OlabKSON, J.
This action was before this Court on appeal by plaintiff from a demurrer filed by defendant and sustained by the court below. This Court reversed the court below and held that the demurrer should have been overruled.
Van Kempen v. Latham,
195 N.
C.,
389. In that case, at p. 394, is the following: “Ordinarily a receiver cannot maintain an action in another jurisdiction. As a rule, they have no extra territorial jurisdiction. But the weight of authority is to the effect that the privilege may be granted as a courtesy, not as an obligation- — by way of comity — and then only when it will not work a detriment to'the citizen of the state in which the jurisdiction is sought. In the progress of the age, the rapid transit and quick means of the intercommunication have brought the states of the union and the nations of the earth in closer alliance than ever before. Commerce is extended to every part of the globe — commercial paper travels with commerce. The present action is based on negotiable notes admitted by the demurrer to be due and unpaid and executed by defendant’s testator. The demurrer is founded solely on the ground that a receiver appointed in a court of a foreign nation should not be allowed to sue in this jurisdiction, although the receiver alleges ownership of the notes due and owing, permission granted to sue, order in the foreign court giving authority and' direction to bring this suit, and on trial would have to produce the notes in this jurisdiction. We must be friendly with other states and nations if we want other states and nations to be friendly with us. On the facts and circumstances of this case, we think the complaint states a cause of action.” Textwriters and decisions are cited by this Court in that opinion, to sustain the position in overruling the demurrer.
On this appeal it seems as if there is a repetition of the position heretofore taken by defendant, that a foreign receiver could not sue in this jurisdiction. For example, in defendant’s brief we find cited to sustain his contentions, the Federal case of
Moore v. Mitchell,
281 U. S., 18. In that case, we find the following, at p. 24: “He is the mere arm of the state for the collection of taxes for some of its subdivisions and has no better standing to bring suits in courts outside Indiana than have executors, administrators, or chancery receivers without title, appointed under the laws and by the courts of that state. It is well understood that they are without authority, in their official capacity, to sue as of right in the Federal courts in other states.” 65 A. L. R., 1354, see anno.
“In
Converse v. Hamilton
(1911), 224 U. S., 243, 56 L. Ed., 749; Am. Cases, 1913D, 1292), tbe Supreme Court of the United States has reviewed
Booth v. Clark,
and a receiver of a Minnesota corporation was allowed to sue in the courts of another state to recover the double liability imposed by the laws of Minnesota, the Court saying: ‘While an ordinary chancery receiver cannot exercise his powers in jurisdictions other than that of the court appointing him, except by comity, one who is a gwasi-assignee and invested with the rights of his
cestui que trustent
may sue in other jurisdictions, and his right to do so is protected by the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution.” 1 Clark on Receivers, 2d ed., chap, 19, sec. 591(f), at p. 811.
It will be noted that defendant cites and discusses the jurisdiction of the United States courts, and relies on the
Moore case, supra,
which is a suit involving a revenue law of another state. Our former decision in this case was based upon comity between foreign nations and different states of the Union. Conceding that the United States courts do not allow or permit a receiver in another jurisdiction, as a matter of comity, to sue for a debt, yet the Federal Court has no control over the state courts in a matter of this kind. The decisions are merely persuasive.
