Vanvooren v. John E. Fogarty Memorial Hospital

321 A.2d 100, 113 R.I. 331, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1183
CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island
DecidedJune 18, 1974
Docket73-46-A
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 321 A.2d 100 (Vanvooren v. John E. Fogarty Memorial Hospital) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vanvooren v. John E. Fogarty Memorial Hospital, 321 A.2d 100, 113 R.I. 331, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1183 (R.I. 1974).

Opinion

Doris, J.

This is a civil action seeking equitable'relief *332 and money damages. The plaintiff, Georges Vanvooren, alleges that fuel oil from adjoining land owned by John E. Fogarty Memorial Hospital, one of the defendants, had seeped through and penetrated into a well on his land, thereby contaminating his water supply. The complaint alleges negligence by the defendants. The case was tried before a jury in the Superior Court, and, at the close ■of the plaintiff’s case, the defendants moved for a directed verdict. The motions were granted by the trial justice and the plaintiff has appealed to this court from the judgments which were thereafter entered.

The record discloses that plaintiff is the owner of land and buildings, which he purchased in 1938, located on Eddie Dowling Highway in the town of North Smithfield. John E. Fogarty Memorial Hospital, (the hospital) one of defendants, is the owner of property immediately adjoining that of plaintiff. That property, which shall hereinafter be referred to as the “Dugas property,” was purchased by the hospital in 1966. In 1941, plaintiff engaged A. & W. Artesian Well Co. to drill a well on his property. When the drilling was completed, the well produced potable water and has since been the sole water supply for plaintiff’s property.

Vanvooren testified that from 1941 until November 1967, when he departed on a vacation trip, the water produced by the well was potable and adequately provided for his needs. He further testified that in May 1968, when he returned from his vacation trip, the water from the well had an unusual odor and color which he described as like oil or kerosene, and was not fit to drink. The plaintiff related that in December 1969, he brought water samples from the well to the Lapuck Laboratories in Waltham, Massachusetts, for analysis and a report. Vanvooren stated that sometime in 1969, he complained to the administrator of the • hospital about the water con *333 tamination, but nothing was done by the hospital about the complaint.

Norman Croteau, maintenance superintendent of the hospital from 1965 to the end of 1968, testified that in October or November 1967, he was called by the occupants of the Dugas property to investigate the presence of oil fumes in the building on the premises. He stated that he could smell oil fumes some distance from the building, and upon investigation observed a puddle of oil on the cellar floor and discovered an oil leak at the fire gun of the furnace which was located in the cellar. He thereupon reported his findings to the hospital administrator, who directed him to call defendant, Martel Oil Co., Inc., (Martel), and “have it straightened out.” He related that Martel sent to the Dugas property one of its maintenance men, who, after viewing the problem, came to Croteau's office at the hospital and advised him that Martel would repair the leak, but that the hospital would be required to break the cement and excavate the earth around the oil pipeline. Croteau stated that the maintenance crew of the hospital, acting under his orders, used an electric hammer to break a 16-inch hole in the cement and excavated the soil from around the pipe to expose the leak. He related that after the cement was broken, he observed that the earth under the cement was saturated with oil and that the oil line was broken. The broken oil line was repaired by Martel, and thereafter the hospital maintenance crew replaced- the saturated soil and patched the -cement floor. Croteau related that the -leak was repaired, the .soil replaced, and the cement floor patched, all within two or three days after the hospital received the complaint from the occupants of the Dugas property. Croteau stated that after the leak was repaired he continued to receive complaints about oil fumes from the occupants of the Dugas property, but that he did nothing further about *334 it. He also stated that he never notified any of the neighbors of the oil leak or discussed the leak with plaintiff.

Victor Brodeur, a repair and installation man employed by A. & W. Artesian Well Co., testified that in December 1969, at the direction of Vanvooren, he took some water samples from plaintiff’s well which contained a black substance with an oily odor.

Jack L. Lapuck, owner of a testing and counseling laboratory, testified that in January 1970, plaintiff brought water samples to the laboratory for testing. Lapuck stated that upon analysis the samples were found to contain fuel oil.

The plaintiff in his appeal initially contends that the trial justice erred when he granted the motions for a directed verdict for each defendant. It is well settled that in reviewing the grant of a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, this court, like the trial court, is bound to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff without weighing it or assessing the credibility of the witnesses, to give plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences flowing from the evidence, and to leave to the jury the determination of any inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony adduced by plaintiff. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R. I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972); Enos v. W. T. Grant Co., 110 R. I. 523, 294 A.2d 201 (1972); Maggi v. DeFusco, 107 R. I. 278, 267 A.2d 424 (1970). With these principles to guide us, we consider the correctness of the trial justice’s decision in granting the motion for a directed verdict in favor of each defendant.

MARTEL OIL CO., INC.

In his decision the trial justice stated that “Negligence implies fault, and there is no evidence before the jury from which they could draw any inference on the fault

*335 of Martel Oil Company.” The plaintiff disagrees and argues that there was evidence on which the jury could find that defendant, Martel, was negligent. He points to the testimony that Martel’s maintenance man, responding to the call from the hospital, undertook to and did repair the leak in the oil line. The plaintiff argues that it then became the maintenance man’s duty as a reasonable person to replace the soil that was saturated with oil, and his failure to do so was evidence on which the jury could find him guilty of negligence. To avoid liability for negligence one must act as a reasonably prudent man would under the circumstances. Union Pac. Ry. v. McDonald, 152 U.S. 262, 14 S.Ct. 619, 38 L.Ed. 434 (1894); Federal Ins. Co. v. Herreshoff Mfg. Co., 6 F.Supp. 827 (D.R.I. 1934). The plaintiff, however, overlooks the fact that before liability attaches there must be a showing that defendant owed a -duty to plaintiff.

The defendant, Martel Oil Co., Inc., was engaged by defendant, Fogarty Memorial Hospital, to deliver oil to the Dugas property. There is no evidence that Martel in any way allowed or caused oil to overflow on the ground outside the house on the premises.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Konar v. PFL Life Insurance
840 A.2d 1115 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 2004)
White v. Tilcon Gammino, Inc., 88-0618 (1992)
Superior Court of Rhode Island, 1992

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
321 A.2d 100, 113 R.I. 331, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1183, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vanvooren-v-john-e-fogarty-memorial-hospital-ri-1974.