VELOZ v. EQUIFAX INC.

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedMarch 22, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-00287
StatusUnknown

This text of VELOZ v. EQUIFAX INC. (VELOZ v. EQUIFAX INC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
VELOZ v. EQUIFAX INC., (D.N.J. 2023).

Opinion

Not for Publication

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JEFFREY D. VELOZ,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23-287 v. OPINION & ORDER EQUIFAX INC.,

Defendant.

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J. Plaintiff seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. D.E. 1. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis but DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint (D.E. 1) (“Compl.”) without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under Section 1915, this Court may excuse a litigant from prepayment of fees when the litigant “establish[es] that he is unable to pay the costs of his suit.” Walker v. People Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989). Plaintiff sufficiently establishes his inability to pay, and the Court grants his application to proceed in forma pauperis without prepayment of fees and costs. When allowing a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must review the complaint and dismiss the action if it determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). When considering dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the Court must apply the same standard of review as that for dismissing a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012). To state a claim that survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the plausibility standard “does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result, a plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims.” Id. at 789. In other words, although a plaintiff need not plead detailed factual allegations, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell

Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the Complaint liberally and holds it to a less stringent standard than papers filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court, however, need not “credit a pro se plaintiff's ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions.’” Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282 (D.N.J. 2013) (quoting Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997)). Plaintiff alleges violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(B)(iii)1 and 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(7) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). The FCRA imposes obligations on credit reporting agencies, in addition to furnishers of information to credit reporting agencies, such as banks and lenders. Seamans v. Temple Univ., 744 F.3d 853, 861 (3d Cir. 2014). Defendant is a credit reporting agency under the FCRA. Section 1681i sets forth certain requirements for credit

reporting agencies to follow when a consumer disputes the accuracy of the information reported in their file. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i. In relevant part, when a consumer notifies an agency directly, or indirectly through a reseller, of any item of disputed information, the agency must “conduct a reasonable reinvestigation” within thirty days of receiving such notice to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). If the disputed information cannot be verified pursuant to a “reasonable reinvestigation” under § 1681i(a)(1), the consumer reporting agency must delete the disputed information from the consumer’s file. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(A)(i). In addition, the agency must communicate the results of any reinvestigation to the

consumer within five business days of the completion of the reinvestigation. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6)(A). That notice shall be in writing and include, in relevant part, a description of the procedure used to determine the accuracy and completeness of the information and the contact information for any furnishers of information contacted in connection with such information, if reasonably available. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6)(B)(iii). Under Section 1681i(a)(7), the information outlined in § 1681i(a)(6)(B)(iii)—i.e., the description of the reinvestigation procedure and the contact information for any furnishers contacted in connection with such information—shall also

1 Based on the facts alleged and the Court’s obligation to construe the pleadings liberally, the Court construes the pleadings as alleging violations of both 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(B)(ii) and 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(B)(iii). be provided to the consumer within fifteen days of the consumer requesting this information from the agency. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(7). The FCRA also provides specific requirements for consumer reporting agencies when reinserting information previously deleted pursuant to a reinvestigation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(B). In relevant part, the agency must notify the consumer in writing of the reinsertion

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Morse v. Lower Merion School District
132 F.3d 902 (Third Circuit, 1997)
Clarence Schreane v. Seana
506 F. App'x 120 (Third Circuit, 2012)
Edward Seamans v. Temple University
744 F.3d 853 (Third Circuit, 2014)
Ryan v. Johnson
115 F.3d 193 (Third Circuit, 1997)
Sandra Connelly v. Lane Construction Corp
809 F.3d 780 (Third Circuit, 2016)
Grohs v. Yatauro
984 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D. New Jersey, 2013)
Klotz v. Trans Union, LLC
246 F.R.D. 208 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2007)
Adams v. Gould Inc.
739 F.2d 858 (Third Circuit, 1984)
Walker v. People Express Airlines, Inc.
886 F.2d 598 (Third Circuit, 1989)

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