Verheggen v. Adams County Department of Human Services

Opinion

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY July 23, 2026

2026 COA 62

No. 25CA1663, Verheggen v. Adams County Department of Human Services — Labor and Industry — Colorado Equal Pay for Equal Work Act — Wage Discrimination Prohibited; Government — Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act — Discriminatory or Unfair Employment Practices

A division of the court of appeals concludes that an employee

is not required to make allegations relating to gender discrimination

to state a claim for relief under either section 8-5-102(2)(d), C.R.S.

2025, of Colorado’s Equal Pay for Equal Work Act or section

24-34-402(1)(i), C.R.S. 2025, of the Colorado Anti-discrimination

Act — both of which prohibit an employer from retaliating against

an employee for discussing or disclosing the employee’s wages. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026 COA 62

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1663 Adams County District Court No. 23CV30482 Honorable Toni J. Wehman, Judge

Emily Camp Verheggen,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Adams County Department of Human Services, Katie McDougal, Kari Daggett, and Sabrina Burbidge,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV Opinion by JUDGE LUM Welling and Schock, JJ., concur

Announced July 23, 2026

HKM Employment Attorneys LLP, Adam M. Harrison, Hayden G. DePorter, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Michael A. Sink, Assistant County Attorney, Brighton, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees ¶1 Plaintiff, Emily Camp Verheggen, appeals the district court’s

judgment dismissing her complaint against defendants, the Adams

County Department of Human Services (ACDHS); Katie McDougal

(in her capacity as the ACDHS director); Kari Daggett (individually);

and Sabrina Burbidge (individually), under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) for

failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

¶2 This appeal presents an issue of first impression: whether

under section 8-5-102(2)(d), C.R.S. 2025, of Colorado’s Equal Pay

for Equal Work Act (EPEWA) or section 24-34-402(1)(i), C.R.S.

2025, of the Colorado Anti-discrimination Act (CADA)1 — which

both prohibit employers from retaliating against employees for

discussing or disclosing their wages — an employee is required to

make allegations relating to gender discrimination to state a claim

for relief. We conclude that neither statute contains such a

requirement and that the district court erred by dismissing

Verheggen’s complaint on that basis.

1 Throughout the proceedings below and the appellate briefing, both

parties refer to section 24-32-402, C.R.S. 2025, as the “Wage Transparency Act.” Because that section is part of CADA, we refer to it as such in this opinion. 1 ¶3 Because we conclude that Verheggen didn’t sufficiently allege

that two of the defendants (Daggett and Burbidge) were “employers”

under the EPEWA, we nevertheless affirm the district court’s

dismissal of the claims against them. However, we reject the

defendants’ arguments to affirm the dismissal as to the ACDHS and

McDougal on other grounds. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in

part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶4 We take the following facts from Verheggen’s complaint.

Verheggen was employed by the ACDHS2 in the Child and Family

Services Division. In 2004, after working for several years as a

caseworker, she was promoted to an intake supervisor position,

which required her to work seventy-six hours every eight days.

However, Verheggen was only paid for forty hours of work per week.

Shortly after her promotion, Verheggen asked her manager and a

human resources representative for an explanation as to why the

new position required her to work extended hours without

2 Verheggen’s complaint also refers to this party as the Adams

County Department of Social Services. We refer to the entity as the ACDHS in this opinion.

2 additional pay. Verheggen was told this was part of her job duties,

and she continued to work this schedule for several years. From

2013 to 2015, Verheggen’s schedule decreased to forty hours per

week before returning to the seventy-six-hour-per-eight-days

schedule. In 2021, Verheggen met with an outside agency to

discuss her schedule and work duties. Shortly afterward, a human

resources representative told Verheggen that she would look into

whether Verheggen may be entitled to overtime compensation.

¶5 Verheggen’s schedule eventually returned to forty hours per

week, but her concerns about her previously earned pay weren’t

resolved. In December 2022, Verheggen, through her attorney, sent

a wage demand letter to the ACDHS, care of McDougal. The

demand letter requested $745,461.39 in back pay. Verheggen

didn’t receive any of the requested pay.

¶6 In April 2023, Verheggen filed her first complaint in this case

(initial complaint), naming the Adams County Board of

Commissioners (the Board) as the only defendant. She alleged that

the Board “deliberately failed and refused to pay [her] for her earned

wages for all hours that she worked at the County’s specific

direction.”

