or the behavioral effect on those specific people directly encroaches upon the Miller guideline.10 Moreover, these considerations permit the trier of fact in a South Carolina obscenity case to ignore the other two parts of the Miller test: (1) whether the work as a whole is patently offensive;11 and (2) whether the material has some literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.12
[1095]*1095The overbreadth in these two sections does not render the entire South Carolina obscenity statutes unconstitutional. It is clearly permissible to excise the specific invalid sections, leaving the remaining statutes intact. See Brockett, 105 S.Ct. at 2802. We see no reason why this course is not the proper one for the instant case. A partial invalidation does not appear to be contrary to the legislative intent behind the statutes in question. Moreover, without the two sections, the obscenity statutes pass constitutional muster, as they fully comply with the requirements of Miller.
IV. SECTION 1983 CLAIM
Finally, we will briefly address Beigay’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have already expressed our doubt that Beigay has suffered a deprivation of his constitutional rights by appellees’ actions. Moreover, Beigay has failed to present sufficient evidence from which we may infer that the alleged misconduct was under the color of governmental custom or policy. Governmental entities cannot be sued under section 1983 because of the misbehavior of their officers and employees.
Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.
Monell v. New York Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Finding no evidence to raise the issue whether appellees were acting pursuant to a custom or policy, we affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment in appellees’ favor on this aspect of the case.
We partially affirm the district court’s order rejecting Beigay’s constitutional challenge to the South Carolina obscenity statutes. Because we find sections 16-15-280(1) and (4) unconstitutionally overbroad, we reverse the district court’s summary judgment motion against Beigay regarding those two specific statutes. The case, therefore, is remanded as to sections 16-15-280(1) and (4), with instructions that the district court enter a judgment in accordance with this decision. The remainder of the district court’s order is affirmed.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.