Vashisht-Rota v. Utah Attorney General

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: September 6, 2023
• Docket: 3:22-cv-00978
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Aparna VASHISHT-ROTA, Case No.: 22-cv-0978-AGS-KSC 4 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF 11) AND MOTION TO AMEND 5 v. (ECF 31) 6 UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 Plaintiff sued a Utah state judge and the Utah Attorney General, alleging that they 10 violated her rights in the handling of her Utah state cases. She also seeks to amend her 11 complaint to add new Utah judges and the State of Utah. The defense moves to dismiss this 12 case on a variety of grounds. 13 BACKGROUND 14 Plaintiff Dr. Aparna Vashisht-Rota has been involved in extensive litigation in both 15 Utah state court and California federal court regarding a previous business relationship she 16 and her business had with Howell Management Services. The claims for the current federal 17 lawsuit stem from two Utah state-court proceedings “over which Judge [Angela F.] 18 Fonnesbeck presided.” (ECF 1, at 2.) In the first case, Judge Fonnesbeck entered a default 19 judgment against Vashisht-Rota. (Id. at 3.) In the second, Judge Fonnesbeck “dismissed 20 with prejudice”1 and declared Vashisht-Rota a “vexatious” litigant under Utah Rules of 21 Civil Procedure. (Id.) The second case, including the “vexatious” litigant determination, 22 was appealed and affirmed. See Vashisht-Rota v. Howell Mgmt. Servs., 503 P.3d 526, 528 23