3 ¶7 In June 2023, about two months after she filed the initial

complaint, Verheggen received a “Written Reprimand and Two-Day

Suspension Without Pay” (suspension), asserting that she had

“demonstrated unprofessional and disrespectful behavior that . . .

negatively impacted team members, [her] peers, and County

partners.” The ACDHS later “rescinded” the suspension but only

after it had “escorted [Verheggen] out of the office, prevented her

from working, and withheld her pay.”

¶8 Verheggen later filed two amended complaints. The operative

complaint names the ACDHS, McDougal, Daggett (the deputy

director of the ACDHS), and Burbidge (Verheggen’s supervisor) as

defendants (but not the Board). As relevant here, Verheggen’s

operative complaint alleged that the defendants violated the EPEWA

and CADA by suspending her in retaliation for sending the demand

letter and filing the initial complaint. (Verheggen asserted the

EPEWA claim against all defendants but asserted the CADA claim

only against the ACDHS.)

¶9 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that

Verheggen failed to state claims under the EPEWA and CADA. The

district court interpreted the EPEWA and CADA to pertain only to

4 complaints that contain allegations related to gender discrimination

because the statutes “were enacted specifically to address systemic

gender-based disparities in compensation.” And because Verheggen

didn’t allege that she suffered gender discrimination or that she

suffered an adverse employment action in retaliation for raising

concerns about gender-based pay disparities, the district court

dismissed her claims under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5).3

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 10 “We review a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss de novo and

apply the same standards as the [district] court.” Norton v. Rocky

Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc., 2018 CO 3, ¶ 7.

¶ 11 In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5), we may

consider the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as

exhibits or incorporated by reference, and documents referred to in

the complaint that are central to the plaintiff’s claim. Norton, ¶ 7;

Titan Indem. Co. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 181 P.3d 303,

3 The district court also dismissed Verheggen’s four other claims

under different rationales. Verheggen doesn’t appeal the dismissal of those claims.

5 306 (Colo. App. 2007). We view the facts alleged as true and in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Norton, ¶ 7.

¶ 12 To survive a motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), the

complaint must plead sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that

is plausible on its face. See Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, ¶¶ 7, 9. “A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

III. No Requirement to Allege Gender Discrimination

¶ 13 Verheggen contends that the district court erred by construing

the EPEWA and CADA to require allegations related to gender

discrimination when bringing a claim for retaliation. We agree.

¶ 14 We review de novo a district court’s statutory interpretation.

Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO 13M, ¶ 21. We construe statutes to give

effect to the legislature’s intent. Allman v. People, 2019 CO 78,

¶ 12. In doing so, we first look to the statute’s text, giving words

and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id. at ¶ 13. We

read the statute as a whole and in the context of the statutory

scheme, “giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of

6 the statute’s language.” Krol v. CF & I Steel, 2013 COA 32, ¶ 15. If

we determine that a statute is unambiguous, we enforce it as

written and do not resort to other rules of statutory construction.

Id.

A. EPEWA

¶ 15 The EPEWA, section 8-5-102(1), provides,

An employer shall not discriminate between employees on the basis of sex, or on the basis of sex in combination with another protected status . . . by paying an employee of one sex a wage rate less than the rate paid to an employee of a different sex for substantially similar work, regardless of job title, based on a composite of skill[,] effort, . . . and responsibility . . . .

¶ 16 Meanwhile, section 8-5-102(2)(d) provides, “An employer shall

not . . . [d]ischarge, discipline, discriminate against, coerce,

intimidate, threaten, or interfere with an employee or other person

because the employee or person inquired about, disclosed,

compared, or otherwise discussed the employee’s wage rate.”

§ 8-5-102(2)(d). (We refer to the adverse employment actions

described in subsection (2)(d) collectively as “retaliation.”)

7 ¶ 17 A person “aggrieved by a violation of section 8-5-102 may

commence a civil action in district court no later than two years

after the violation occurs.” § 8-5-103(2), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 18 The language of section 8-5-102 unambiguously prohibits an

employer from taking multiple distinct types of actions. Subsection

(1) says that an employer shall not “discriminate between employees

on the basis of sex” by paying an employee of one sex a wage rate

less than the rate paid to an employee of a different sex for

substantially similar work. § 8-5-102(1). And subsection (2)(d)

says that an employer shall not retaliate against an employee for

discussing or disclosing the employee’s wage rate. § 8-5-102(2)(d).

