Vanshpreet Singh v. Christopher Chestnut, et al.

Opinion

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9

10 VANSHPREET SINGH, Case No. 1:25-cv-01501-EPG-HC

11 Petitioner, ORDER DISCHARGING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 12 v. ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT 13 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al.,1 OF HABEAS CORPUS, DENYING RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, 14 Respondents. DIRECTING RESPONDENTS TO IMMEDIATELY RELEASE PETITIONER, 15 AND DIRECTING RESPONDENTS TO FILE STATUS REPORT 16 (ECF Nos. 1, 13, 14) 17 18 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is an immigration detainee proceeding with a petition 19 for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The parties have consented to the 20 jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF Nos. 10–12.) For the reasons stated herein, 21 the Court grants the petition for writ of habeas corpus and orders Petitioner’s immediate release. 22 1 Respondents argue that the “Court should dismiss all respondents other than the Facility Administrator 23 of the California City Correctional Facility because the only proper respondent to a habeas petition is the custodian having immediate custody of the petitioner.” (ECF No. 13 at 1 n.1.) “[L]ongstanding practice 24 confirms that in habeas challenges to present physical confinement—‘core challenges’—the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held . . . .” Rumsfeld 25 v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). The Ninth Circuit has “affirm[ed] the application of the immediate custodian and district of confinement rules to core habeas petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 26 including those filed by immigrant detainees.” Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 2024). Although Doe held that “Padilla set forth a clear rule requiring core habeas petitioners challenging their present physical confinement to name their immediate custodian, the warden of the facility where they are 27 detained, as the respondent to their petition,” 109 F.4th at 1197, Doe did not necessarily preclude naming more than one respondent so long as the immediate custodian is named. Given that Petitioner has named 1 I. 2 BACKGROUND 3 Petitioner is a citizen of India. (ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 13-1 at 2.2) On July 21, 2024, 4 Petitioner entered the United States through Montreal, Canada, and was encountered by United 5 States Border Patrol agents in Moores, New York. (Id.) Petitioner was detained for three to four 6 hours, was issued a notice to appear (“NTA”), and was released on his own recognizance due to 7 a lack of bed space. (ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 13-1 at 2, 6, 9–11.) Petitioner was served with a 8 Form I-220A, Order of Release on Recognizance, which informed him of the conditions of his 9 release. (ECF No. 13-1 at 2, 13.) 10 On August 20, 2024, Petitioner filed his asylum application, which is pending before the 11 immigration court. (ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 13-1 at 2.) An immigration court hearing is 12 currently set for February 6, 2026. (ECF No. 13-1 at 2.) 13 Petitioner’s first check-in with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 14 occurred on August 5, 2024. He fully complied with ICE requirements and provided his address, 15 and they informed him that his next check-in date would be on August 5, 2025. On August 5, 16 2025, ICE officers put Petitioner on GPS monitoring and informed Petitioner that they were 17 going to visit his house. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) It appears that at that time, Petitioner was enrolled in 18 the Alternative to Detention, Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (“ATD-ISAP”). (ECF 19 No. 13-1 at 2.) 20 Petitioner resided with his uncle and aunt in Sacramento, California. After Petitioner 21 returned home on August 5, 2025, Petitioner’s relatives became uncomfortable because he had 22 been placed on GPS, and an argument ensued when they found out ICE was going to visit the 23 house. They informed Petitioner that he couldn’t reside with them any longer and told him to 24 leave. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) As it was nighttime, Petitioner called a friend within the same 25 jurisdiction and his friend allowed Petitioner to stay with him. Petitioner intended to go to the 26 ICE office the next morning, August 6, 2025, to inform them of the change of address. However, 27 1 before Petitioner could go to the office, an ICE officer called Petitioner and Petitioner informed 2 the officer of what had happened. The petition alleges that the officer indicated that it was okay 3 and informed Petitioner that he just needed to come into the office and update his address. (ECF 4 No. 1 at 2–3.) Petitioner immediately went to his attorney and updated his address with the court 5 by filling out the Form E-33, Change of Address. Petitioner then immediately took the form to 6 the ICE office and submitted the form. (Id. at 3.) 