Vaughn v. United States

• Court: District Court, N.D. Alabama
• Decided: April 25, 2024
• Docket: 7:23-cv-08021
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA WESTERN DIVISION

THOMAS JERMAINE VAUGHN, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) vs. ) 7:23-cv-08021-LSC ) (7:20-cr-00306-LSC) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) ) Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION I. Introduction Before this Court is a motion by Thomas Jermaine Vaughn (“Vaughn” or “Petitioner”) to vacate, set aside, or otherwise correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“§ 2255”). (Doc. 1.) The United States (“Government”) responded in opposition to the motion. (Doc. 10.) For the reasons set forth below, Vaughn’s § 2255 motion (doc. 1) is due to be denied and the present IaIc.t ionB daiscmkgisrsoeudn. d In September 2020, Vaughn was indicted by a grand jury on one count of 1 felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1). (Cr. Doc. United 1States v . “VCaru. gDhonc.” refers to an entry on the doc ket sheet in the underlying criminal case, 16 at 5.) On December 3, 2020, Vaughn entered into a plea agreement and pled

guilty to the one count in the indictment. (Cr. Doc. 13.) He was sentenced to 120 mIIIo. nthTsi bmye tlhinise Csos uarnt.d ( CNro. nD-oScu. c1c7e.s) s iveness of Vaughn’s § 2255 Motion

This Court entered Vaughn’s judgment on April 29, 2021. (Cr. Doc. 17.) He filed a notSiecee Uofn aitpepde Satla, twesit vh. Vthaeu Eghlenventh Circuit rendering their opinion on July 7, 2022. , No. 21-11732. He then had nineSteye d ays

to file a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. SUP. CT. R. 13. He did not file a writ of certiorari, so his judgment became final on October 5, 2022, when the time to do so expired. Thus, he had until October 5, 2023, to file his petition to comport with the one-year statute of limitations

articulated in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Because he filed his petition in July of 2023, his motion is timely. Additionally, Vaughn is bringing his first § 2255 motion, so it is not

“second or successive” within the meaSneine g of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective IDVe.a th SPteannadltayr dA cotf o Rf e1v9i9e6w ( “AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h), 2244(b)(3)(A).

Because collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2)

exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded theS emeaximum authorizeUd nbiyte lda wSt, aotre s( 4v). iPsh oiltlhipesrwise subject to collateral attack. 2U8n Uit.eSd.C S. t§a t2e2s5 v5. W; alker , 225 F.3d 1198, 1199 (11th Cir. 2000); , 198 F.3d

811, 813 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999). “Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ‘is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in directL aypnpne va.l aUnndit ewdo uStlda,t eifs condoned,

result in a complete miscarriage of juRsitcichea.r’”d s v. United States , 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting , 837 F.2d 965, 966 (11th Cir. 1988)). In litigation stemming from a § 2255 motion, “[a] hearing is not required

on patently frivolous claims or those which are based upon unsupported generalizations. Nor is a hearing required whHeorlem tehse v[.m Uonviatendt’ sS]t aaltleesgations are affirmatively contradicted by the reGcouredr.r”a v. United States , 876 F.2d

1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting , 588 F.2d 519, 520- 21 (5th Cir. 1979)). However, it is appropriate for the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing if, “accept[ing] all of the [movant’s] alleged facts as true,”

tDhiea zm vo. vUannitt ehda sS “taaltleesge[d] facts which, if proven, would entitle him toA rgealine fv.”. , 930 F.2d 832, 834 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Dugger Futch v. Dugger , 835 F.2d 1337, 1338 (11th Cir. 1987) and , 874 F.2d

1V4. 83, D14is8c5u (s1s1iothn Cir. 1989)). a. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Vaughn asserts in his § 2255 motion that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise concerns about Vaughn’s mental health history, and by failing to use binding caselaw in his defense. Because these assertions

are meritless, they will be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised for the �irst time in a § 2255 motion and are therefMoraes nsaorto s uvb. jUenctit teod aS ptarotecsedural bar for failing to raise them on direct appeal. , 538 U.S. 500, 504

