Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp.

46 F.R.D. 6, 13 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 932, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13469
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Oklahoma
DecidedFebruary 3, 1969
DocketCiv. No. 68-362
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 46 F.R.D. 6 (Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 46 F.R.D. 6, 13 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 932, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13469 (W.D. Okla. 1969).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

EUBANKS, District Judge.

The plaintiff seeks to recover for personal injuries and the intervening plaintiff for property damages resulting from a truck accident alleged to have been caused by a defective steering mechanism on the truck at the time it was sold by defendants. The plaintiffs, in response to inquiries, were advised that defendant, since the accident, had made certain tests of “the steering column universal joint body” and that it was found “to perform satisfactorily, with no evidence of any defect in material.” The plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 33, by interrogatories, secured the names of the persons in charge of each test, the date and place of the tests, the items tested, and the defects which the tests were designed to reveal. Plaintiffs then specifically inquired: “What were the results of the tests?” Defendants objected to that interrogatory and said objection was sustained by order of this court dated December 2, 1968. Other interrogatories disclosed that written reports covering the tests had been prepared by defendant’s experts. The plaintiffs now seek to obtain the reports, for copying pursuant to Rule 34 on Motion for the Production of Documents. Defendant responds that “good cause” for the motion has not been shown and that the reports are “privileged.”

It is to be observed generally that the Rules governing discovery are vague. Each decided case appears to have turned on its facts. The problem of setting the boundary limits of discovery is a constant one.

There is nothing mandatory about the discovery provisions of the Rules. On the contrary, the purpose and intent is evident throughout to leave their application to the discretion of the trial court—not, of course, an absolute discretion but one controlled and governed, not only by statutory enactments and the well-established rules of the common law, but also by considerations of policy and of necessity, propriety and expediency in the particular case at hand. Judge Kirkpatrick in U. S. v. Kohler, E.D.Pa.1945, 9 F. R.D. 289.

It may be observed further generally that under Rule 34 it is not the duty of the court to search out a “good cause” for the production of the documents sought. It is the duty of the moving party explicitly to show in his motion or by a supporting affidavit that “good cause” exists for the production of the document. Martin v. Capital Transit Co., 1948, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 239, 170 F.2d 811.

' Finally it may be observed generally that a showing that- the docu[9]*9ment sought exists is not equivalent to “showing good cause therefor” because it does not satisfy the qualifying adjective. The adjective “good” specifies the quality of the showing which the movant must make as a condition precedent to moving the court to grant the motion. Each motion for the production of documents must be evaluated by the circumstances which are made to appear from the pleadings and that evaluation rests in the sound discretion of the court. The court’s decision ultimately is no more than a comparative evaluation of competing claims.

The question at hand is whether plaintiffs have shown cause sufficient to require an order for production under Rule 34. The Rule provides that: “Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor * * [Emphasis supplied.] A showing of “good cause” must affirmatively appear. It is a condition precedent to the granting of the motion by the court. The burden of showing the condition precedent is on the movant. He encounters it at the threshold of the Rule. He assumes it by filing his Motion for Production. His mere statement, without more, that He is entitled to relief sought in that he will be prejudiced if the document be not produced, does not suffice.

The Motion in the case at hand is not sufficient. It describes the reports sought and recites that they are in the hands of the defendant, and then recites that “each of the documents (reports) constitutes or contains evidence relevant and material to this case, or as more fully shown in Exhibit ‘A’ which is attached hereto.” The language underscored relates to the relevancy of the reports and does not show good cause. A showing of good cause for the Motion must precede any showing of relevancy of the document sought.

Plaintiff’s assertion that the reports “contain evidence relevant and material to this case” does not satisfy “good cause”. The relevancy of the documents sought is one factor. It goes to the scope and materiality of the document sought while “showing good cause” is a condition precedent to the granting of the Motion. The two are different. The specifics are not identical. To equate “relevancy”, which is only one specific of the document sought, with “showing good cause” which is a condition precedent to granting the Motion, would render the “relevancy” requirement redundant. In Martin v. Capital Transit Co., supra, the Court said:

Rule 34 authorizes the District Court to order production of documents, papers, etc., upon motion of a party “showing good cause,” not upon a mere allegation or recitation that a good cause exists. The rule contemplates an exercise of judgment by the court, not a mere automatic granting of a motion. The court’s judgment is to be moved by a demonstration by a moving party of its need, for the purposes of trial, of the document or paper sought. This view is confirmed by the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 1947, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451. [Emphasis supplied.]

Absent any showing of “good cause” in the Motion, we turn now to the Affidavit annexed to the Motion. It alleges firstly that plaintiffs “do not have the proving grounds or the other facilities at their disposal in which to conduct similar tests to those conducted by the defendants.” This hardly suffices as “showing good cause”. In Hoagland v. T. V. A., E.D.Tenn.1963, 34 F.R.D. 458, the plaintiff sought the production of the written report of a metallurgist who had examined the brake band of a hoist that allegedly had caused the alleged injuries. The affidavit of plaintiff’s counsel therein stated, “that plaintiff has been severely limited in the financial resources necessary to make a proper investigation of the facts preparatory to the trial of the lawsuit.” There, as here, the plaintiff insisted [10]*10that the liberality of the discovery rules required the production of the report sought. The court held to the contrary.

The supporting Affidavit annexed to the Motion in the case at hand alleges secondly, that:

Plaintiffs believe that defendant will use the results of the tests in their denial of liability on this cause of action. In order for plaintiffs to adequately prepare for trial, it is necessary that they be allowed to examine and copy the written reports. Unless plaintiffs are allowed to inspect and copy the written reports, they will not be in a proper position to rebut the results of the tests which were conducted.

These recitals in the supporting Affidavit do not constitute “showing good cause”. In Sacco v. Greyhound Corporation, D.C.W.D.Pa.1959, 24 F.R.D. 257, in denying a like motion, the Court said:

What plaintiffs here seek, of course, is an order of court, requiring the defendant to produce certain documents and things for plaintiffs’ inspection.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
46 F.R.D. 6, 13 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 932, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13469, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vaughn-v-chrysler-corp-okwd-1969.