7 On August 12, 2025, ICE contacted Petitioner to come into the office. When Petitioner 8 reached the office, he was apprehended and notified that it was due to a GPS violation of not 9 being at his registered house on August 6, 2025. (ECF No. 1 at 3; ECF No. 13-1 at 2.) Petitioner 10 was very confused and informed the agents of the situation again, that he had already updated the 11 officer and the ICE office through proper legal channels. Petitioner was held in a holding cell 12 until August 14, 2025. On the evening of August 14, Petitioner was transferred to the California 13 City Correctional Facility. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) 14 On November 5, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus and a 15 motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On November 7, 2025, the 16 Court denied the motion for TRO as untimely. (ECF No. 5.) Respondents have filed a motion to 17 dismiss, and Petitioner has filed an opposition. (ECF Nos. 13, 15.) 18 II. 19 DISCUSSION 20 A. Order to Show Cause 21 On December 10, 2025, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition. (ECF No. 22 13.) Per the Court’s November 10, 2025 scheduling order, “[i]f Respondent files a Motion to 23 Dismiss, Petitioner SHALL FILE an Opposition or Statement of Non-Opposition within 24 FOURTEEN (14) days of the date of service of Respondent’s Motion.” (ECF No. 6 at 2.) As no 25 opposition or statement of non-opposition had been filed by the deadline, on December 29, 2025, 26 the Court ordered Petitioner to file an opposition or statement of non-opposition by January 7, 27 2026, and ordered counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for failure to 1 On December 31, 2025, Petitioner filed his response to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 2 15.) Therein, counsel requests that the Court not impose sanctions and states: 3 Counsel candidly acknowledges that the deadline set by the Court was missed due to counsel’s oversight. Specifically, counsel 4 mistakenly reviewed only the docket text and missed that there was a full order and failed to open and review the full written order 5 entered on ECF, which contained the briefing deadline. This was counsel’s error, and counsel accepts full responsibility for the 6 mistake. 7 (ECF No. 15 at 12.) 8 The Court declines to impose sanctions and discharges the December 29, 2025 order to 9 show cause. 10 B. Procedural Due Process 11 In his second claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that as “part of the liberty protected by 12 the Due Process Clause, Petitioner has a weighty liberty interest in avoiding re-incarceration 13 after his release.” (ECF No. 1 at 17.) Petitioner contends that his “re-detention without a pre- 14 deprivation hearing violated due process. Nearly two years after deciding to release Petitioner 15 from custody on his own recognizance, Respondents re-detained Petitioner with no notice, no 16 explanation of the justification of his re-detention, and no opportunity to contest his re-detention 17 before a neutral adjudicator before being taken into custody.” (Id.) 18 “We examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there 19 exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second 20 examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally 21 sufficient.” Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (internal citations 22 omitted). 23 1. Liberty Interest 24 Respondents argue that “Petitioner has ‘only those rights regarding admission that 25 Congress has provided by statute.’ That is, Petitioner is entitled only to the protections set forth 26 by statute and ‘the Due Process Clause provides nothing more.’” (ECF No. 13 at 23 (quoting 27 DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020)).) In support of this position, Respondents rely 1 U.S. 206 (1953), United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), and 2 Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103. These cases addressed due process rights with respect to 3 admission, as evidenced by the language from these cases quoted by Respondents. Here, 4 however, Petitioner is not raising claims regarding the admission process. See Padilla v. U.S. 5 Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1171 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“Defendants ask the 6 Court to extract from Thuraissigiam a broad rule that any inadmissible noncitizen possesses only 7 those due process rights afforded to them by statute, regardless of the nature of their status or the 8 relief they seek. But such a conclusion is untethered to the claim in Thuraissigiam and the 9 Court’s reasoning. Thuraissigiam’s discussion of due process is necessarily constrained to 10 challenges to admissibility to the United States.”), appeal filed, No. 24-2801 (9th Cir. argued 11 May 21, 2025); J.E.H.G. v. Chesnut, No. 1:25-cv-01673-JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3523108, at *10 12 n.10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) (rejecting similar government argument); Carmen G.C. v. Robbins, 13 No. 1:25-cv-01648-KES-HBK (HC), 2025 WL 3521304, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025) 14 (rejecting similar government argument). 15 “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including 16 aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. 17 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, 18 detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause 19 protects.” Id. at 690. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court addressed 20 whether due process requires a parolee be afforded some opportunity to be heard prior to 21 revocation of parole. 