NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 24-2928 ____________
VAUDRAL LUXAMA; CHANDLER LUXEUS; JAVIER R. GARCIA; SANTOS MALDONADO; CHANEL FONTIN, individually and as class representatives; KIMBERLY M. BONHOMME
v.
IRONBOUND EXPRESS, INC., Appellant ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil No. 2:11-cv-02224) Magistrate Judge: Honorable James B. Clark, III ____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R.34.1(a) on June 30, 2025
Before: SHWARTZ, FREEMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 12, 2025) _______________
OPINION* _______________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.
A putative class of tractor-trailer drivers sued Ironbound Express, a transport
company to whom they leased their vehicles and driving services. After the District
Court certified the class and determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction, a
Magistrate Judge (acting with the consent of the parties) entered a permanent injunction
against Ironbound. Ironbound appeals from that order, which we will affirm.
I
Six tractor-trailer drivers who lease their vehicles and driving services to
Ironbound pursuant to a form lease agreement sued Ironbound in 2011. Individually and
as representatives of a putative class, they alleged a breach of contract and violations of
federal truth-in-leasing regulations. See 49 C.F.R. § 376.1 et seq. They sought damages
and declaratory and injunctive relief.
In 2018, the District Court certified a class (“the Drivers”) under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) for declaratory and injunctive relief on the truth-in-leasing
claims. In March 2021, the District Court resolved the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment, holding that portions of Ironbound’s template lease agreement
conflicted with federal regulations. It determined that the Drivers satisfied the four-factor
test for a permanent injunction with respect to these violations, and it stated the
following:
The Court will enjoin Defendant from entering into leases with Plaintiffs containing or lacking language consistent with [three federal regulations]. Within 10 days of this Opinion, Plaintiffs shall submit proposed language for the injunction order to the Court.
2 App. 103. The District Court echoed this language in an accompanying order (“the
March 2021 Order”), which stated:
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to their claim for injunctive relief as to [three federal regulations] is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that the Court will enjoin Defendant from entering into leases with Plaintiffs containing or lacking language consistent with [those regulations]. Within ten (10) days of this Order, Plaintiffs shall submit proposed language for the injunction order to the Court consistent with the accompanying Opinion.
App. 105. The Drivers did not timely file proposed language within 10 days. Therefore,
the District Court never issued the injunction order it contemplated in the March 2021
Order.
As the litigation continued, the parties engaged in mediation with a Magistrate
Judge in November 2023. Although the parties characterize what happened next
differently, the record suggests that they reached an agreement with respect to some but
not all terms of a settlement agreement. They filed a joint status report in May 2024
stating they were unable to reach agreement on two issues, one of which was injunctive
relief. The Drivers requested leave to submit proposed language for the injunction
contemplated by the March 2021 Order, stating that they had not done so in a timely
manner due to an oversight. For its part, Ironbound asserted that (1) the Drivers failed to
establish excusable neglect regarding their failure to file a timely proposed order for an
injunction, and (2) any entitlement to injunctive relief was extinguished by the parties’
having allegedly reached a settlement agreement.
3 Shortly after filing the joint status report, the Drivers moved for a permanent
injunction to effectuate the March 2021 Order. While that motion was pending, the
parties executed a proposed settlement agreement regarding monetary damages and filed
it for judicial approval. They also consented to the Magistrate Judge ruling on the motion
for a permanent injunction and conducting all remaining settlement-approval
proceedings.
In September 2024, the Magistrate Judge entered the permanent injunction.
Although he questioned the need to do so, the Magistrate Judge issued an order formally
effectuating the March 2021 Order. Ironbound timely appealed.
II1
Ironbound offers various arguments to challenge the permanent injunction. None
is persuasive.
Ironbound contends that the parties agreed upon a settlement in 2023 and any
subsequent impasse was merely over the written terms memorializing the settlement. In
Ironbound’s view, that alleged settlement extinguished the Drivers’ ability to obtain
injunctive relief. There are several problems with this theory. For one, the District Court
granted summary judgment to the plaintiff class in 2021, ruling that a permanent
injunction was warranted. Therefore, to the extent the parties subsequently reached a
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to the Magistrate Judge’s jurisdiction over the motion for a permanent injunction. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review the issuance of a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. Benezet Consulting LLC v. Sec’y Commonwealth of Pa., 26 F.4th 580, 584 (3d Cir. 2022).
