Vann v. Union Central Life Ins. Co.

1920 OK 243, 191 P. 175, 79 Okla. 17, 1920 Okla. LEXIS 8
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedJune 29, 1920
Docket9836
StatusPublished
Cited by36 cases

This text of 1920 OK 243 (Vann v. Union Central Life Ins. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vann v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 1920 OK 243, 191 P. 175, 79 Okla. 17, 1920 Okla. LEXIS 8 (Okla. 1920).

Opinion

RAMSEY, J.

On March 26, 1918, William Vann and Lovey Vann, as plaintiffs in error, filed their petition in -error in this court against the defendants in error, Union Central Life Insurance Company and others, wherein they allege that a judgment by default was entered against them in favor of-defendants in error on February 8, 1917, in the district court of Nowata county, foreclosing a real estate mortgage; that thereafter and on August 4, 1917, plaintiffs in error filed a motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment and gave notice to the adverse parties, as required by section 5268, Rev. Laws 1910; also that they objected to the confirmation of the sale of the land, which objection was overruled and the sale confirmed. They also claim that the trial court overruled their motion to vacate the judgment, and they come to this court with their petition in error, attaching thereto what purports to be a transcript of the record.

1. The purported transcript of the record shows that plaintiffs in error did file a mo tion to vacate the judgment for want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action. The defendants in error have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. In the brief of counsel for plaintiffs in error, it is insisted that the motion to vacate the judgment was filed under the authority of sections 5267 to 52 Í4, inclusive, Rev. Laws 1910. Of course, if the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action and that is disclosed by an inspection of the judgment roll, the judgment is void on its face and may be vacated* at any time on motion. Pettis v. Johnston (decided June 1, 1920), 78 Okla. 277. An order of the court overruling a motion to vacate a judgment on' the ground that it is void on its face, is a final order, to reverse which a proceeding in error may he prosecuted in this court under the provisions of sections 5236 and 5237, Rev. Laws 1910. To hold otherwise is to make the trial court the court of last resort in an attack on a judgment by a method expressly provided by statute' for testing its validity. It is an order affecting a substantial right. It is not an interlocutory order. It is final. As said by Lord Alverstone, G. J., speaking for the English Court of Appeals “The test as to whether an order should be considered final or interlocutory is this: If the order finally disposes of the rights of the parties, it ought to be treated as final; if, on the other hand, further proceedings are necessitated, it ought to be treated as interlocutory.” 2 Standard Proc. 166. When the court overrules the motion to vacate, that settles the matter and “no further proceedings are necessitated.” While an order vacating a judgment for the purpose of permitting a party against whom the judgment is rendered to prosecute or defend is interlocutory (Moody & Co. v. Freeman & Williams, 24 Okla. 701; Maddle v. Beavers, 24 Okla. 703; Town of Byars v. Sprouls, 24 Okla. 299; Moody & Co. v. Free *19 man-Sipes Co., 29 Okla. 390; Smith v. Whitlow, 31 Okla. 758), because further proceedings are necessitated in the trial court,- an order overruling the motion to vacate is final, and, as it affects a substantial right, an appeal therefrom lies to this court. This court in Wesley v. Diamond, 26 Okla. 170, 109 Pac. 524. after reviewing the authorities, said “that the correct rule to he observed is that an appeal will lie to this court under the statute quoted prior to final judgment whenever the order which is made involves the merits of the action or any part thereof.” A motion to vacate filed under the statute is an attack upon the validity of the judgment, and the order of the court, either overruling the motion or vacating the judgment on the ground that it is void on its face, is a final order and judgment involving the merits of the action. See Wauchope v. McCormick, 158 Mo. 660, 59 S. W. 970. The motion to vacate is a statutory substitute (although not exclusive) for a bill in equity, and no one would claim that a judgment of the court in equity, denying or granting plaintiff relief, was not appealable. Stevirmac Oil & Gas Co. v. Dittmann, 245 U. S. 210. The weight of authority holds that an appeal lies from a judgment void on its face. 2 Standard Proc. 150; Baker v. Newton, 22 Okla. 658. If the invalidity of the judgment appears from an inspection of the judgment roll, that question may be first raised in this court, although no exceptions were taken thereto in the trial court; International Harvester Co. v. Cameron, 25 Okla. 256; Cafrey v. Overholser, 8 Okla. 202; Goodwin v. Bickford. 20 Okla. 91, 129 Am. St. Rep. 729; Kellogg v. School District. 13 Okla. 285.

2.Plaintiffs in error also assign as error the court’s action in overruling their objections to the confirmation of the sheriff’s sale. If the objections to the confirmation are based on matters which should be insisted upon as grounds for vacating the judgment under which the sale is made, then the. remedy is a motion to vacate the judgment. If there was fraud or irregularities in the sale and the facts to prove the same are presented to the court and the court overrules the objections based thereon and confirms the sale, then an appeal may be prosecuted from the order of confirmation. The assault on the order of confirmation, in order to present matters reviewable by this court, must be based on matters distinct from errors in rendering the judgment under which the sale is ordered. That an order confirming a sheriff’s sale over objections and exceptions based upon matters arising subsequent to the rendition of the order of sale may be appealed from, see Morrison v. Burnett, 154 Fed. 617; Dakota Investment Co. v. Sullivan, 9 N. D. 303, 81 Am. St. Rep. 584; Wauchope v. McCirmick, 158 Mo. 660, 59 S. W. 970; State Nat. Bank v. Neel (Ark.) 122 Am. St. Rep. 185; Hammond v. Cailleand, 111 Cal. 206, 52 Am. St. Rep. 167.

3. There is no case-made attached to the petition in error, but there is a transcript of the record duly certified to by the clerk. The motion to vacate the judgment is not a part of the judgment roll as defined by section 5146, .Rev. Laws 1910. The motion to vacate and set aside the judgment and the order of the court thereon are not parts of the record unless they are brought into the same by a bill of exceptions or case-made. Devault v. Merchants’ Exch. Co., 22 Okla. 624. Neither are the objections and exceptions to the order confirming the sheriff’s sale any part of the record proper, and they must be made such by bill of exceptions or case-made.

4. There are two ways of bringing a record to this court on petition in error: (a) The party dissatisfied with the judgment may attach to his petition in error a case-made, as provided by the statutes. The case-made, under Section 5242, Rev. Laws, 1910, as amended by the act approved March 21, 1917, containing statements of the exceptions shall have the same effect as if the exceptions had been reduced to writing, allowed, and signed by the judge at the time they were made. Therefore, when the petition in error has attached thereto a case-made, as provided by the statutes, there is no necessity for a bill of exceptions, (b) The party appealing may attach to his petition in error a transcript of the record, and if the plaintiff in error desires to bring to this court any part of the record other than the pleadings, the pro cess, the return, reports, verdicts, orders,^and judgments, as provided for in section 5146, Rev. Laws 1910, he should incorporate the same into the record by a bill of exceptions. Sections 5026 to 5032, inclusive, indicate what may be incorporated into a bill of exceptions.

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Bluebook (online)
1920 OK 243, 191 P. 175, 79 Okla. 17, 1920 Okla. LEXIS 8, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vann-v-union-central-life-ins-co-okla-1920.