408 U.S. at 472. In examining “the nature of the interest of the parolee in 22 his continued liberty,” the Supreme Court stated: 23 The liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open to persons who have never been convicted of any crime. The 24 parolee has been released from prison based on an evaluation that he shows reasonable promise of being able to return to society and 25 function as a responsible, self-reliant person. Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free 26 to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life. Though the State properly subjects him 27 to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison. . . . The 1 parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions. 2 3 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. The Supreme Court found “that the liberty of a parolee, although 4 indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts 5 a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others” and held that “the liberty is valuable and 6 must be seen as within the protection of” due process. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. 7 Relying on Morrissey, courts in this district have consistently held that noncitizens who 8 have been released from immigration custody pending civil removal proceedings have a 9 protected liberty interest in remaining out of immigration custody. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 787 10 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025); J.A.E.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01380-KES-HBK 11 (HC), 2025 WL 3013377, at *3–6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); J.C.L.A. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv- 12 01310-KES-EPG (HC), 2025 WL 2959250, at *3–5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025); Qazi v. Albarran, 13 No. 2:25-cv-02791-TLN-CSK, 2025 WL 3033713, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); Martinez 14 Hernandez v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *10 (E.D. Cal. 15 Aug. 28, 2025); Yang v. Kaiser, No. 2:25-cv-02205-DAD-AC (HC), 2025 WL 2791778, at *8 16 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025); Maklad v. Murray, No. 1:25-cv-00946 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2299376, 17 at *7–8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2025). Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner has a protected 18 liberty interest in remaining out of immigration custody. 19 2. Mathews Test 20 In Mathews, the Supreme Court held that “identification of the specific dictates of due 21 process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”: 22 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through 23 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 24 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 25 requirements would entail. 26 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. 27 Respondents contend that the “Supreme Court, however, has never used this balancing test to divine the due-process requirements for immigration detention,” citing Rodriguez Diaz v. 1 Garland, 53 F.4th at 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022); id. at 1214 (Bumatay, J., concurring). (ECF No. 2 13 at 19.) However, in Rodriguez Diaz, which concerned a noncitizen detained pursuant to 8 3 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and whether “continued detention was unconstitutional because under the Due 4 Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, he is entitled to a second bond hearing at which the 5 government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence,” the panel majority 6 “assume[d] without deciding” that the Mathews test applied, noting that the Ninth Circuit has 7 “regularly applied Mathews to due process challenges to removal proceedings,” and finding 8 “Mathews remains a flexible test that can and must account for the heightened governmental 9 interest in the immigration detention context.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1193, 1206. 10 Similarly, the dissent “agree[d] that the test developed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 11 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), is the appropriate legal framework to determine whether there 12 was a due process violation.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1219 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting). See 13 Rocha Chavarria v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01755-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 3533606, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 14 Dec. 9, 2025) (“Many district courts in the Ninth Circuit have found that non-citizens paroled 15 into the United States pursuant to § 1182(d)(5) have a liberty interest in their continued release, 16 entitling them to certain due process protections, the extent of which are determined by applying 17 the test provided in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).”); J.E.H.G., 2025 WL 18 3523108, at *10–11 (finding “liberty interest created by the fact that the Petitioner in this case 19 was released on recognizance” and “[t]hus, the Court must evaluate the three-part test set forth in 20 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-335 (1976), to determine whether the procedures (or 21 lack thereof) that have been applied to Petitioner are sufficient to protect the liberty interest at 22 issue”). Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Mathews test is appropriate in this 23 instance. 24 With respect to the first factor, the Court finds that the private interest at issue is 25 fundamental. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that it “is beyond dispute” an immigration 26 detainee’s “private interest at issue here is ‘fundamental’: freedom from imprisonment is at the 27 ‘core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 1 With respect to the second factor, “‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is 2 high’ where, as here, ‘[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody redetermination 3 hearing.’” J.A.E.M., 2025 WL 3013377, at *7 (alterations in original) (quoting A.E. v. Andrews, 4 No. 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 871334, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2025)). “Civil 5 immigration detention, which is ‘nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]’ is justified when a 6 noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.” Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25- 7 cv-01471-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 3254999, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (alteration in 8 original) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). Petitioner’s release on recognizance necessarily 9 required a determination that he posed neither a flight risk nor a danger. Rocha Chavarria, 2025 10 WL 3533606, at *4 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b); Noori v. Larose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 11 2025 WL 2800149, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025)); Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 12 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“The federal government sometimes releases noncitizens on bond or 13 parole while their removal proceedings are pending. Release reflects a determination by the 14 government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”), aff’d sub 15 nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). Respondents do not argue that 16 Petitioner is now a flight risk or a danger to the community. “[A]s there have been no procedural 17 safeguards to determine if petitioner’s re-detention is justified, ‘the probable value of additional 18 procedural safeguards, i.e., a bond hearing, is high.’” Sharan S., 2025 WL 3167826, at *10 19 (quoting A.E., 2025 WL 1424382, at *5). 20 With respect to the third and final factor, “although the government has a strong interest 21 in enforcing the immigration laws, the government’s interest in detaining petitioner without a 22 hearing is ‘low.’” J.A.E.M., 2025 WL 3013377, at *7 (citing Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 23 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094). See Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22- 24 cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2022) (“Although the Government 25 has a strong interest in enforcing the immigration laws and in ensuring that lawfully issued 26 removal orders are promptly executed, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without 27 providing an individualized bond hearing is low.”). Courts generally have found that the cost of 1 Court demonstrating that providing Petitioner with a pre-deprivation hearing would be fiscally or 2 administratively burdensome. See J.A.E.M., 2025 WL 3013377, at *7 (“In immigration court, 3 custody hearings are routine and impose a ‘minimal’ cost.” (citing Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 4 1094)). 5 On balance, the Mathews factors show that Petitioner is entitled to notice and a bond 6 hearing and “[t]hat hearing should have occurred before petitioner was re-detained.” Carmen 7 G.C. v. Robbins, No. 1:25-cv-01648-KES-HBK (HC), 2025 WL 3521304, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8 8, 2025). 9 “‘[T]he root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause” is “‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is 10 deprived of any significant protected interest.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Boddie v. 11 Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)); see Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127 (“Applying [the Mathews] test, the Court usually has held that 12 the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty ....”). Courts typically require evidence 13 of urgent concerns or an especially strong government interest to justify a post-deprivation hearing. See Guillermo M. R., 2025 WL 14 1983677, at *9; United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53, 59–61 (1993) (“We tolerate some exceptions to 15 the general rule requiring predeprivation notice and hearing, but only in extraordinary situations where some valid governmental 16 interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event[,]” such as “executive urgency.” (internal quotations 17 omitted)). 18 Carmen G.C., 2025 WL 3521304, at *7. 