4 settlement, they did so with that issue already resolved. For another, the parties’ May
2024 status report makes clear that they had not agreed upon the specific terms of the
injunctive relief. Ironbound invokes the general proposition that an oral settlement
agreement may be enforceable, but that reliance is misplaced because the parties did not
reach an agreement on the relevant terms. Moreover, even if the parties had agreed to a
settlement in 2023, that occurred after the District Court certified the Drivers as a class
pursuing injunctive relief. So court approval was necessary before any settlement took
effect as to the class’s claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses
of a certified class . . . may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with
the court’s approval.”).2
Next, Ironbound argues that the Magistrate Judge did not properly consider the
factors articulated in Pioneer Investment Services Company v. Brunswick Associates
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 24-2928 ____________
VAUDRAL LUXAMA; CHANDLER LUXEUS; JAVIER R. GARCIA; SANTOS MALDONADO; CHANEL FONTIN, individually and as class representatives; KIMBERLY M. BONHOMME
v.
IRONBOUND EXPRESS, INC., Appellant ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil No. 2:11-cv-02224) Magistrate Judge: Honorable James B. Clark, III ____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R.34.1(a) on June 30, 2025
Before: SHWARTZ, FREEMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 12, 2025) _______________
OPINION* _______________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.
A putative class of tractor-trailer drivers sued Ironbound Express, a transport
company to whom they leased their vehicles and driving services. After the District
Court certified the class and determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction, a
Magistrate Judge (acting with the consent of the parties) entered a permanent injunction
against Ironbound. Ironbound appeals from that order, which we will affirm.
I
Six tractor-trailer drivers who lease their vehicles and driving services to
Ironbound pursuant to a form lease agreement sued Ironbound in 2011. Individually and
as representatives of a putative class, they alleged a breach of contract and violations of
federal truth-in-leasing regulations. See 49 C.F.R. § 376.1 et seq. They sought damages
and declaratory and injunctive relief.
In 2018, the District Court certified a class (“the Drivers”) under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) for declaratory and injunctive relief on the truth-in-leasing
claims. In March 2021, the District Court resolved the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment, holding that portions of Ironbound’s template lease agreement
conflicted with federal regulations. It determined that the Drivers satisfied the four-factor
test for a permanent injunction with respect to these violations, and it stated the
following:
The Court will enjoin Defendant from entering into leases with Plaintiffs containing or lacking language consistent with [three federal regulations]. Within 10 days of this Opinion, Plaintiffs shall submit proposed language for the injunction order to the Court.
2 App. 103. The District Court echoed this language in an accompanying order (“the
March 2021 Order”), which stated:
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to their claim for injunctive relief as to [three federal regulations] is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that the Court will enjoin Defendant from entering into leases with Plaintiffs containing or lacking language consistent with [those regulations]. Within ten (10) days of this Order, Plaintiffs shall submit proposed language for the injunction order to the Court consistent with the accompanying Opinion.
App. 105. The Drivers did not timely file proposed language within 10 days. Therefore,
the District Court never issued the injunction order it contemplated in the March 2021
Order.
As the litigation continued, the parties engaged in mediation with a Magistrate
Judge in November 2023. Although the parties characterize what happened next
differently, the record suggests that they reached an agreement with respect to some but
not all terms of a settlement agreement. They filed a joint status report in May 2024
stating they were unable to reach agreement on two issues, one of which was injunctive
relief. The Drivers requested leave to submit proposed language for the injunction
contemplated by the March 2021 Order, stating that they had not done so in a timely
manner due to an oversight. For its part, Ironbound asserted that (1) the Drivers failed to
establish excusable neglect regarding their failure to file a timely proposed order for an
injunction, and (2) any entitlement to injunctive relief was extinguished by the parties’
having allegedly reached a settlement agreement.
3 Shortly after filing the joint status report, the Drivers moved for a permanent
injunction to effectuate the March 2021 Order. While that motion was pending, the
parties executed a proposed settlement agreement regarding monetary damages and filed
it for judicial approval. They also consented to the Magistrate Judge ruling on the motion
for a permanent injunction and conducting all remaining settlement-approval
proceedings.