Nothing in subsection (2)(d) — or in the rest of subsection (2) —

refers to discrimination based on gender or requires that the

discussion or disclosure of the employee’s wage rate must pertain to

gender-based pay disparities.

¶ 19 Further, nothing in the statutory scheme suggests that an

employer must violate both subsection (1) and subsection (2) for the

employee to bring a claim for retaliation. Indeed, other statutory

provisions contemplate that an employer can be held liable for

violating either subsection — and that different damages may be

8 available depending upon which section is violated. See

§ 8-5-104(1), C.R.S. 2025 (describing damages available when an

employer violates subsection (1)); § 8-5-104(2) (describing damages

available when an employer “violates any provision of section

8-5-102” (emphasis added)).

¶ 20 Based on the statute’s plain language, we conclude Verheggen

isn’t required to allege facts related to gender discrimination to

bring a retaliation claim under section 8-5-102(2)(d), and the

district court erred by dismissing her claim for that reason.

B. CADA

¶ 21 CADA authorizes a plaintiff who alleges that their employer

engaged in a discriminatory or unfair employment practice to file a

civil action against the employer in the district court after

exhausting administrative remedies. § 24-34-306(14), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 22 Section 24-34-402(1) of CADA describes what constitutes a

“discriminatory or . . . unfair employment practice.” Under

subsection (1)(a)(I), it is a discriminatory or unfair employment

practice for an employer to “discriminate in matters of

compensation . . . because of . . . sex, sexual orientation, gender

identity, [or] gender expression.” § 24-34-402(1)(a)(I). And under

9 subsection (1)(i), it is a discriminatory or unfair employment

practice for an employer to “discharge, discipline, discriminate

against, coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any employee

or other person because the employee inquired about, disclosed,

compared, or otherwise discussed the employee’s wages.”

§ 24-34-402(1)(i).

¶ 23 Like the EPEWA, the relevant statutory language of CADA is

unambiguous. CADA states that retaliating against an employee for

inquiring about, discussing, or disclosing the employee’s wages is a

discriminatory and unfair employment practice. § 24-34-402(1)(i).

This subsection likewise contains no language tying the retaliation

to discrimination based on gender (or any other protected class).

Thus, we conclude that the district court erred by dismissing

Verheggen’s CADA claim for not alleging facts pertaining to gender

discrimination.

C. Statutory Purpose, Redundancy, and Breadth

¶ 24 We aren’t persuaded otherwise by the defendants’ arguments

that (1) the EPEWA and CADA were enacted to deter gender

discrimination; (2) our interpretation renders the statutes

10 redundant; and (3) our interpretation could open the door to a

multitude of retaliation claims.

¶ 25 First, our interpretation is consistent with the

anti-discrimination purpose of the EPEWA and CADA. Open

discussion among employees about wage rates — regardless of

whether those discussions pertain to gender-based pay disparities

and regardless of whether any gender-based discrimination

occurred — promotes wage transparency and helps uncover

discriminatory wage practices. The statutes’ prohibitions on

retaliating against employees for inquiring about or discussing their

wages furthers that purpose.

¶ 26 Second, while the EPEWA and CADA both provide employees

with a claim for retaliatory conduct by the employer, the statutes

aren’t redundant because the available remedies, though

overlapping, are not the same. Compare § 8-5-104 (remedies under

the EPEWA may include reinstatement; promotion; pay increase;

payment of lost wage rates; liquidated damages; and the employee’s

reasonable costs, including attorney fees), with § 24-34-405, C.R.S.

2025 (remedies under CADA may include reinstatement or hiring of

the employee with or without back pay, front pay, and

11 compensatory and punitive damages).4 We also reject the

defendants’ argument that the EPEWA and CADA are redundant of

the Colorado Wage Claim Act (CWCA), §§ 8-4-101 to -126, C.R.S.

2025. The CWCA also addresses wage-related conduct, but it

expressly excludes “the state or its agencies or entities; counties;

cities and counties; municipal corporations; [and] quasi-municipal

corporations” from the definition of “employer.” § 8-4-101(6). Thus,

the EPEWA and CADA reach employers that the CWCA excludes.

See § 8-5-101(5), C.R.S. 2025 (defining “[e]mployer” under the

EPEWA to include the state and any of its political subdivisions);

§ 24-34-401(3), C.R.S. 2025 (defining “[e]mployer” under CADA to

include the state and any of its political subdivisions).