19 At such a pre-deprivation hearing, the government bears the burden of proving by clear 20 and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk such that re- 21 detention is warranted. See Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 784–86 (9th Cir. 2024) (confirming 22 that the government bears the “clear-and-convincing burden of proof” at an immigration bond 23 hearing ordered pursuant to the Due Process Clause); Carmen G.C., 2025 WL 3521304, at *7 24 (“On balance, the Mathews factors show that petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing where the 25 government must prove that she is a flight risk or danger to the community by clear and 26 convincing evidence.”); J.E.H.G. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01673-JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3523108, 27 at *14 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) (“[T]he immigrant’s initial release reflected a determination by 1 the government that initiated re-detention, it follows that the government should be required to 2 bear the burden of providing a justification for the re-detention.”). “Moreover, several courts 3 have explicitly discussed the discretionary nature of revocation of parole under § 1226, and held 4 that despite such discretion, changed circumstances are necessary in order to revoke parole under 5 § 1226.” Tenorio Rugama v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-1918 AC, 2025 WL 3707234, at *4 (E.D. 6 Cal. Dec. 22, 2025) (collecting cases).3 7 C. Appropriate Relief 8 Courts in this district have taken differing approaches to the relief granted to petitioners 9 who have been released, subsequently re-detained, and denied bond hearings in violation of due 10 process. In some cases, the immediate release of the petitioner has been ordered. See, e.g., 11 Yurani Hortua v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01670-TLN-JDP, 2025 WL 3525916 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 12 2025) (ordering immediate release of petitioner who had been released from immigration 13 detention on parole, was arrested for theft but the case was resolved with community service and 14 did not result in a conviction, and was re-detained at a routine six-month check-in); Carmen 15 G.C., 2025 WL 3521304 (ordering immediate release of petitioner who allegedly violated 16 reporting requirements four times); Rocha Chavarria, 2025 WL 3533606 (ordering immediate 17 release of petitioner who allegedly “incurred compliance violations” that were not identified and 18 where respondents did not suggest the alleged violations were the reason for petitioner’s re- 19 detention). 20 In other cases, bond hearings have been ordered rather than immediate release. See, e.g., 21 J.E.H.G., 2025 WL 3523108 (ordering bond hearing for petitioner who allegedly violated 22 reporting requirements numerous times and was re-detained based on said violations); Paz 23 Aguilera, 2025 WL 3485016 (ordering bond hearing for petitioner who allegedly violated 24 reporting requirements one time and was re-detained based on said violation); Sharan S., 2025 25 WL 3167826 (ordering bond hearing for petitioner who allegedly violated reporting 26 requirements eight times).

27 3 In light of the Court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s re-detention without notice and a bond hearing violates procedural due process, the Court declines to address Petitioner’s first claim for relief regarding 1 Here, Respondents state that “Petitioner was taken into custody for violating his ATD- 2 ISAP residence verification requirement.” (ECF No. 13 at 6; ECF No. 13-1 at 2.) However, as 3 set forth in section I, supra, Petitioner was kicked out of his relatives’ house the night of August 4 5, 2025. On August 6, 2025, an ICE officer called Petitioner and Petitioner informed the officer 5 of what had happened. Petitioner immediately went to his attorney and updated his address with 6 the court by filling out the Form E-33, Change of Address. Petitioner then immediately took the 7 form to the ICE office and submitted the form. (ECF No. 1 at 2–3.) Respondents do not contend 8 that Petitioner is a danger or flight risk based on this alleged violation. Accordingly, the Court 9 finds that Petitioner’s immediate release is the appropriate remedy in this case. 10 III. 11 ORDER 12 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that: 13 1. The order to show cause issued on December 29, 2025 (ECF No. 14) is DISCHARGED. 14 2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED on Petitioner’s second claim for 15 relief. 16 3. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 13) is DENIED. 17 4. Respondents SHALL IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner Vanshpreet Singh from 18 custody with the same conditions he was subject to immediately prior to his detention on 19 August 12, 2025. 20 5. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining Petitioner absent 21 compliance with constitutional protections, which include, at a minimum, pre-deprivation 22 notice—describing the change of circumstances necessitating his arrest and detention— 23 and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. At any such hearing, the 24 government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that 25 Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight, and Petitioner shall be 26 allowed to have counsel present. 27 /// 1 6. On or before Tuesday, January 20, 2026, Respondents SHALL FILE a status report 2 confirming that Petitioner has been released from custody. 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 Dated: _ January 16, 2026 [sf Pe heey 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28