(2003). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two components: �irst, the petitioner “must show that the counsel’s performance was de�icient;” second, the petitiSotnriecrk l“amndu svt. Wshaoshwin gthtoant the de�icient performance prejudiced the

defense.” , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To satisfy the �irst component, “the defendant must show thaItd c.ounsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” at 688. The second component is

satis�ied only when the defendant shows that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’sI du.nprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would In exaImd.i ning counsel’s performance, the Court should be “highly

deferential.” at 689. The Court must make “every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challengedI dc.onduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at

the time.” The Court must also “indulge a strong presumption that counseIdl’.s cseoen dBuecllt vfa. lClso wneithin the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” ; , 535 U.S. 685, 702 (2002) (holding that “tactical decision[s]

about which competent lawyers might disagree” do not qualify as objectively unreasonable). A petitioner who seeks to overcome this presumption does not carry his burden by offering bare accusations and complaints, but rather “must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that aSrteri cakllleagnedd not to have been the

result of reasonable professional judgment.” , 466 U.S. at 690. The defendant must show “thaCt hnaon cdolmerp ve. tUennitt ecdo uSntasteel swould have taken the action that his counsel did take.” , 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th

Cir. 2000) (en banc). Where a petitioner fails to show that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective sSteaen Hdoalrlda doafy r ve.a Hsoanleaybleness, the court need not address the issue

of prejudice. , 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000). Where the court does consider this prong, the petitioner must show that counsel’s Strickland whose result is reliable.” , 466 U.S. at 687. This burden is met by

establishing by a reasonable probability that the oWuitlclioammes vo. fT thhree aptrtoceeding would have been diffeSrternictk blaunt dfor counsel’s errors. , 529 U.S. 362, 391–93 (2000); , 466 U.S. at 691.

“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to

the extent thatS rteraicskolnanabdle professional judgments support the limitations on investigationi.. ” Vaughn, 4’s6 6in Ue.fSf.e actt 6iv9e0 –a9s1s.i stance of counsel claims are conclusory.

Each of Vaughn’s allegations claiming ineffective assistance of counsel

are conclusory and include no facts or reasoning as to why they constitute an ineffective assistance of Wcoiulsnosne vl.. U“nCiotendc lSutsaotersy allegations of ineffective assistance are insufficient.” ,n 9o6t 2 F.2d 996, 998 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). “A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary

hearing…‘whTenej ahdisa clva.i mDsu agrgee mr erely “conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics.”’” , 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991). Additionally, for motions pursuant to § 2255, the petitioner is required to “state the facts supporting each ground.” Rule 2(b)(2), Rules Governing Section 2255

Proceedings (2022). In the section of Vaughn’s § 2255 motion designated to list specific facts to support his claim, Vaughn states only that “Counsel fail[ed] to investigate

mental health history[,] ask forB eruveanluatioRn eahnadi fcall in doctor at sentencing,” and “Counsel also fail[ed] to apply and case[s].” (Doc. 1 at 3) (emphasis added). These statements are vague and do not provide any specific facts as to

why his counsel was deficient based upon these allegations. Because the Court finds these allegations by VaughSne aer Tee cjaodnaclusory, they are due to be dismissed without an eivi.i denVtiaauryg hhena’sr inign. effective , a9s4s1i sFt.a2ndc aet 15o5f 9.c ounsel claims regarding his mental health are without merit.

Even if Vaughn’s claims were not conclusory, they are also without merit. Vaughn claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to investigate his history of mental health concerns and failed to call a doctor as an expert witness.

Vaughn has provided no reason to beSliterivcek latnhdat his attorney’s performance was deficient, as required by the standard. In his affidavit, Vaughn’s attorney, Kevin Roberts (“Mr. Roberts”), lists numerous

steps he took to understand Vaughn’s mental health history. During their first meeting, Vaughn allegedly informed Mr. Roberts of his paranoid schizophrenia

diagnosis, and that he was “experiencing symptoms of depression, had suicidal thoughts, but was not hearing voices.” (Doc. 10-1 at 2.) Following that meeting, Mr. Roberts contacted Vaughn’s mother to obtain further information Idon

Vaughn’s mental health history and a list of his prior treatment facilities. ( .) Mr. Roberts then received treatment records from Indian Rivers Behavioral Health Center, which informed himId of Vaughn’s history of schizophrenia and

non-compliance with treatment. ( . at 3.) Over the following months, Mr. Roberts stated that Vaughn reported that he was being medicated for his mental health issues, “had not had suicidal thoughtIsd for ten years,” and experienced no symptoms besides having nightmares. ( . at 2-3.) Additionally,

