Vargus v. McHugh

87 F. Supp. 3d 298, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46358, 2015 WL 1632623
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedApril 9, 2015
DocketCivil Action No. 2014-0924
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 87 F. Supp. 3d 298 (Vargus v. McHugh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vargus v. McHugh, 87 F. Supp. 3d 298, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46358, 2015 WL 1632623 (D.D.C. 2015).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Gladys Kessler, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Vargus (“Plaintiff’ or “LTC Vargus”) brings this action against Defendant Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh (“Defendant” or “the Government”) to challenge decisions of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (“ABCMR” or “the Army Correction Board”) as arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to applicable law *300 or regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706.

This matter is presently before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of the Administrative Record [Dkt. No. 10]. Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition (“Gov’t’s Opp’n”) [Dkt. No. 12], and Reply [Dkt. No. 16], the entire record herein, and for the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of the Administrative Record is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 30, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Complaint seeking review under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, of two decisions by the Army Board for Correction of Military Records. The Army Correction Board first denied the relief Plaintiff sought on February 24, 2009, and denied his request for reconsideration on September 24, 2009.

The precise factual details of Plaintiffs claims before the Army Correction Board are complex, but the essential thrust is that the United States Army failed to properly classify LTC Vargus’s area of specialization. That improper classification, according to LTC Vargus, deprived him of the 'opportunity for promotion to the rank of colonel.

On October 30, 2014, the Government filed a Motion to Dismiss (“Gov’t’s Mot. to Dismiss”), contending that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs challenge, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Government contends, among other things, that Plaintiffs request for reclassification presents a non-justicia-ble political question, that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, that Plaintiffs claim is moot, and that Plaintiff is not entitled to the particular relief he has requested. In support of its Motion to Dismiss, the Government attached several exhibits, many of which were drawn from or rely on the Administrative Record underlying the ABCMR’s proceedings.

On November 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Consent Motion for an Extension of Time to File an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 8], which the Court granted the next day.

On December 12, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Second Consent Motion to Extend Time to File [Dkt. No. 9], In this Second Consent Motion, Plaintiff stated that “a dispute ha[d] arisen over the time to produce and file the [A]dministrative [R]ecord.” Accordingly, Plaintiff would “shortly file a motion to compel production of the [A]d-ministrative [R]ecord[,]” which Defendant would oppose. Id. Plaintiff suggested that “the Court hold [Plaintiffs Opposition] to [Defendant’s] Motion to Dismiss in abeyance until 30 days, after the administrative record is filed, if the Court so rules.” Id. A copy of the Second Consent Motion was served upon counsel for Defendant. Id.

The Second Consent Motion (as its title suggests) was made with Defendant’s consent, and the Government did not indicate any objection to Plaintiffs proposal. Accordingly, the Court granted the Motion by Minute Order on December 15, 2015. By that Order, the Court held in abeyance Plaintiffs obligation to file his Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss “until 30 days after the Administrative Record is filed,” in the event the Court orders its production. Defendant has never asked this Court to reconsider its Order regarding the briefing schedule for the Motion to Dismiss.

On December 31, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Compel Production of the Administrative Record which is presently before the Court. Following requests for *301 extensions of time to file from both Parties, the Government filed its Opposition on February 3, 2015, and Plaintiff filed his Reply on March 12, 2015.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Administrative Procedure Act requires reviewing courts to “set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 706. In doing so, the APA requires courts to “review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party[.]” Id.

Some matters, like “interpreting the extent to which [a] regulation is consistent with [a] statute[,]” may be “resolved with nothing more than the statute and its legislative history.” Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 271 F.3d 262, 266 (D.C.Cir.2001). Often, jurisdictional questions may be decided without recourse to the record. See Swedish American Hosp. v. Sebelius, 691 F.Supp.2d 80, 85 (D.D.C.2010). 1

However, when courts must determine whether the “adjudicatory process was reasonable and whether the decision was consistent with Congressional intent!,]” they must look to the administrative record. Swedish American, 691 F.Supp.2d at 89. When recourse to the record is necessary, a court “should have before it neither more nor less information than did the agency when it made its decision.” See Boswell Memorial Hosp. v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 788, 792 (D.C.Cir.1984). “To review less than the full administrative record might allow a party to withhold evidence unfavorable to its case and so the APA requires review of ‘the whole record.’” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

The Government argues that the Court should deny Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of the Administrative Record because resolution of its Motion to Dismiss does not require inquiry into the full Record. In the Government’s words,

the administrative record is not needed to decide whether the Court may direct an officer’s assignment to a particular position in the Army; whether Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative reme-, dies; whether Plaintiffs claims are moot because the requested amendments to his Official Military Personnel Record (“OMPF”) have been made; or whether Plaintiff states a claim for inclusion of civilian records in his OMPF.

Gov’t’s Opp’n at 2 (internal citations omitted).

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87 F. Supp. 3d 298, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46358, 2015 WL 1632623, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vargus-v-mchugh-dcd-2015.