Ventana Investments v. 909 Corp.

870 F. Supp. 723, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 207, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18036, 1994 WL 705101
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedNovember 23, 1994
DocketNo. 1:93-CV-0495
StatusPublished

This text of 870 F. Supp. 723 (Ventana Investments v. 909 Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ventana Investments v. 909 Corp., 870 F. Supp. 723, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 207, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18036, 1994 WL 705101 (E.D. Tex. 1994).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COBB, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

The Plaintiffs, Ventana Investments, Pride House Care Corporation, and Bruce H. Whitehead (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Ventana”), filed this suit alleging breach of contract, fraud, violations of the [726]*726Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”), estoppel, and breach of fiduciary-duty. The plaintiffs ask this court to grant summary judgment for the breach of contract, estoppel, and breach of fiduciary duty.

Defendants, Underwood, Neuhaus & Co., Kemper Financial Companies, Inc., Lovett Mitchell, Webb & Garrison, Inc., Franklin Financial Services, Inc., and William Soren-son (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Underwood”), also filed a motion for summary judgment. Underwood asks this court to grant summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims of misrepresentation, fraud, breach of contract, Texas’ Deceptive Trade Practices Act. In addition, defendant, Underwood, Neuhaus & Company, Inc., filed a counterclaim seeking to enforce and collect two notes from plaintiffs Bruce H. Whitehead and Ventana Investments. Defendants also asks this court to grant summary judgment on this counterclaim based on the express writings of the notes that state that the notes are due and owing.

1. Facts

Ventana, a Texas general partnership, entered into an agreement with Underwood in late March 1989.1 Underwood is a Texas close corporation whose principal place of business was Ottawa, Kansas. Underwood is currently in dissolution. Franklin Federal Savings Association (FFSA) owns Franklin Financial Services, Inc., which owns Underwood as a subsidiary. FFSA is presently in conservatorship with the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) acting as conservator. The RTC sold, assigned, transferred, conveyed and delivered assets of FFSA to a newly created association. Underwood was included in these assets transferred by the RTC.

Underwood agreed to render investment banking services to Ventana for Ventana’s acquisition of approximately eighty-five (85) nursing homes in the states of Iowa and Arkansas. Underwood received a percentage of the total financing provided.

The first transaction between Ventana and Underwood involved the purchase of forty-tive (45) Iowa health care facilities. Underwood placed the bonds issued for the transaction with various investors. Ventana purchased these facilities from Beverly Enterprises and resold them to Mercy Health Initiatives (“Mercy”). Ventana contends that the Iowa and Arkansas deal were considered a single transaction. Ventana allegedly obtained commitments from Underwood to close the Iowa portion of the transaction by July 1, 1989 and the Arkansas portion of the transaction by August 1, 1989 in order to “take advantage of a hot market” for tax exempt bonds. A letter from the First Vice-President of Underwood, Terry Colip (“Co-lip”) indicated that Underwood recognized and accepted Ventana’s timetable for these transactions.

Two notes were executed. A note for $100,000 specifically stated that it was due and payable at the closing of the Iowa bond issuance. The second note stated that $700,-000 was due and payable in full on June 1, 1990, or upon consummation of the purchase of the Arkansas facilities, whichever occurred first.

The Iowa transaction closed on or about August 1, 1989 with Undeiwood earning approximately seven (7) million dollars in fees. Ventana paid only $50,000 of the $100,000 note dated May 22, 1989. A few days later, Underwood changed management personnel. The Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), Michael Gibbons, resigned. The new CEO, William Sorenson, began re-evaluating the firm’s existing business commitments.

Ventana became concerned about Underwood’s ability to meet its financial obligations due to these management changes. Consequently, Ventana asked to substitute Donaldson, Lufkin, and Jenrette (“DLJ”) as the underwriter for the Arkansas transaction. Sorenson verbally refused to allow Ventana to substitute underwriters. On September 11, 1989, Whitehead sent a letter confirming Sorenson’s refusal to allow DLJ to substitute as underwriters. Sorenson never responded to the letter.

Judge John Harkey threatened litigation over this transaction alleging that the bond [727]*727issuance would not benefit the people of Arkansas. Judge. Harkey was an extremely influential player in the various financial deals that involved bond issuances and other transactions in Arkansas. However, Judge Harkey withdrew this threat as confirmed by a letter dated September 18, 1989.

On September 21, 1989, the Arkansas Development and Finance Authority (“ADFA”) approved the Arkansas transaction with Underwood as the underwriter and issued an authorizing resolution. The transaction still required final approval of the ADFA as well as the signature of then Governor Clinton.

Underwood withdrew from this transaction on or about September 25,1989. Within one day of Underwood’s withdrawal, Ventana hired DLJ as a replacement. In spite of this timely replacement of underwriters, Ventana alleges that the withdrawal of Underwood necessarily required that the transaction be resubmitted to the ADFA, denoting DLJ as the new underwriter. Ventana claims that, had Underwood not withdrawn, the bonds for the Arkansas transaction would have been issued soon after the initial approval on September 21, 1989.

By the time the ADFA met again to consider the bond proposal, the bond issue had become a tumultuous political issue. Many political players seized the proposal as an example of business people from other states exploiting the people of Arkansas for their own gain. Governor Clinton also entered battle against the proposal by stating that he would not sign the proposal even if the ADFA approved the transaction.

Ventana argues that Underwood’s withdrawal and the subsequent re-submission of the proposed transaction to the ADFA subjected it to the political turmoil that occurred a month before the November elections. Ventana could not overcome these political obstacles and regain ADFA approval.

Since the Arkansas transaction was not' consummated, the second note was due and payable by its terms on June 1, 1990. Venta-na did not pay the second note for $700,000 after the June 1, 1990 contract date.

Underwood contends that its withdrawal as underwriter did nothing to change the outcome of the proposed bond issuance because no final approval had been officially granted. Underwood asserts that the political backlash from the proposed transaction would have prevented the ADFA from granting final approval irrespective of its status as an underwriter. Underwood also contends that the remaining $50,000 of the first $100,-000 note and the $700,000 note are now due and payable under the express provisions of the respective promissory notes.

2. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 grants this court jurisdiction over all actions, suits, or proceedings to which the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) is a party. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(Z)(l). Section 1441a(Z)(l) provides that:

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Bluebook (online)
870 F. Supp. 723, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 207, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18036, 1994 WL 705101, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ventana-investments-v-909-corp-txed-1994.