Mr. Roberts filed a sentencing memorandum prior to sentencing that included details on Vaughn’s mental health concerns. (Cr. Doc. 15.) At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Roberts once again reiterated to this Court all of his concerns 2 regarding Vaughn’s mental health. (Cr. Doc. 27 at 4-5.) Based on the affidavit , sentencing memorandum, and Mr. Roberts’ remarks at sentencing, the Court

2 OAwlethnos uv gUhS “contested fact issues may not be decided Joanm easf fvid. Samviittsh alone . . . . Where the affidavi ts are supported by other evidence in the record[,] the court may rely upon them.” finds no reason to believe thaSt eMe Sr.t rRicokblaenrtds was deficient in investigating

Vaughn’s mental health history. , 466 U.S. at 689. Further, even if Mr. Roberts was deficient in investigating Vaughn’s mental health history, Vaughn suffered no prejudice as a result of the

deficiency. The Pretrial Sentencing Report (“PSR”) shows that this Court was fully aware of Vaughn’s long history of mental health concerns, including his diagnoses of schizophrenia and depression, along with his several suicide

attempts. (Cr. Doc. 16 at 20-21.) Vaughn provides no information that the court was unaware of, thus, there is no proof that Vaughn suffered prejudice from a 3 lack of evidence raised by his attorney. Regarding Vaughn’s claim that Mr. Roberts failed to provide a doctor as an expert witness at his sentencing hearing, there is no proof in the record that an expert witness would have raised evidence that was not already before this Court. The court sWhaotuelrds sve.l dTohmo mseacso, nd guess an attorney’s decision to call a

witness or not. 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995).

3 Vaughn also seems to indicate that his attorney should have orHdeorlleadd aay m v.e Hntaalel yevaluation for him. (Doc. 1 at 3.) “[C]ounsel is notB reerqtuoilroettdi tvo. sDeuegkg aanr independent evaluation when the defendant does not display strong evidence of mental problems.” , 209 F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing , 883 F.2d 1503, 1511 (11th Cir. 1989)). Thus, because the Court was made aware of Vaughn’s history with mental health and his symptoms seemed to be under control, there is no reason another evaluation needed to Considering the deference given to an attorney’s decision to call upon a witness

along with the inclusive mental health history report received by this Court in the PSR, Vaughn’s cl aim that his counsel was deficient by not calling an expert witness is mieiri.i tlesVsa.ughn’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim that his attorney failed to assert binding caselaw is without merit.

Vaughn Naelswo Yaossrekr Rtsif tleh a&t Phiisst oalt tAosrsnoecy., pInrco.v vi.d Bedru ienneffective assistance by

failing to use Rehaif v. United States , 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), and , 588 U.S. --, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) in crafting his defense. This claim is also without mBerruiet.n

BruenRegardless of the legal substance in the ruling, failing to include in the defense of Vaughn cannot Bcrounesntitute deficient performance because the Supreme Court did not rule on for over a year Satfrtiecrk lVaanudg,hn 4 was sentenced. “To be effective within the boJuancdksso ns evt. Hbyer ring an attorney need not anticipate changes in the law.” , 42 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1995). Because Vaughn’s attorney was not requBirrueedn to or expected to anticipate potential changes in the law, not asserting does

not render his counsel deficient.

Bruen Rehaif v. United States, In the Supreme Court held that to be found guilty

under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), “the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” 139 S. Ct. at

2200. Vaughn admits he knew that he was in possession of a firearm but alleges that he “did not know he could not carry [a firearm] while being a felon.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) Even if it is true that Vaughn was not aware that it was illegal for him to

possess a fiRreeahramif as a felon, such knowledge is not required for a § 922(g) conviction. only requires knowledge of possession and knowledge of felon status. At multiple points in time, Vaughn admitted that he had knowledge of his

status as a felon. During his arrest, Vaughn informed the arresting officer that he was a convicted felon. (Cr. Doc. 16 at 6.) Additionally, Vaughn’s plea agreement notes that “Vaughn knew he had been convicted of a crime

