Vandenberg v. University of Saint Thomas
This text of Vandenberg v. University of Saint Thomas (Vandenberg v. University of Saint Thomas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT July 16, 2020 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS David J. Bradley, Clerk HOUSTON DIVISION
KELLY VANDENBERG, § § Plaintiff, § VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:18-CV-379 § UNIVERSITY OF SAINT THOMAS; aka § UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS § (HOUSTON), § § Defendants. §
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant University of St. Thomas’s Motion to Compel. Dkt. 85. After reviewing the motion, response, reply, all relevant submissions, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motion should be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. I. Background Plaintiff Kelly Vandenberg asserts that St. Thomas unlawfully terminated and retaliated against her based on her race. St. Thomas moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 30. In response, Vandenberg submitted the affidavit of her former colleague, Pamela Love (née Hodges), who attested that she also experienced racial discrimination by her former employer, St. Thomas. Dkt. 68-5. St. Thomas had previously served discovery requests on Vandenberg for her communications with Love, to which Vandenberg objected. After summary judgment briefing, the parties submitted a joint discovery letter outlining the dispute, and the Court ordered further briefing. Dkt. 79. St. Thomas now asks the Court to compel Vandenberg to produce “unredacted copies of any documents and communications with Love regarding: (1) Vandenberg’s allegations in this lawsuit, (2) Love’s declaration, and (3) Love’s EEOC charge.” Dkt. 85 at 1. The Court ordered
Vandenberg to submit the withheld documents for in camera review (Dkt. 93), which Vandenberg did (see Dkt. 94), and the Court has reviewed the documents. II. Applicable Legal Standards a. Attorney-Client Privilege Attorney-client privilege protects only those disclosures necessary to obtain
informed legal advice which might not have been made absent the privilege. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). Only communications made “for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding” are privileged. United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1167 (5th Cir. 1985).
b. Work-Product Doctrine The work product doctrine exists to promote the adversary system by enabling attorneys to prepare cases without fear that their work product will be used against their clients. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947). The privilege extends qualified immunity to 1) “documents and tangible things,” 2) “prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial,” 3) “by or for another party or by or for that other party’s representative.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see also United States v. Noble, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975). The work product immunity is “qualified” because material prepared in anticipation of litigation is nonetheless discoverable if the requesting party establishes that it has a substantial need for information and that it cannot obtain substantially equivalent information from other sources without undue hardship. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). III. Analysis
a. Vandenberg’s communications with Love are not privileged. Vandenberg asserts that, under the “common legal interest” doctrine, the attorney- client privilege protects her communications with Love. The Fifth Circuit has held that only “two types of communications” are protected under the common legal interest privilege: “(1) communications between co-defendants
in actual litigation and their counsel,” and “(2) communications between potential co- defendants and their counsel.” In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). The Fifth Circuit “has not expressly held that the privilege is inapplicable to co-plaintiffs.” BCR Safeguard Holding, L.L.C. v. Morgan Stanley Real Estate Advisor, Inc., 614 F. App’x 690, 703 (5th Cir. 2015). However,
“[c]ommunications may be protected by the common legal interest privilege only if those communications ‘further a joint or common interest.’” Id. (emphasis in original). Regardless whether the Fifth Circuit recognizes a common legal interest privilege applicable to co-plaintiffs, the Court finds that Vandenberg’s text messages with Love are not privileged because they do not further a joint or common interest. Having reviewed
the text messages in camera, the Court finds that these text messages do not indicate that the parties communicated with each other at the direction of counsel or for a clear litigation-related objective. They appear to be the social conversation of two friends keeping each other updated about life developments, which happened to include their legal action against St. Thomas. Cf. United States v. Krug, 868 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Ultimately, what is vital to the privilege is that the communication be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer.” (internal
quotations, brackets, and emphases omitted)). The Court finds that the privilege does not extend so far as to encompass such communications between two plaintiffs merely because they are suing the same defendant. Vandenberg’s objections to requests for production that seek these documents are OVERRULED. As to these communications, St. Thomas’s motion to compel is
GRANTED. b. Emails between Vandenberg’s counsel and Love are protected from disclosure. Vandenberg’s counsel exchanged emails with Love concerning (1) prospective legal representation in Love’s lawsuit and (2) Love’s testimony in this case. Having reviewed the emails in camera, the Court finds that the attorney-client privilege was properly asserted as to the first category of emails because these communications were made to secure legal services or assistance in legal proceedings. See, e.g., Harrelson, 754 F.2d at 1167.
The Court also finds that the second category of emails, about Love’s testimony, are protected by the work-product doctrine because they contain the “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). St. Thomas asserts that even documents protected by the work product doctrine should be produced because St. Thomas has substantial need for the materials and cannot obtain the materials by other means without undue hardship. St. Thomas argues that substantial need arises because Vandenberg seeks to support her claims by introducing Love’s allegations, and that obtaining the documents by other means is unduly difficult
because it would require St. Thomas to conduct discovery on two witnesses. The Court finds that St. Thomas has not identified a need for the documents substantial enough to override the work product protection, and that St. Thomas could obtain the discovery sought by other means without hardship burdensome enough to override work product protection. King v. Odeco Inc., 106 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court
decision not to order party to produce photographs because of other readily available sources, including deposition testimony).
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