24 25 1 Although Vashisht-Rota believes that Judge Fonnesbeck dismissed the second suit with prejudice, the Utah Court of Appeals suggests that Vashisht-Rota voluntarily 26 withdrew her complaint before the trial judge’s ruling. See Vashisht-Rota v. Howell Mgmt. 27 Servs., 503 P.3d 526, 529 (Utah Ct. App. 2021) (noting her voluntary dismissal on “August 5, 2020,” predated the trial court’s “September 2, 2020” dismissal order). 28 1 (Utah Ct. App. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Vashisht-Rota v. Howell Mgt., 509 P.3d 196 2 (Utah 2022), and cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 487 (2022), reh’g denied, 143 S. Ct. 849 (2023). 3 Vashisht-Rota now sues Judge Fonnesbeck, in her individual capacity, and the Utah 4 Attorney General, in both his individual and official capacities. Vashisht-Rota claims that 5 the Utah Attorney General failed to respond to her when she wrote to him complaining 6 about “poor services, delays, and faulty orders.” (ECF 1, at 1.) Her allegations against 7 Judge Fonnesbeck are more numerous. (See ECF 1, passim.) They include: 8 • “faulty rulings,” • “delayed rulings,” 9 • “threat of legal force,” 10 • “unwarranted sanctions,” 11 • “refusal to accept established precedent,” • “misuse of discretion,” 12 • attempting to “coerce a settlement,” 13 • “discriminating” against plaintiff in her rulings, • issuing a “gag” order, 14 • “perpetrat[ing] white supremacy by being unprofessional,” 15 • “fail[ing] to provide a fair trial,” 16 • “refus[ing] to allow leave to amend freely,” and • “using [plaintiff’s] race to enslave her” by failing to order payment of claimed 17 wages. 18 (ECF 1, at 2, 3, 8, 11, 14.) Vashisht-Rota asserts that these actions violated constitutional, 19 statutory, and common-law rights under United States, California, and Utah law. (ECF 1, 20 passim.) She seeks billions of dollars2 in monetary damages and asks the Court to: 21 (1) transfer her cases “to California” and reopen them, (2) require the Utah Attorney 22 General “to search all phones and messages from Judge Fonnesbeck to all related parties 23 in that Utah lawsuit,” (3) “immediately restore Plaintiff’s statute of limitations to her 24 claims,” (4) “set up 100X the damages awarded herein to prevent future denial of fast and 25 26 27 28 1 prompt service to minorities,” and (5) mandate “bias training” for all Utah judges. (ECF 1, 2 at 17.) 3 DISCUSSION 4 Defendants move to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. Defendants argue, among 5 other things, that judicial immunity insulates Judge Fonnesbeck, the Rooker-Feldman 6 doctrine bars all claims, and this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over both defendants. 7 A. Judicial Immunity 8 “[A] judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act 9 upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” 10 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871). Accordingly, judges may not be sued in civil 11 actions for their judicial acts, “however erroneous the act may have been, and however 12 injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.” Id. Litigants who believe 13 the judicial process has wrongfully harmed them may pursue relief through the appellate 14 process; they are not entitled to sue judges for alleged mistakes in their decision making. 15 There are only two instances in which a judge will be deprived of this immunity. 16 “First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken 17 in the judge’s judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial 18 in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 19 11–12 (1991) (internal citations omitted). 20 Vashisht-Rota argues that judicial immunity does not apply both because the actions 21 were nonjudicial and because they exceeded Judge Fonnesbeck’s jurisdiction. She believes 22 that Judge Fonnesbeck’s actions were “[e]rroneous[ly] issued without jurisdiction,” 23 rendering them “nonjudicial.” (ECF 22, at 17.) She also contends that Judge Fonnesbeck 24 “acted in excess of her jurisdiction” because the “matter was governed by AAA [American 25 Arbitration Association] rules.” (Id.) Vashisht-Rota also suggests that the underlying cases 26 should have been decided in California, not Utah. 27 First, the Court considers whether Judge Fonnesbeck’s actions were judicial or 28 nonjudicial. In this determination, the court looks to “the nature of the act itself, i.e., 1 whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the 2 parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Mireles, 502 U.S. 3 at 12. Vashisht-Rota’s complaint is based on Judge Fonnesbeck’s actions and decisions 4 throughout the course of the Utah trials, including granting default judgment, ordering 5 mediation, and granting the other party relief. (ECF 1, at 3–8.) These are “function[s] 6 normally performed by a judge.” See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Further, all allegations relate 7 directly to the cases over which Judge Fonnesbeck presided, so Vashisht-Rota was 8 certainly dealing “with the judge in [her] judicial capacity.” See id. Thus, it seems that 9 Judge Fonnesbeck acted in her judicial capacity. 10 Vashisht-Rota contends, though, that Judge Fonnesbeck was improperly “acting on 11 behalf of the government” and repeatedly violating Vashisht-Rota’s rights with her rulings 12 (see, e.g., ECF 22, at 13–14)—none of which are functions normally performed by a judge. 13 But a judicial act “does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or 14 corruption of motive.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988). Nor is a judge 15 “deprived of immunity” if her actions were “in error” or were “in excess of [her] authority.” 16 Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13. So even if Vashisht-Rota’s malice allegation proved true, it would 17 not alter the analysis. Judge Fonnesbeck’s actions were judicial. 18 Second, the Court must assess whether Judge Fonnesbeck acted in the complete 19 absence of jurisdiction. For judicial-immunity purposes, “the scope of the judge’s 20 jurisdiction must be construed broadly.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). 