VASQUEZ v. NATIONWIDE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 27, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-02731
StatusUnknown

This text of VASQUEZ v. NATIONWIDE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY (VASQUEZ v. NATIONWIDE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
VASQUEZ v. NATIONWIDE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, (E.D. Pa. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EDWIN VASQUEZ and JESSICA : CIVIL ACTION VASQUEZ : : No. 23-2731 v. : : NATIONWIDE PROPERTY AND : CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY : a/k/a NATIONWIDE :

MEMORANDUM

Judge Juan R. Sánchez September 27, 2024 Plaintiffs Edwin and Jessica Vasquez bring this action against Defendant Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“Nationwide”) for breach of contract and bad faith arising from Nationwide’s denial of Plaintiffs’ claim for underinsured motorist (“UIM”) benefits under their automobile insurance policy with Nationwide. Nationwide argues Plaintiffs waived UIM coverage on the policy and are not entitled to benefits as a result. Plaintiffs argue the UIM waiver does not apply to the policy they now seek coverage under. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. There is no dispute Plaintiffs waived UIM coverage on the initial policy. The dispute is whether the UIM waiver applies to the operative policy Plaintiffs seek coverage under. To answer this question, the Court must determine whether the operative policy is a renewal of the initial policy or an entirely new policy under Pennsylvania law. If it is a renewal, the UIM waiver applies and Plaintiffs may not claim UIM benefits. If it is a new policy, the UIM waiver does not apply and Plaintiffs are entitled to UIM benefits. Because the scope of coverage and limits of the operative policy is the same as the initial policy, the Court concludes it is a renewal. Accordingly, the Court will grant Nationwide’s motion on all claims and deny Plaintiffs’ motion on all claims. BACKGROUND On March 13, 2021, Plaintiffs Edwin and Jessica Vasquez were injured in a car accident with an underinsured driver. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6-9, ECF No. 6. Plaintiffs later submitted a claim for UIM benefits under their automobile insurance policy with Nationwide. Id. ¶¶ 57-60. Nationwide

denied the claim on the ground that Plaintiffs did not have UIM coverage under the policy. Id. ¶¶ 64-65. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit as a result of the denial. From October 1, 2015, to October 1, 2020, Plaintiffs had an auto policy with Nationwide with the policy number 5837G056552 (“056 Policy”). See Def.’s Ex. Summ. J., ECF No. 17-5 at 3; ECF No. 17-7. Under the 056 Policy, Plaintiffs rejected UIM coverage by signing a valid waiver form and did not pay UIM premium. Def.’s Ex. Summ. J., ECF No. 17-6. During this period, Plaintiffs renewed their policy every six months—maintaining the same policy number. See ECF No. 17-7. Effective October 1, 2020, the policy number changed to 5837J2900090 (“290 Policy”) because of Nationwide’s One Product initiative. See Def.’s Ex. Summ. J., ECF No. 17-3 at 23.

According to Nationwide, as part of its One Product initiative, it issued “auto policies to existing insureds with new policy numbers, as renewals, without the need to obtain all new forms.” Def.’s Summ. J. Br. at 2, ECF No. 17-1. Nationwide maintains it obtained approval of the Pennsylvania Insurance Department (“Department”) to issue One Product policies as “renewal” policies. Def.’s Ex. Summ. J., ECF No. 17-9 at 12; see ECF No. 17-10 at 1-3. Prior to changing the policy number, Nationwide sent a notice of a “policy renewal” to Plaintiffs informing them of the impending change. ECF No. 17-3 at 23-26.1 In that notice, Nationwide included the following message:

1 The document was prepared on July 28, 2020, to notify Plaintiffs of their policy for October 1, 2020, to April 1, 2021. Id. at 25. IMPORTANT MESSAGES: Please be advised that this policy does not provide protection against damages caused by uninsured and/or underinsured motorists on one or more vehicles listed below.

Id. at 25. Plaintiff Edwin Vasquez acknowledged receiving notice of the policy number change. Pl’s Ex. Summ. J., ECF 20-4 at 16.2 On the day of the accident, the 290 Policy was in place. See Pl.’s Ex. Summ. J., ECF No. 21-2 at 1-3. Plaintiffs assert the 290 Policy is a new policy, and, as a result, the signed UIM waiver form does not apply to the 290 Policy. Pl.’s Summ. J. Br., ECF No. 21 at 9-10. To support this assertion, Plaintiffs point to the differences in the declaration pages for the two policies. Id. at 16- 17. Plaintiffs claim the 209 Policy declaration is missing language about UIM coverage. Id. They note the 056 Policy declaration page has line items for “Uninsured Motorists-Bodily Injury” and “Underinsured Motorists-Bodily Injury” with “Rejected” next to both. Pl’s Ex. Summ. J., ECF No. 20-1 at 6. The 290 Policy declaration page does not. Pl’s Ex. Summ. J., ECF No. 20-2 at 6. Nationwide asserts the 290 Policy is a renewal because the substance of the policy remains the same.3 Def.’s Summ. J. Br., ECF No. 17 at 8-10. This case was removed to the Court on July 18, 2023. After the Court denied Nationwide’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint on October 19, 2023, the following claims proceeded to

2 In his deposition, Plaintiff Edwin Vasquez stated, “I received an email from Nationwide the summer of 2020 stating that my policy was getting changed. And then a few months later, I did receive another email stating—well, not stating, but showing that my policy number did change.” Id. 3 Nationwide also argues the Court must give substantial deference to the Department’s approval of the 290 Policy “as a renewal policy.” Def.’s Opp’n., ECF No. 23 at 9. Deference only applies when there is statutory ambiguity. Crown Castle NG E. LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 234 A.3d 665, 677 (Pa. 2020) (“A court does not defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute because statutory interpretation is a question of law for the court.”). The Department applied statutes to facts rather than interpret the meaning of statutes. No such deference is required here. discovery: (I) breach of contract and (II) bad faith under Pennsylvania law. The parties now move for summary judgment. STANDARD OF REVIEW A court must grant summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Material” facts “affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the [non-moving] party.” Id. at 248. “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 247-48. To defeat summary judgment, “a nonmoving party must adduce more than a mere scintilla of evidence in its favor . . . and cannot simply reassert factually unsupported allegations contained in its pleadings[.]” Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must “view all facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party and draw all inferences in that party’s favor.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019) “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted).

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VASQUEZ v. NATIONWIDE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vasquez-v-nationwide-property-casualty-insurance-company-paed-2024.