Vallie v. General Insurance Co. of America

Wisconsin Supreme Court

Vallie v. General Insurance Co. of America

117 N.W.2d 703, 17 Wis. 2d 522

CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

DecidedOctober 30, 1962

StatusPublished

Cited by17 cases

This text of 117 N.W.2d 703 (Vallie v. General Insurance Co. of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Vallie v. General Insurance Co. of America, 117 N.W.2d 703, 17 Wis. 2d 522 (Wis. 1962).

Pincite

Opinion

Gordon, J.

This is another in that all-too-frequent line of cases in which precious little is known as to what actually happened. Four of the five people who were in the two cars perished directly. The fifth, the plaintiff, did not see the crash.

The jury chose to believe Mr. La Vallie’s version of what took place before the collision. His testimony, coupled with the physical facts, contains at least the minimum credible evidence to sustain the verdict. Mr. La Vallie testified that he saw an automobile about 600 feet to the rear at the moment that he struck a bump in the road and started to skid; he then gradually reduced his speed from 35 miles per hour to 10 miles per hour. He traveled a total of about 250 feet from the time he hit the bump until the crash. This, he said, took between ten and fifteen seconds.

The jury exculpated Mr. La Vallie from negligence, presumably because they accepted his testimony regarding his modest speed and further because they believed that his loss of control was not caused by his own negligence. There was corroboration of his testimony as to both the existence of the bump on the highway and as to the icy road conditions. The jury’s finding as to Mr. La Vallie’s being free from negligence is supported by credible evidence.

The appellants urge that we must attribute some negligence to Mr. La Vallie for his violation of sec. 346.05 (1), *527 Stats., requiring one to drive on the right half of the roadway, and also for his violation of sec. 346.34 (1), proscribing a change of direct course upon a roadway unless it can be done safely.

The jury expressly found that Mr. La Vallie was not negligent as to his position on the roadway. The jury was properly instructed on the emergency doctrine. Their answer on this part of the verdict must be sustained, and this disposes of the alleged violation of sec. 346.05 (1), Stats. Also, the emergency doctrine would excuse any alleged violation of sec. 346.34 (1), since the change of direct course occurred at a time when the La Vallie car was out of control through no fault of the driver.

Can the finding of negligence on the part of the deceased Mr. Rudenberg be supported? As previously noted, no survivor or other witness actually saw the collision. -. Mr. La Vallie testified that he observed an automobile 600 feet to the rear at the time the car he was driving went into its skid. We know that the Rudenberg car and the La Vallie car collided with great force in the northbound lane, with the front part of the Rudenberg car meeting the right side of the La Vallie car.

While Mr. La Vallie’s observation to the rear was only a glance, the jury was entitled to accept his testimony in this regard as a verity. Mr. La Vallie did not attempt to attribute any given rate of speed to the car at his rear, but the jury was warranted in considering its earlier location in relation to the time and place of the impact in resolving the issue of speed.

Furthermore, the physical facts tend to support the finding of speed. Photographs of the two vehicles were before the jury; we consider that these pictures could very properly have been cogent proof that the Rudenberg car was going at a speed excessive under the existing road conditions. Photographs reflecting the severity of the impact are reproduced with this opinion.

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