Varner v. Pretty Products, Inc.

410 A.2d 1261, 270 Pa. Super. 86, 1979 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2972

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 26, 1979
• Docket: 1455
• Status: Published

Opinions

HESTER, Judge:

This is an appeal from an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County denying appellants’ motion for a new trial.

Appellants (husband and wife) initiated an action in trespass to recover damages for injuries the wife sustained while in the employ of Mason’s Department Store in Johns-town, Pennsylvania.

Appellee is a manufacturer of automobile floor mats. In connection with their retail sale, appellee furnished unassembled racks for their display. Employees of the retailer would then assemble and load the racks. Appellant was in the process of loading a rack when it tipped over, knocking her to the floor thus causing her various injuries.

The case was tried on a strict liability theory against the manufacturer; the issue of negligence was not involved. The jury returned a defense verdict. Appellants’ post verdict motions were denied, thus this appeal.

Appellants complain that the trial judge improperly charged the jury to the effect that they could return a verdict for appellants if they found that the rack was delivered in a defective condition or was unreasonably dangerous to the user. Appellants’ theory is based on his reading of the Supreme Court decisions in Azzarello v. Black Brothers Company, Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978) and Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).

Our analysis of this case leads us to conclude that the application of the holdings in the above cases to the case sub judice, is inappropriate. Thus we affirm.

Berkebile and Azzarello both concerned situations where the trial court had defined “defective condition” by using the term “unreasonably dangerous”. The holdings in both cases enumerated the principle that a plaintiff in a products liability case does not have the burden of proving that the instrumentality causing the harm was “unreasonably dangerous”. It is necessary only to prove a defect in the design or manufacture and that such defect caused injury.

The Supreme Court in both cases, expressed concern that use of the term “unreasonably dangerous” in a charge on “defective condition” would inject principles. of negligence and thus confuse the jury.

Here, we are of the opinion that there was no comingling of principles. The trial court charged that the appellants could recover if the jury found that the rack was delivered in a defective condition or was unreasonably dangerous to the user.

Contrary to the holdings in the above cases, here the strict liability charge was kept pure of taint by the term “unreasonably dangerous”. The trial judge’s use of the term “unreasonably dangerous” clearly referred to an alternative theory of recovery.

Order of the lower court denying appellants’ motion for a new trial is affirmed.

MONTGOMERY, J., files a dissenting opinion.