Vandenburgh v. Truscon Steel Co.

277 F. 345, 1922 U.S. App. LEXIS 1741
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit·Decided January 9, 1922·No. No. 3587·Published·Cited by 13 cases

Opinion

KNAPPEN, Circuit Judge.

Suit for infringement of claims 1 and 3 of reissued patent No. 14,182 (August 15, 1916), to Vandenburgh. The original patent, No. 841,741, was issued January 22, 1907. The application for reissue was filed July 1, 1916. The invention relates generally to reinforced concrete construction. Its prominently stated specific object is to “provide a reinforcing bar with one or more spirally disposed coils secured to the bar, so as to provide an extended area of contact adapted to resist strain longitudinally and laterally on the bar, and to form a truss within the body of concrete,” etc. As a preferred means of securing the coils to the bar the specification discloses “a series of kerfs in one face of the bar inclined away from the center of the bar toward the opposite ends thereof,” the coils being “seated within these kerfs and held therein by means of the integral spurs, [346] which are forced downward upon the coils when inserted and permanently retain them in position.” The specifications, considered in connection with the drawings, plainly show an integral spur overlapping the kerf, which when forced downward upon the coils holds them rigidly in position. Claims 1 and 3 read as follows:

“1. A concrete reinforcing consisting of a bar having a plurality of integral spurs and a spiral coil permanently secured thereto, by having the spurs bent down on the several coils, the coils extending beyond and free of the bar at the opposite side therefrom to the securing point.”
“3. A reinforcing bar provided upon one edge with a series of kerfs each having an integral overlapping spur, and a coil disposed in said kerfs, each convolution thereof being retained beneath one of said spurs.”

The defenses are invalidity of the reissue, lack of invention, and noninfringement. The .District Court held claim 1 invalid as too broad, and claim 3 void for lack of patentable novelty, if construed broadly enough to embrace defendant’s structure. The appeal is from a decree dismissing the bill.

[1] The District Court was plainly right in holding claim 1 invalid. As will later appear, the only novelty in plaintiff’s conception is in the specific method of attaching the coils to the bar by kerfs therein and integral spurs rigidly securing the coils within the kerfs. The claims of the original patent, which were replaced by claims 1 and 2 of the reissue, in terms call for a rigid fastening. The omission of the requirement of rigidity in claims 1 and 2 was apparently intended to cover the feature of collapsibility found in later devices. Claim 1 of the reissue is thus unwarrantably broad. The same conclusion has been reached by the Circuit Courts of Appeals of both the Second1 and Third 2 Circuits. Claim 3 of the reissue differs from the third claim of the original patent only in the substitution in the reissue of the word “edge” for the word “end” in the original. This is plainly merely a correction of a clerical error. It thus becomes unnecessary to give further consideration to the question of the validity of the reissue.

[2] The real date of plaintiff’s invention is more of less material in determining what is prior art as related to invention. Plaintiff’s original application was filed May 9, 1906. He attempted to carry the actual date of his invention back to 1903, and offered some testimony tending to show such earlier invention date. The trial judge held the testimony not sufficient to establish such earlier date. We cannot disturb this conclusion. The evidence consisted solely of the oral testimony of plaintiff and another witness, taken in open court. Under well-settled rules, the burden rested heavily upon plaintiff to establish the fact of the asserted earlier date of invention to the satisfaction of the court—whether or not such satisfaction is required to be beyond a reasonable doubt. St. Paul Plow Works v. Starling, 140 U. S., 184, 198, 11 Sup. Ct. 803, 35 L. Ed. 404; Clark Co. v. Willimantic Co., 140 U. S. 481, 492, 11 Sup. Ct. 846, 35 L. Ed. 521; Moline v. Rock [347] Island (C. C. A. 7) 212 Fed. 727, 732, 129 C. C. A. 337; Barber v. Otis (C. C. A. 2) 271 Fed. 171, 180. The question presented was one of fact only, depending upon the weight to be given this oral testimony, and the trial court’s conclusion thereon must be accepted here, unless the evidence decidedly preponderates against it. Pugh v. Snodgrass (C. C. A. 6) 209 Fed. 325. Assuming that we are at liberty, upon this record,3 to consider this testimony, it is enough to say that the evidence does not preponderate against the conclusion of the trial judge.

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Vandenburgh v. Truscon Steel Co., 277 F. 345, 1922 U.S. App. LEXIS 1741 (6th Cir. 1922).

277 F. 345 (Vandenburgh v. Truscon Steel Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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