Valley Motor, Inc. v. Almberg

Nevada Supreme Court

Valley Motor, Inc. v. Almberg

792 P.2d 1131, 106 Nev. 338, 1990 Nev. LEXIS 60

CourtNevada Supreme Court

DecidedMay 30, 1990

Docket19907

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 792 P.2d 1131 (Valley Motor, Inc. v. Almberg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Valley Motor, Inc. v. Almberg, 792 P.2d 1131, 106 Nev. 338, 1990 Nev. LEXIS 60 (Neb. 1990).

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Opinions

[339]*339OPINION

By the Court,

Young, C. J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court permanently enjoining appellants from placing “‘trailers,’ also known as ‘mobile homes,’ also known as ‘manufactured homes’” in a subdivision in the City of Ely commonly known as Mountain View Subdivision, Units 1 and 2 (hereafter “Mountain View”).

The district court judgment was based upon a restrictive covenant applicable to Mountain View which provides that:

7. TEMPORARY STRUCTURES. No structure of a temporary character, trailer, basement, tent, shack, garage, barn, or other outbuilding shall be used on any lot as a residence at any time.

The district court alternatively ruled that the term “trailer” unambiguously included appellants’ manufactured homes, and that assuming the term “trailer” was ambiguous, the drafters of the covenant intended the term to include appellants’ manufactured homes.

At trial, conflicting evidence was presented on the issue of whether the drafters of covenant seven intended the term “trailer” to include appellants’ homes. The district court found that the drafters did intend such a construction. The district court’s finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence and will not be disturbed on appeal. NRCP 52(a); Sutherland v. Gross, 105 Nev. 192, 772 P.2d 1287, 1289-90 (1989).

This court has previously held that restrictive covenants will be enforced as long as the original purpose of the covenants can still be accomplished and substantial benefit will inure to the restricted area. Tompkins v. Buttrum Constr. Co., 99 Nev. 142, 145-46, 659 P.2d 865, 867 (1983). The evidence produced at trial supports respondents’ contention that enforcement of covenant seven will maintain the exclusive character of Mountain View and facilitate the resale of respondents’ homes. Therefore, the restrictive covenant should be enforced.

Because we hold that the district court’s second basis for [340]*340granting the permanent injunction is sound, we need not address appellants’ remaining contentions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Steffen and Mowbray, JJ., concur.

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[339]*339OPINION

By the Court,

Young, C. J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court permanently enjoining appellants from placing “‘trailers,’ also known as ‘mobile homes,’ also known as ‘manufactured homes’” in a subdivision in the City of Ely commonly known as Mountain View Subdivision, Units 1 and 2 (hereafter “Mountain View”).

The district court judgment was based upon a restrictive covenant applicable to Mountain View which provides that:

7. TEMPORARY STRUCTURES. No structure of a temporary character, trailer, basement, tent, shack, garage, barn, or other outbuilding shall be used on any lot as a residence at any time.

The district court alternatively ruled that the term “trailer” unambiguously included appellants’ manufactured homes, and that assuming the term “trailer” was ambiguous, the drafters of the covenant intended the term to include appellants’ manufactured homes.

At trial, conflicting evidence was presented on the issue of whether the drafters of covenant seven intended the term “trailer” to include appellants’ homes. The district court found that the drafters did intend such a construction. The district court’s finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence and will not be disturbed on appeal. NRCP 52(a); Sutherland v. Gross, 105 Nev. 192, 772 P.2d 1287, 1289-90 (1989).

This court has previously held that restrictive covenants will be enforced as long as the original purpose of the covenants can still be accomplished and substantial benefit will inure to the restricted area. Tompkins v. Buttrum Constr. Co., 99 Nev. 142, 145-46, 659 P.2d 865, 867 (1983). The evidence produced at trial supports respondents’ contention that enforcement of covenant seven will maintain the exclusive character of Mountain View and facilitate the resale of respondents’ homes. Therefore, the restrictive covenant should be enforced.

Because we hold that the district court’s second basis for [340]*340granting the permanent injunction is sound, we need not address appellants’ remaining contentions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Steffen and Mowbray, JJ., concur.

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792 P.2d 1131, 106 Nev. 338, 1990 Nev. LEXIS 60, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/valley-motor-inc-v-almberg-nev-1990.

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