21 Under Utah’s Constitution, the state district courts are courts of general jurisdiction. Utah 22 Const. art. VIII, §1. Thus, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution or by 23 statute, the district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal.” Utah 24 Code § 78A-5-102(1). So, Judge Fonnesbeck had jurisdiction to hear these cases. 25 Vashisht-Rota disagrees, pointing to the arbitration agreements and arguing that the 26 cases should have been heard in California. But the allegedly applicable arbitration 27 agreements do not alter a court’s jurisdiction. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 28 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008) (explaining that the Federal Arbitration Act placed “arbitration 1 agreements on equal footing with all other contracts,” but “[a]s for jurisdiction over 2 controversies touching arbitration, the Act does nothing”). And even if the underlying cases 3 should have applied California law, as Vashisht-Rota asserts, state courts routinely 4 consider conflict-of-laws questions and have jurisdiction to apply out-of-state law. See 5 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (requiring that each state’s laws “shall have the same full faith and credit 6 in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by 7 law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are 8 taken”); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 2 cmt. 3 (1971) (“Each state has its 9 own methods and rules for determining whether particular issues in a suit involving foreign 10 elements should be determined by its own local law rules or by those of another state.”). 11 So neither the existence of an arbitration agreement nor the possible implication of 12 California law affected Judge Fonnesbeck’s jurisdiction to hear the dispute. 13 All claims against Judge Fonnesbeck are barred by judicial immunity. 14 B. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 15 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction 16 over a direct appeal from a state-court decision, as well as “over the de facto equivalent of 17 such an appeal.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up); see 18 generally Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of 19 Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). In short, Rooker-Feldman “applies only when 20 the federal plaintiff both asserts as her injury legal error or errors by the state court and 21 seeks as her remedy relief from the state court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 22 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004). 23 What’s more, Rooker-Feldman bars lower federal courts from entertaining “federal 24 constitutional claims” that are “‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment.” 25 Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 26 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16). Claims are “inextricably intertwined” if “the district court 27 must hold that the state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. 28 at 1030. 1 Vashisht-Rota’s complaint seems to function as a forbidden de facto appeal. First, 2 Vashisht-Rota’s alleged legal wrongs consist entirely of decisions made during the Utah 3 cases and of failures to correct those internally. In other words, she complains of the state 4 court’s judgment and issues inextricably intertwined with it. Second, she seeks damages 5 arising from these state-court proceedings, as well as the reopening and transfer of those 6 cases to California. (See ECF 1, at 17.) So, she “seeks relief from the judgment” of a state 7 court. See Cooper, 704 F.3d at 778. Rooker-Feldman bars all such claims. 8 To avoid Rooker-Feldman’s fatal sweep, Vashisht-Rota raises two arguments. First, 9 she protests that the doctrine does not apply when the state case is on appeal. Not so. See 10 Eicherly v. O’Leary, 721 F. App’x 625, 627 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that plaintiffs “may 11 not avoid Rooker-Feldman’s bar” simply “because at least one of their cases remains 12 pending on appeal”). At any rate, the point may be moot. It appears that neither of her state 13 cases are currently pending appeal. See Aug. Educ. v. Howell Mgmt., 525 P.3d 1266 (Utah 14 2023) (denying state certiorari, with no evidence of a U.S. Supreme Court certiorari 15 petition); Vashisht-Rota v. Howell Mgmt. Servs., 143 S. Ct. 487 (2022) (denying certiorari), 16 reh’g denied, 143 S. Ct. 849 (2023). 17 Second, Vashisht-Rota insists that Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable due to arbitration 18 agreements between her business and the defendant company. But the Court has found no 19 authority—and Vashisht-Rota offers none—suggesting that arbitration agreements are 20 relevant to the Rooker-Feldman analysis. To the contrary, many courts have deployed 21 Rooker-Feldman to prevent the losing party from challenging state-court rulings 22 concerning arbitration. See, e.g., Arnold v. Melwani, 680 F. App’x 600, 603 (9th Cir. 2017) 23 (applying Rooker-Feldman to a determination of whether to enforce an arbitration award). 24 Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives this Court of subject-matter 25 jurisdiction over this dispute. 26 C. Personal Jurisdiction 27 Finally, defendants argue that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. 28 Because the preceding issues are sufficient to dispose of this case, the Court will not 1 belabor this last issue. But defendants are correct. Vashisht-Rota has not carried her 2 “burden of demonstrating that [personal] jurisdiction is appropriate.” See Schwarzenegger 3 v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 4 § 410.10 (California’s long-arm statute, coextensive with the constitutional requirements 5 of due process). “For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, 6 that defendant must have at least ‘minimum contacts’ with the relevant forum such that the 7 exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 8 justice.’” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 9 310, 316 (1945)). As relevant here, Vashisht-Rota has the burden of demonstrating specific 10 personal jurisdiction over the defendants, by satisfying this three-prong test: 11 (1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or 12 perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege 13 of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; 14

