Vaughn v. Yawn
This text of 29 S.E. 759 (Vaughn v. Yawn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1. The office of an injunction being, under the code of this State, merely to restrain and not to compel the performance of an act, this remedy is not available for the purpose of evicting a party from the actual possession of land, the right to which is in dispute between himself and another; and consequently such a result can not be indirectly accomplished by an order restraining the party so in possession “from further interfering with said lot of land, house and crop” thereon. Such an order, being mandatory in its nature, would afford relief not within the proper scope of the writ of injunction. Civil Code, § 4922. Russell v. Mohr-Weil Lumber Company, 102 Ga. 563.
2. Applying this established rule to the facts of the present case, the court erred in granting the injunction “as prayed for.”
Judgment reversed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
29 S.E. 759, 103 Ga. 557, 1897 Ga. LEXIS 416, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vaughn-v-yawn-ga-1897.