¶ 27 Third, we acknowledge that the conduct protected by the

EPEWA and CADA — “inquir[ing] about, disclos[ing], compar[ing],

or otherwise discuss[ing]” the employee’s wages, §§ 8-5-102(2)(d),

24-34-402(1)(i) — is broad, which could result in a claim being

brought against an employer simply because an adverse

4 We also note that the district court’s interpretation — which the

defendants urge us to adopt — doesn’t resolve any arguable redundancy between section 8-5-102(2)(d), C.R.S. 2025, and section 24-34-402(1)(i), C.R.S. 2025.

12 employment action happened to fall close in time to a breakroom

discussion among employees about their wages. But just because a

claim can be brought does not mean it can be proved. And in any

event, we cannot add limitations to a statute that aren’t there. See

Oakwood Holdings, LLC v. Mortg. Invs. Enters., LLC, 2018 CO 12,

¶ 12 (“[W]e do not add words to the statute or subtract words from

it.”). It is for the legislature to enact additional guardrails or

requirements if it sees fit to do so. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Idaho

Springs, 192 P.3d 490, 494 (Colo. App. 2008) (“If a statute gives rise

to undesirable results, the legislature must determine the remedy.

Courts may not rewrite statutes to improve them.” (citation

omitted)).

IV. Alternative Grounds to Affirm

¶ 28 Our inquiry doesn’t end there, however, because the

defendants argue that, even if the EPEWA and CADA contemplate a

retaliation claim in the absence of gender discrimination, Verheggen

nevertheless failed to state a claim against some or all of the

defendants.

¶ 29 For a retaliation claim to survive a motion to dismiss, a

plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) they engaged in activity

13 protected by the applicable statute; (2) they suffered an adverse

employment action after or at the same time as the protected

activity; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity

and the adverse employment action. Cf. Conner v. Schnuck Mkts.,

Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1394 (10th Cir. 1997) (analyzing a Federal Fair

Labor Standards Act (FLSA) retaliation claim by applying the same

elements in an employment action alleging retaliation); Reznik v.

inContact, Inc., 18 F.4th 1257, 1260 (10th Cir. 2021) (noting similar

elements for an employee to state a plausible claim of Title VII

retaliation); see People v. Davis, 2012 COA 56, ¶ 29 (we may rely on

federal cases interpreting federal law that is similar to Colorado

law).

¶ 30 The defendants argue that (1) Daggett and Burbidge aren’t

“employers” within the meaning of the EPEWA; (2) Verheggen didn’t

engage in protected activity; and (3) Verheggen didn’t plausibly

allege a link between any protected activity and the adverse

employment action. We agree with the first contention as it relates

to Daggett and Burbridge and reject the other two contentions.

14 A. Employers

¶ 31 The defendants assert that Verheggen didn’t plausibly allege

that Daggett and Burbidge are “employers” within the meaning of

the EPEWA. We agree.

¶ 32 The EPEWA defines “[e]mployer” as “the state or any political

subdivision, commission[, or] department . . . thereof, and every

other person employing a person in the state.” § 8-5-101(5).

During the relevant time, Daggett was the deputy director of the

ACDHS, and Burbidge was an intake manager at the ACDHS, as

well as Verheggen’s immediate supervisor. In other words, Daggett

and Burbidge — like Verheggen — were ACDHS employees.

¶ 33 In an effort to bring Daggett and Burbidge under the

“employer” umbrella, Verheggen asserted in her complaint that the

definition of “employer” includes not only “the company for which

an employee works, but also any person acting on behalf of that

company who exercises ‘operational control.’” And, relying on cases

interpreting the FLSA, she argued that a person may exercise

operational control — and thus be an “employer” — if they (1) have

hiring and firing power; (2) supervise and control the employee’s

work; (3) determine wage rates and methods of payment; and

15 (4) maintain employee records. See, e.g., Inniss v. Rocky Mountain

Inventory, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 3d 1165, 1167-68 (D. Colo. 2019);

Robertson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1151

(D. Colo. 1999).