Van Kempen v. Latham,
195 N. C., at p. 393; 23 R. C. L., part sec. 151-2, at p. 142-3.
The whole matter is well stated in Tardy’s Smith on Receivers, Yol. 2, p. 1924: “The general principles involved in the question of the extent of the right of a receiver to sue or assert rights in respect to the receivership property outside of the jurisdiction of his appointment have been a source of controversy for many years. . . . (p. 1925) The international effect to be given to transfers of property by operation of law through the instrumentality of assignees and receivers, and the extra-territorial operation of the title of such officers as established in England, and other foreign countries, is based upon the broad and constantly growing system of international comity, and recognition of the fact that on account of the quickness of transportation of every character, freedom of business relations and easy transference of property rights should be fostered both among states and nations. Following the line of decisions of the earlier English courts upon the subject the courts in the American colonies prior to the Revolution, and many of the state and United States courts since that period, established the doctrine that an assignee or receiver’s title to personal property extended only to such property of the debtor as had a
situs
within the state of the assignee or receiver’s appointment, and that beyond the state line he had no title or right of possession, or at least such as the court would enforce. As a corollary of this doctrine it was held that a
foreign receiver could not sue or defend and bad no standing in a court of foreign jurisdiction. While some of the features of the earlier doctrine are still recognized and enforced in some of the American courts upon the principle of
stare decisis,
yet the modern doctrine as to the receiver’s rights to sue in a foreign jurisdiction, and reduce to possession the assets of his principal, or recover his choses in action is well established by the great weight of authority as well as by reason, though there are still some limitations that will be noticed hereafter. Courts of this country have recognized the justice and cogent reasoning of the modern English courts and jurists and have sought to break away from the doctrine of tire Court in
Booth v. Clark
(17 How., 322, 58 U. S., 15 L. Ed., 164), which, though not the earliest, yet has been regarded as the leading case upon the subject, sometimes by compelling the debtor to make a formal transfer of his property to the receiver and thus vesting in him the absolute legal title by act of the parties which is recognized and enforced in all jurisdictions. Sometimes the same end has been accomplished by the establishment of a species of interstate comity, by which the judgment, and decrees of other states, and the rights and powers of receivers thereunder have been given an extraterritorial virtue and force, and the right of the receiver to sue and enforce his property rights in a foreign jurisdiction recognized and respected.”
Minor, Conflict of Laws (1901), part sec. 118, p. 266: “A receiver, strictly speaking, has no more right to sue in a foreign state than to do any other act. But if a suit instituted by a foreign receiver will not work a detriment or an injustice to the citizens of the forum, he will generally, upon principles of comity, be permitted to appeal to its courts.”
Goodrich on Conflict of Laws (1927), p. 442-3: “There is a considerable body of authority, however, which allows suit to be brought locally by a foreign receiver, even though he is not a statutory successor or gwasi-assignee as described above. Allowing him to sue is frequently called an instance of comity.”
“The appointment of a receiver in a court of another state will have no extra-territorial effect, and he can have no recognition in another state, except by comity. Where a receiver was appointed for a foreign corporation in a court of the state where it was created, he may be allowed to become a party to litigation in this State by comity, and not as a right, and this will not be allowed where it would injuriously affect the rights of citizens of this State. But, when such receiver is allowed to come in and sue, his authority should be shown by a duly certified copy of his appointment; and it is said to be a better rule
to have a receiver appointed regularly in the courts here.” N. 0. Prac. & Proc. (McIntosh), sec. .898, p. 1014.
In
Berger v. Stevens,
197 N. C., at p. 235-6: “The major contest of defendants is founded on the allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff is a non'resident alien and is living* in Nice, in the Eepublie of France. The question arises: can a nonresident alien sue in the courts of this State? We think a resident of any friendly nation can sue. In 1796 the question arose in this jurisdiction and an English subject was allowed to sue. In a
Per Curiam
opinion, in
Executors of Cruden v. Neale,
2 N. C., at p. 344, the following observations are made: ‘All persons in general, as well foreigners as citizens, may come into this Court to recover rights withheld, and to obtain satisfaction for injuries done, unless where they are subject to some disability the law imposes. Foreigners are in general entitled to sue, unless a war exists between our country and theirs. . . . It is incompatible with a state of national friendship, and is a cause of war, if the citizens of another country are not allowed to sue for and obtain redress of wrongs in .our courts.’ ”
We
reiterate the position laid down in the former opinion in this case and cite additional authorities, as the defendant again so earnestly argued against the position taken by this Court in the
Van Kempen case, supra. We
are mindful of the Eule 44 and decisions thereunder that there cannot be a rehearing by means of a second appeal. 200 N. C., p. 839-40.
The sole material question on this appeal is whether the three-year statute, C. S., 441(1), is applicable, which defendant sets up in the answer? We think not.
The notes, the subject of this controversy, were dated New Orleans, La., 5 August, 1919, (1) $5,000, due 5 August, 1921; (2) $25,000, due 5 August, 1922, signed by E. W. Eosenthal and E. B. Hackburn. They are negotiable notes.