15 (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and 16

17 (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e.[,] it must be reasonable. 18

19 Id. at 802. 20 There is no evidence that any claim here arose from activities directed towards 21 California by the defendants. The claims against Judge Fonnesbeck ensued from two cases 22 assigned to her and filed in Utah, one by a Utah company and another by Vashisht-Rota 23 and her company. Similarly, the Utah Attorney General was implicated in Vashisht-Rota’s 24 claims only after she wrote him a letter that he purportedly ignored. None of that suggests 25 either of them purposefully availed themselves of California’s forums, residents, or laws. 26 Vashisht-Rota attempts to derive personal jurisdiction over the defendants from her 27 work with Howell Management Services in California. (See ECF 22, at 19–20 (“All 28 liability is due to Plaintiff’s work and conduct [in] California.”).) But Vashisht-Rota’s 1 decision to work in California does not demonstrate that either defendant purposefully 2 availed themselves of California’s benefits and laws—Judge Fonnesbeck and the Utah 3 Attorney General merely worked on (or didn’t work on) cases in Utah. Nor does Vashisht- 4 Rota’s California residency alter the analysis. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 5 (2014) (holding that the “‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts 6 with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there”); 7 Pyle v. Hatley, 239 F. Supp. 2d 970, 981 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“Issuance of an order by a 8 Nevada judge to a party who appeared before the judge is not sufficient to create personal 9 jurisdiction in this [California federal] Court over the judge . . . .”). Thus, the Court lacks 10 personal jurisdiction over both defendants.3 11 D. Leave to Amend 12 Vashisht-Rota requests leave to amend her complaint to add additional parties and 13 allegations. (See ECF 31.) In particular, she wants to add the State of Utah and seven more 14 judges—mostly current or former members of the Utah Court of Appeals who denied her 15 appeals. (See ECF 31-1, at 1.) She also wishes to add more causes of action and somewhat 16 more detail to her claims and damages calculations. (See ECF 31-1, passim.) But she does 17 not seek to change the basic character of her complaint. That is, the proposed amended 18 complaint would still focus on the defendants’ purported violation of her “right to have a 19 fair civil trial” during her two cases before Judge Fonnesbeck and the ensuing appeals. (See 20 ECF 31-1, at 3.) 21 A request to amend that requires judicial consent, like this one, should be “freely” 22 granted “as justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But the Court may deny a request 23

24 25 3 Defendants raise additional concerns about Vashisht-Rota’s complaint, arguing that: her injunctive-relief requests violate the Federal Courts Improvement Act; the Utah 26 Attorney General is eligible for Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity; Younger 27 abstention applies; and the complaint doesn’t state a claim. But given that this Court lacks subject-matter and personal jurisdiction—and that judicial immunity applies to the primary 28 1 to amend based on “futility,” among other things. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 2 (1962). “Futility of amendment is analyzed much like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss— 3 an amended complaint is futile when it would be subject to dismissal.” Pappy’s Barber 4 Shops, Inc. v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 3d 738, 739 (S.D. Cal. 2020). “Plaintiffs’ 5 motion for leave to amend should be denied if the proposed amended complaint does not 6 remedy the deficiencies that caused the Court to dismiss the original complaint.” Id. 7 That is precisely the problem here. The additional facts in Vashisht-Rota’s proposed 8 amended complaint would not change the Court’s analysis of the first two issues—judicial 9 immunity and Rooker-Feldman—in the least. (See generally ECF 31-1 (proposed amended 10 complaint).) So, the motion to amend with that new complaint is denied as futile. 11 But that ends neither the analysis nor this case. Courts should not dismiss complaints 12 by unrepresented plaintiffs, like Vashisht-Rota, without offering them at least one 13 opportunity to remedy identified defects, “unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies 14 of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 15 (9th Cir. 2012). Perhaps the defects here are incurable. After all, the defendants’ motion to 16 dismiss highlighted the shortcomings detailed above, yet Vashisht-Rota’s later proposed 17 amended complaint failed to fix them. (See ECF 11 (motion to dismiss); ECF 31-1 18 (proposed amended complaint).) But the matter is not “absolutely clear,” so the Court will 19 provide Vashisht-Rota an opportunity to attempt to cure the defects identified above. 20 CONCLUSION 21 Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion to amend the 22 complaint with her currently proffered amended complaint is DENIED. By October 4, 23 2023, plaintiff Vashisht-Rota may file a new amended complaint addressing the 24 deficiencies discussed in this order. Vashisht-Rota may not add new defendants nor new 25 causes of action to any such amended complaint; she may only add facts that address the 26 defects described above. 27 The Clerk is directed to close this case. The Clerk will postpone issuing a judgment 28 until the deadline to amend passes without an amended complaint or until Vashisht-Rota | || affirmatively notifies the Court that she will not amend. If Vashisht-Rota files an amended 2 ||complaint by the deadline, the Clerk will reopen this case. 3 Dated: September 6, 2023

5 Andrew G. Schopler United States District Judge

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