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year prior to the instant offense.” (Cr. Doc. 13 at 4.) Because VauRgehhna aifdmitted to this element of the crime on numerous occasions, not using as part of a defense cannot be

viewed as ineffectiveR aeshsaisitfance of counsel because any argument raised by Mr. Roberbts. pCuornsustaintut ttoio nality wofo 1u8ld U h.aSv.Ce. b§e 9e2n 2fu(gti)l e under the circumstances. In his motion, Vaughn also claims that 1N8 ewU .YS.oCr.k §R ifl9e2 &2( gP)is toisl

uAnsscoocn.,s Itnitcu. vti. oBnraule nafter the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bruen , 597 U.S. 1, 14B2ru Se. nCt. 2111 (2022), but such an interpretation of the ruling is incorrect. ’s holding that the Second and Fourteenth

Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a handguBnr ouuentside the home for self-defense is only applicable to law-abiding citizeBnrsu. en , 142 S. Ct. at 2122. Because of Vaughn’s status as a convicted felon, ’s Uhonlidteind gS thaatse sn vo.

eRfofezicetr on Vaughn’s § 922(g) charge. Thus, this circuit’s ruling in , 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010), stating that “§ 922(g)(1) is a constitutional restriction on [a defendant’s] Second Amendment right” applies to the present motion, and no relief is available for Vaughn pursuant to this

claim. c. Elements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

Vaughn’s third argument claims that he should not have been convicted

under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because he was not aware that he was barred from possessing a firearm while being a convicted felon, and because the firearm he possessed was nonfunctioning. (Doc. 1 at 6.) First, Vaughn is not entitled to

relief on this claim becSaeues eL ytnhnis v a. Urgnuitmede nStt actoeusld have and should have been raised on direct appeal. , 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal).

Second, this claim is entitled to no relief based on the merits of the argument. To convict on a felon in possession of a firearm charge, the government need only prove that a defendant knowingly possessed a firearm that has

traveled in interstate commerce, was convicted of a felUonniyte odf fSetnastees, avn. Pdr kicneew of their status as a convicted felon. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); , 828 F. Appx. 573, 575-76 (11th Cir. 2020). As previously discussed, there is no

requirement that the defendant must know that their status as a felon makes it 5 a crime to possess a firearm. Similarly, there is no requirUenmiteendt S tthaatte tsh ve. fAirdeaamrms be readily operable for conviction under § 922(g)(1). , 137 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Nothing in…§ 922(g)(1)… requires the government to show that the unlawfully possessed firearm is operable.”). The statute simply requires possession of a “firearm,” which means “(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be

converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; [or] (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3). Although Vaughn argues

5 Vaughn also asserts a fourth ground in his motion that stated his lawyer did not explain to him that his rights to possess a firearm were taken away due to his felon status. (Doc. 1 at 9.) However, the Court cannot offer any relief here because by the time this case was before this Court, Vaughn had already committed the criminal conduct in this case. Thus, Mr. Roberts that his firearm was inoperable at the time of arrest, it could regularly function

as soon as the necessary parts were inserted—a process that took less than twenty minutes according to a firearms enforcement officer. (Doc. 13 at 4.) Vaughn acknowledged that he knowingly possessed a firearm that

traveled in interstate commerce, that the firearm he possessed at the time of arrest was a firearm within the statutory definition, and that he was aware of his status as a convicted felon in his plea agreement. (Doc. 13 at 2-4.) Because

this argument is not suited for a § 2255 motion, and even if it were, it is without mVIe. rit, Cnoon rcelluiesfi ocann be granted on this claim.

For the foregoing reasons, Vaughn’s § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside,

or correct a sentence is due to be denied and this case dismissed with prejudice. Rule 11 of the Rules governing § 2255 Proceedings requires the Court to issue or deny a ceSreteificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse

to the applicant. Rule 11, Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings. This Court may issue a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, a “petitioner must demonstrate that a reasonable jurist would find the Sdliasctrki cvt . McocuDratn’si elassessment of the (2000), or that “the issues presented were adequate to deserve to proceed further.” Miller-EL v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (internal quotations omitted). This Court finds that Vaughn’s claims do not satisfy either standard. A separate order consistent with this opinion will be entered. DONE and ORDERED on April 25, 2024.

L. Scott G United States DistWét Judge 215708

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