¶ 34 Assuming, without deciding, that the notion of operational

control applies to the EPEWA’s definition of “employer,” Verheggen’s

complaint still doesn’t plausibly allege sufficient facts to infer that

Daggett and Burbidge had such control. Her only allegation is that

these “defendants, jointly, had the power to hire and fire [ACDHS]

employees, supervised and controlled the work of [ACDHS]

employees, determined wage rates and methods of pay for [ACDHS]

employees, and maintained employment records for [ACDHS]

employees.” This is nothing more than a “threadbare recital” of the

elements of operational control, which is insufficient to plausibly

16 allege that Daggett and Burbidge are employers for purposes of the

EPEWA. Inniss, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1168 (citation omitted).5

¶ 35 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the

EPEWA claim as to Daggett and Burbidge.

B. Protected Activity and Causal Link

¶ 36 The defendants next assert that Verheggen didn’t plausibly

allege a causal link between any protected activity and the

suspension. Specifically, they argue that (1) any protected activity

was temporally distant from the suspension, and (2) the activities

5 In Inniss v. Rocky Mountain Inventory, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 3d 1165,

(D. Colo. 2019), the plaintiff brought a wage claim against both the company that employed him and the company’s owners. In denying a motion to dismiss, the court noted that the plaintiff’s “threadbare recital” of the operational control elements was insufficient alone to state a plausible claim that the owners were also “employers.” Id. at 1168 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). However, the plaintiff also alleged that (1) the company was a closely-held corporation controlled solely by the owners, suggesting that the owners alone had the power to hire, fire, and set wage rates; (2) the owners frequently “castigated” the plaintiff regarding mileage reports; and (3) he complained to each of the owners about pay discrepancies, suggesting authority to supervise and maintain employment records. Id. at 1168-69. These additional allegations “nudge[d] [the plaintiff’s claim] across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

17 closer in time to the suspension (the demand letter and complaint)

weren’t protected activity. We disagree.

¶ 37 We conclude that the district court erred to the extent it

concluded that the demand letter wasn’t protected activity. Recall

that both the EPEWA and CADA protect “inquir[ing] about,

disclos[ing], compar[ing], or otherwise discuss[ing]” the employee’s

wages. §§ 8-5-102(2)(d); 24-34-402(1)(i). This definition is broad.

The demand letter explains Verheggen’s historical hourly schedule;

discusses how Verheggen was paid (i.e., for “only [forty] hours per

week”); and discusses the number of hours she alleges were

uncompensated and the wages she alleges she is owed for working

those hours. In other words, the letter “otherwise discusses” her

wages. Thus, it qualifies as protected activity.

¶ 38 We need not decide whether the complaint is protected activity

because even if it isn’t, we conclude that Verheggen plausibly

alleged a link between other protected activity and the suspension.

See Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 23. In so doing, we reject

the defendants’ assertion that the demand letter (and the earlier

protected activity) is too remote in time to the suspension for the

court to infer a causal link.

18 ¶ 39 Verheggen’s complaint alleges that she made numerous

inquiries about her wages over the course of approximately twenty

years. We cannot, as the defendants seem to suggest, simply

discount the earlier inquiries or consider them in isolation. Viewing

Verheggen’s complaint in the light most favorable to her, as we

must, see Norton, ¶ 7, the claims allege an escalating pattern of

Verheggen inquiring about or expressing dissatisfaction with her

wages, eventually culminating in her sending the demand letter in

December 2022 (approximately six months before the suspension).

¶ 40 In support of their argument that the demand letter was too

remote in time, the defendants cite cases discussing when timing

alone is insufficient to plausibly allege a causal link. See, e.g.,

Meiners v. Univ. of Kan., 359 F.3d 1222, 1230-32 (10th Cir. 2004).

However, Verheggen’s complaint contains other allegations to

support her claim that the suspension was retaliatory. She alleged

that the statements in the suspension were false; that she had

never witnessed another employee treated so harshly for

comparable (alleged) conduct; and that the defendants hadn’t

followed any of the ACDHS’s standard disciplinary procedures

before issuing the suspension.

19 ¶ 41 We acknowledge that this case presents a close call; the

allegations in Verheggen’s complaint could have been more robust.

But at this stage of the proceedings, we must draw every reasonable

inference in Verheggen’s favor. See Edge Telecom, Inc. v. Sterling

Bank, 143 P.3d 1155, 1160 (Colo. App. 2006). Looking through

that lens, we conclude that the facts alleged by Verheggen give rise

to a plausible inference that the ACDHS and McDougal (as its

director) violated the EPEWA and (as to the ACDHS only) CADA by

retaliating against her for discussing her wages.

V. Disposition

¶ 42 The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the

case is remanded to the district court for proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.