On 11 December, 1923, J. C. Yan Hempen, receiver of the estate of H. H. Blijdenstein, brought an action against defendant, J. E. Latham, trustee for E. B. Hackburn, deceased, on these two negotiable notes. Summons was served on defendant 12 December, 1923, and complaint duly filed. The action was on the two notes above set forth. “Wherefore, the plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant, J. E. Latham as trustee, of E. B. Hackburn, deceased, and J. E. Latham, executor of the estate of E. B. Hackburn for the sum of $30,000, with interest on the said $30,000 from 5 August, 1919; at 4 per cent; for the cost of this action, and for such other and further relief as the plaintiff may be entitled to.”
A judgment of voluntary nonsuit at May Term, 1926, was entered. On 13 April, 1927 (service 16 April, 1927), witbin a year after tbe nonsuit, tbis action was instituted and complaint filed for tbe recovery on said two notes of $30,000, and interest. “When tbe plaintiff elects to abandon bis action for any cause, except tbe ruling 'of tbe court against bim, it is a voluntary nonsuit, and be may commence another action, but be has
no right of
appeal.” N. C. Prac. & Proc.,
supra,
sec. 627, p. 700; C. S., 415;
Merrick v. Bedford,
141 N. C., 504;
Midkiff v. Ins. Co.,
198 N. C., 568;
Davis v. R. R.,
200 N. C., 345. Tbe record discloses after a voluntary nonsuit a petition filed by plaintiff setting forth in detail tbe history of tbe two notes mentioned above, beaded “Petition of J. C. Yan Kempen, receiver of estate of II. H. Blijdenstein to sue in Superior Court of Craven County.”
On 13 October, 1926, Judge N. A. Sinclair, presiding in tbe Superior Court of Craven County, found tbe following facts: “It appearing to tbe undersigned judge of tbe Superior Court riding tbe courts of tbe Fifth Judicial District, and tbe court finding as a fact that on 10 December, 1923, there was duly instituted in tbe Superior Court of Craven County tbe suit entitled J. C. Yan Kempen, receiver of tbe estate of H. H. Blijdenstein v. J. E. Latham, trustee of E. B. Hack-burn and J. E. Latham, executor of estate of E. B. Hackburn, deceased, defendants, and tbe court further finding that a voluntary judgment of nonsuit was entered in tbe said action, and the court further finding as a fact that tbis petition to sue by tbe plaintiff against tbe same defendants was made witbin one year from tbe entering of judgment of nonsuit in said original action, and it further appearing to tbe court that a cause of action exists in favor of-J. O. Yan Kempen, receiver of the estate of H. H. Blijdenstein v. J. E. Latham, trustee of E. B. Hackburn and J. E. Latham, executor of estate of E. B. Hackburn, deceased.” An order was made allowing and j^ei'ndtfcuig jdaintiff to bring tbis present action.
Tbe final decree in tbe Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, filed 19 April, 1921, contained tbe following: “It appearing unto tbis Court that tbe plaintiff, J. 0. Yan Kempen, is tbe receiver of tbe estate of H. H. Blijdenstein, duly appointed and acting pursuant to tbe order of the District Court of Amsterdam, tbe Netherlands; . . . That there is now held by tbe Alien Property Custodian tbe following money and other property: . . . Note made by Edward
W.
Rosenthal and E. B. Hackburn jointly for $5,000, due 5 August, 1921. Note made by Edward W. Rosenthal and E. B. Hackburn jointly for $25,000, due 5 August, 1922. It is therefore, adjudged, ordered and decreed that Thomas
~W.
Miller, as Alien Property Custodian, do forthwith convey,
transfer, assign, deliver and/or pay to J. 0. Van Hempen, receiver of tbe estate of H. H. Blijdenstein, tbe money and other property heretofore specified as held by him as Alien Property Custodian.”
These notes were negotiable and were duly endorsed and in the possession of plaintiff at all times and at the time the first suit in this action was instituted. The court order was to “convey, transfer, assign, deliver and/or pay to,” etc. We think that under the facts and circumstances of this case that plaintiff in the first suit was entitled to sue. Taking a voluntary nonsuit, and getting permission to sue in the second action was mere surplusage, and this action is not barred by the three-year statute of limitations.