In September 2024, the Magistrate Judge entered the permanent injunction.
Although he questioned the need to do so, the Magistrate Judge issued an order formally
effectuating the March 2021 Order. Ironbound timely appealed.
II1
Ironbound offers various arguments to challenge the permanent injunction. None
is persuasive.
Ironbound contends that the parties agreed upon a settlement in 2023 and any
subsequent impasse was merely over the written terms memorializing the settlement. In
Ironbound’s view, that alleged settlement extinguished the Drivers’ ability to obtain
injunctive relief. There are several problems with this theory. For one, the District Court
granted summary judgment to the plaintiff class in 2021, ruling that a permanent
injunction was warranted. Therefore, to the extent the parties subsequently reached a
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to the Magistrate Judge’s jurisdiction over the motion for a permanent injunction. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review the issuance of a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. Benezet Consulting LLC v. Sec’y Commonwealth of Pa., 26 F.4th 580, 584 (3d Cir. 2022).
4 settlement, they did so with that issue already resolved. For another, the parties’ May
2024 status report makes clear that they had not agreed upon the specific terms of the
injunctive relief. Ironbound invokes the general proposition that an oral settlement
agreement may be enforceable, but that reliance is misplaced because the parties did not
reach an agreement on the relevant terms. Moreover, even if the parties had agreed to a
settlement in 2023, that occurred after the District Court certified the Drivers as a class
pursuing injunctive relief. So court approval was necessary before any settlement took
effect as to the class’s claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses
of a certified class . . . may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with
the court’s approval.”).2
Next, Ironbound argues that the Magistrate Judge did not properly consider the
factors articulated in Pioneer Investment Services Company v. Brunswick Associates
Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), before extending the time in which the Drivers
could propose language for an injunction. Although his Pioneer analysis was brief, the
Magistrate Judge nonetheless considered all four factors before concluding that, on
balance, an extension was warranted. Notably, the Magistrate Judge determined that the
three-year delay could not have significantly prejudiced Ironbound because the District
Court “had already made clear in 2021 that the relief at issue was being granted.” App.
2 Relatedly, Ironbound argues the Magistrate Judge should have denied the motion for an injunction as moot in light of the proposed settlement the parties submitted for court approval while the motion was pending. This argument fails for the same reasons discussed above the line.
5 210. The Magistrate Judge appropriately considered this unusual procedural history, and
he did not abuse his discretion in ruling on the timeliness issue. See Drippe v. Tobelinski,
604 F.3d 778, 784–85 (3d Cir. 2010).
Finally, Ironbound argues that the September 2024 injunction does not comply
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), which requires that any injunction “describe
in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts restrained or required.” We take a context-based
approach to objections under Rule 65(d), because “the degree of particularity required . . .
will depend on the nature of the subject matter.” Mallet & Co. Inc. v. Lacayo, 16 F.4th
364, 379 (3d Cir. 2021) (alterations and quotation marks omitted). The specificity
requirement “prevent[s] uncertainty and confusion on the part of those faced with
injunctive orders,” particularly given the risk of a finding of contempt for non-
compliance. Id. (quoting Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476–77 (1974)).
Ironbound’s trivial objections to the September 2024 injunction make clear there
is no such risk of uncertainty or confusion here. For example, Ironbound faults the
September 2024 injunction for citing 49 C.F.R. § 367.12, instead of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12.
It is hard to imagine how a party to this case would be confused by that scrivener’s error.
Indeed, Ironbound’s ability to note and correct the error in its brief demonstrates its lack
of confusion. Ironbound also complains that the September 2024 injunction applies to
“defendant Ironbound Express, Inc., including its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates,
successors and assigns,” App. 212, instead of just “the Defendant,” App. 105, as stated in
the March 2021 Opinion. But the additional language merely clarifies what entities are
encompassed by “the Defendant.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2) (stating that injunctions
6 bind the parties, the parties’ agents, and those “in active concert or participation with” the
parties).
In sum, Ironbound identifies no reason to disturb the September 2024 permanent
injunction.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Magistrate Judge’s order.