Vasquez-Calix v. Blanche

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedApril 29, 2026
Docket24-1364
StatusUnpublished

This text of Vasquez-Calix v. Blanche (Vasquez-Calix v. Blanche) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vasquez-Calix v. Blanche, (9th Cir. 2026).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 29 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUNIOR NOEL VASQUEZ-CALIX, No. 24-1364 Agency No. Petitioner, A095-800-372 v. MEMORANDUM*

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted April 20, 2026 San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, CHRISTEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Junior Vasquez-Calix, a lawful permanent resident of the United States and

citizen of Honduras, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

(BIA) summary dismissal of his appeal from the denial of his applications for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. See Jauregui-Cardenas v.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Barr, 946 F.3d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 2020). In light of our decision in United States

v. Gomez, 165 F.4th 1199 (9th Cir. 2026) (en banc), Vasquez 1 is no longer

removable. His removability was solely premised on his prior criminal conviction

that after Gomez is no longer properly considered an aggravated felony. See id. at

1210. We grant the petition, vacate the order of removal, and remand to the BIA

with instructions to terminate proceedings.

When an immigration case turns on an issue that the agency did not have an

opportunity to pass on, “the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand

to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.” INS v. Orlando Ventura,

537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). However, we have

articulated four indicators that suggest remand for the agency to address an issue “is

inappropriate.” Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106, 1118 (9th Cir. 2014). They

are: (1) whether “purely legal issues remain”; (2) whether the record is complete; (3)

whether the agency has already addressed the dispositive issue; and (4) whether the

Government is precluded from relitigating the conclusive issue. Id. Applying this

framework here, we conclude that remand for the BIA to apply Gomez is

unnecessary.

First, as in Medina-Lara, whether an offense can serve as a predicate for

removal is a legal question. See id.; see also Kwong v. Holder, 671 F.3d 872, 876

1 Petitioner’s briefs refer to Petitioner as Vasquez. We do as well.

2 24-1364 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Whether an offense is an aggravated felony for removal purposes

is a question of law.” (citation modified)). And the agency “has no special

expertise . . . in construing state or federal criminal statutes.” Marmolejo-Campos v.

Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

Second, and relatedly, no record development is needed here. All parties agree

that Vasquez was convicted under California Penal Code § 245(a)(1), and that this

conviction was the sole basis for removal. In other words, “the evidence in the record

either supports the finding of removability or it does not.” Ruiz-Vidal v. Gonzales,

473 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Kwong, 671

F.3d 872. No additional fact finding is needed.

The other indicators are absent. The agency has yet to have the opportunity to

assess Vasquez’s removability, and is not precluded from doing so. Cf. Medina-

Lara, 771 F.3d at 1118–19 (describing the requirements for preclusion in this

context). But it is bound by our decision in Gomez. See Goulart v. Garland, 18 F.4th

653, 655 n.1 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he BIA is generally bound by our precedent in

cases arising from this circuit.”). We see little to be gained in remanding to the

agency so it can apply law that obviously leads to only one conclusion. Cf. Loper

Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024) (explaining that judges are

experts in the field of legal interpretation).

We decline to reach the other issues raised by Vasquez because doing so is

3 24-1364 unnecessary to resolve his petition.

PETITION GRANTED. WE VACATE THE ORDER OF REMOVAL

AND REMAND WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO TERMINATE

PROCEEDINGS.

4 24-1364

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Related

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Ventura
537 U.S. 12 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Chuen Piu Kwong v. Holder
671 F.3d 872 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder
558 F.3d 903 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Jose Medina-Lara v. Eric Holder, Jr.
771 F.3d 1106 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Maria Jauregui-Cardenas v. William Barr
946 F.3d 1116 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
Jose Goulart v. Merrick Garland
18 F.4th 653 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)

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Vasquez-Calix v. Blanche, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vasquez-calix-v-blanche-ca9-2026.