“The time is extended because the new action is considered as a continuation of the former action, and they must' be substantially the same, involving the same parties, the same cause of action, and the same right; and this must appear from the record in the case, .and cannot be shown by oral testimony.” N. C. Prac. & Proc.,
supra,
part sec. 126, p. 119;
Young v. R. R.,
189 N. C., 238;
McLeod v. McNeill,
195 N. C., at p. 423.
The question arises: Can a receiver sue for the recovery of a money judgment on negotiable notes as in this case and under the assignment to plaintiff, without obtaining special authority from the court? We think so. We find in the case of
Weill v. Bank,
106 N. C., at p. 10: “While the court may exercise very great control over the receiver, and may direct, in appropriate cases that he shall or shall not do particular things, yet, ordinarily, when he is invested with full power as a receiver, he will have authority to bring appropriate necessary actions without special leave or direction of the court.”
In
Battle v. Davis,
66 N. C., at p. 256, it is written: “A receiver cannot commence any action for the recovery of outstanding property without an order of the court and when such order is made the action must be brought in the name of the legal owner and he will be compelled to allow the use of his name upon being properly indemnified out of the estate and effects, under the control of the court. 3 Dan’l Ch. Pr., 1971, 1991.” See High on Eeceivers, 3d ed., see. 208. Note at p. 184,
"Battle v. Davis,
66 N. C., 252. But see
Gray v. Lewis,
94 N. C., 392. And in
Weill v. Bank,
106 N. C., 1, it is held under the provisions of the Code of Procedure that a receiver in aid of judgment creditors, upon proceedings supplemental to execution, might sue to recover property of the debtor without leave of court.”
“It has been stated as a general rule that a receiver should obtain leave of court before bringing any action. As explaining the former practice, the Court says:
‘A
receiver cannot commence any action
for- the recovery of outstanding property without an order of court, and when such order is made the action must be brought in the name of the legal owner, and he will be compelled to allow the use of his name, upon being properly indemnified out of the estate and effects under the control of the court.’ The rule is different now, depending upon the general powers conferred in the order of appointment, or in the statute under which the order is made. While the court may limit the powers, yet, when the receiver is invested with full power as a receiver, he may sue without special leave of court; and under the statutes regulating receivers, in the case of banks and other corporations, he is expressly authorized to sue. Under the present practice, where there is no distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, a receiver authorized to sue may sue in his own name or in the name of the person or corporation represented.” N. C. Prac. & Proe.,
supra,
part sec. 894, at p. 1010.
In the appointment of a receiver, unless specially limited, ordinarily the presumption is that he is invested with full power as receiver and thus may sue without special leave of court. The allegation in the original complaint so indicates. ✓
The present case is distinguishable from the
Battle case, supra.
The negotiable notes here were transferred, assigned and delivered to plaintiff under the court order, but in the
Battle case
the note was not transferred. Plaintiff was the assignee, but under the general power, the receiver
ex mero motu
had the authority to sue without “special leave or direction of the Court.” This seems to be the sensible holding and permissible. It may be before a court order could be obtained the receiver may lose valuable rights, which quick action would save. See Norton on Bills and Notes (4th ed.), p. 279-280.
Thompson v. Osborne,
152 N. C., 408;
Bank v. Rochamora,
193 N. C., 1; C. S., 446;
Martin v. Mask,
158 N. C., 436;
Sheppard, v. Jackson,
198 N. C., 627. We see no good reason, under the facts and circumstances of this case, why by comity plaintiff, a foreign receiver, cannot also sue, and it was not necessary for plaintiff to have taken a voluntary nonsuit and thereafter obtained an order to sue. Even the permission could have been allowed in the original action.
S. v. Scott,
182 N. C., 865. The statute of limitation is not applicable. In
May v. Menzies,
186 N. C., at p. 144, we find: “Merchants, in trading with each other, should know their rights and responsibilities. Settled law often has the effect of making people certain .and careful in their dealings. Honesty in dealing with each other at home, with those of other states, and with the nations of the earth, is the golden cord to bind us together. Good faith — keeping of contracts.”
Defendant does not deny the debt, or tbat it is an bonest one. For years plaintiff bas attempted to collect these notes, and bas been baffled by technical defenses. "We think the charge of the court below correct. For the reasons given, in the judgment of the court below we find
No error.